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INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty years American divorce law has gone
through a period of dramatic change. No-fault divorce swept the
nation, bringing in its wake far-reaching changes in the rules
that govern the allocation of a couple's income and property. In
the first wave of reform, most states enacted laws that deem-
phasized alimony, the traditional entitlement of a divorced wife,
and instead emphasized property distribution as a means of allo-
cating marital wealth and spousal needs. Among property alloca-
tion schemes, most states adopted some form of "equitable"
property distribution, a system that permits judges to distribute
marital property in accordance with their perceptions of the eq-
uities of the particular case.
While changes in divorce grounds were largely motivated by
the desire to conform the law to existing practice and reduce the
level of acrimony in divorce proceedings,' changes in the rules
1 Although divorce laws of this era required a showing of marital fault as a precondi-
tion to obtaining a divorce, spouses frequently colluded to fabricate grounds. See Rich-
ard H. Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CORNULL LQ. 303 (1950); Note, Collu-
sive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36 CoLuW& L. Rzv. 1121
(1936). For historical accounts describing the policy reasons for no-fault divorce reforms,
see HERBERT JACOB, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 66-69 (1988); Herma H. Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective
on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CiN. L REv. 1, 4-14 (1985); Lynn D. War-
dle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 79, 91-97. For a
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governing alimony and property division were also motivated by
a desire to improve the position of divorced wives. The old rules,
reformers urged, failed to comport with the modern view of mar-
riage as an economic partnership of equals: the myth of alimony
as an entitlement had obscured the fact that it was rarely
awarded 2 and even less frequently paid, while title-based prop-
erty rules had caused women to get less than their fair share of
marital assets.'
This first wave of divorce reform is now the subject of a new
reform movement. Critics claim that, rather than helping di-
vorced women, the reforms have hurt them.4 They argue that
too few women are receiving alimony, in inadequate amounts,
and for inadequate periods of time. Moreover, they claim, "equi-
table" property distribution is in practice inequitable to di-
vorced wives. Property awards are said to be arbitrary and un-
predictable, with the result that many women do not receive
their fair share of marital assets. Equal distribution of marital
assets, some contend, should replace equitable asset distribution.
While recent research reports have established that modest
declines in the likelihood of receiving alimony and major de-
clines in the permanence of those awards have indeed occurred
following no-fault divorce reforms in some states,5 information
regarding equitable property distribution is still scanty. Infor-
mation regarding the interplay between alimony and property
distribution is scantier still. Have women typically been getting
more, or less, property than men? What factors, if any, predict a
large or small award? Is a large property award typically corre-
lated with a small or nonexistent alimony award, or vice versa?
comparative perspective on no-fault divorce reform, see MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION
AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES, EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987).
2 See notes 27-29 infra.
' See note 27 and accompanying text infra.
4 One prominent critic has argued that the major result of the divorce law revolu-
tion "is the systematic impoverishment of divorced women and their children." LENORE
J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA XiV (1985). For other representative criti-
cism, see, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 63-144; Martha L. Fineman, Implementing
Equality: Ideology, Contradiction, and Social Change, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 789; Herma H.
Kay, An Appraisal of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987);
Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Re-
forms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS
191 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) [hereinafter CROSSROADS].
' For a description of the research, see notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
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To what extent have the observed changes resulted from
changes in the grounds for divorce or in the rules governing fi-
nancial entitlements? Definitive answers to such questions have
been unavailable.
We need these answers. As a result of a substantial rise in
the divorce rate during the 1960s and 1970s,e more families are
affected by divorce law. Almost half of current American mar-
riages are now expected to end in divorce, and every year more
than a million do.8 The distribution of property and income that
is made when divorce occurs will inevitably determine the eco-
nomic well-being of individuals in these families over the short
term and, for some divorcing couples, will have a major impact
on their financial status for years to come. Moreover, women
and children in households headed by women are the most rap-
idly growing segment of the poor." The extent to which the new
rules have exacerbated this trend, and to which changed rules
can ameliorate it, are urgent issues.
This report describes empirical research I have conducted
on divorce in New York and the answers it provides to these
important questions. Part I provides some historical background
on the origin of the alimony and property rules that are now the
subject of controversy. Part H describes my research findings on
how the adoption of a new law that retained a largely fault-
based system of divorce grounds, while instituting equitable
property distribution and authorizing rehabilitative alimony, af-
8 Between 1960 and 1978 the divorce rate climbed from 23 to 90 per 1000 married
persons. SAR A. LEvrrAN & RICHARD S. B-Lous. WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THE AMRIcAN
FAMILY 28-29 (1981). See also ANDREW J. CHERLIN. MARRIAGE. DIVORCE. REMARRIAGE- 26-
27 (1981). During the 1980s, however, the divorce rate appears to have leveled off. See
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITD
STATES: 1990 86 (Table 126) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (showing slight decline
in divorce rate between 1981 and 1986).
7 Samuel H. Preston, Estimating the Proportion of American Marriages that End
in Divorce, 3 Soc. METHODS & RES. 435, 457 (1975).
8 Id. See also HUGH CARTER & PAUL C. GLICK. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A SOCIAL ANm
EcoNoMIC STUDY 394 (rev. ed. 1976).
9 In 1987 female-headed families accounted for 52 % of Americans living below the
poverty line. See US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES'
1987 28-29 (1988) (Table 16). While female-headed families accounted for only about
21% of all families with children, they represented 60% of all such families that fell
below the poverty line. Id. at 36-37 (Table 19).
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fected divorce outcomes.10 Part III discusses the policy implica-
tions of the research findings and makes proposals for legislative
change.
I. ALIMONY AND PROPERTY DIVISION RULES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE
A. The Development of the Alimony Entitlement
The alimony concept derives from the practices of English
ecclesiastical courts. These courts were only empowered to
award divorces from bed and board, which authorized husband
and wife to live separately but did not dissolve the marriage
bond; when they required the husband to pay alimony they were
simply requiring him to continue to fulfill his marital support
obligation.11 Such a remedy was not available in every case, how-
ever. A divorce from bed and board was only available upon a
showing that one spouse was guilty of adultery, cruelty, or other
proscribed offenses. 12 Even the wife who had established such
grounds might not obtain alimony if her husband had not prof-
ited from property she had brought into the marriage.13 The
early alimony entitlement thus appears to have rested primarily
on a theory of unjust enrichment.
When nineteenth century American legislatures enacted
laws providing for absolute divorce,1 4 they adopted the alimony
concept and, like the ecclesiastical courts, restricted its availabil-
ity to wives who were not at fault in causing the dissolution of
the marriage. Wives had a continuing entitlement to marital
" At the time of the reform, divorce was available on any of four fault-based
grounds: abandonment for one or more years, cruel and inhuman treatment that "so
endangers the physical or mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or im-
proper for the plaintiff to cohabit with the defendant," confinement of the defendant in
prison for three or more years, and adultery. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney
1988). The only basis for a divorce apart from the fault grounds was a one year separa-
tion either pursuant to a judgment of separation (which itself required establishing one
of the grounds for divorce or showing nonsupport) or pursuant to a written separation
agreement resolving issues of custody and financial obligation. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
170(5)-(6) (McKinney 1988). The same grounds remain in effect today.
" For a description of the practices of the English ecclesiastical courts, see JOHN
EEKELAAR & MAVIS MACLEAN, MAINTENANCE AFTER DIVORCE 4-8 (1986).
12 Id. at 5-6.
" Id. at 6 (citing POYNTER, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 259 (1824)).
" For historical accounts of the development of American divorce law, see LAW-
RENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-84, 430-40 (1973); LYNNE C.
HALEM, DIVORCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES (1980).
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support, it was believed, only if the husband was the guilty
spouse. 5
When a wife was awarded alimony during this period, she
was entitled to support until her death or remarriage.16 In deter-
mining the size of the award, courts looked primarily to the
wife's needs and the husband's station in life. These were not,
however, the only factors considered. The degree of fault exhib-
ited by the husband was also taken into account, as well as any
financial contribution the wife may have made to the marriage.
Thus need, status, fault, and contribution to the marital estate
each played a role in determining the alimony award.
B. Equitable Property Distribution: A Remedy For Inade-
quate Alimony
While the alimony entitlement theoretically offered ample
economic protection to the "blameless" divorced woman, in real-
ity it often failed to do economic justice even for women in this
group. Sometimes, for example, a husband was simply unable to
pay alimony that adequately compensated a wife for property
she had brought into the marriage. In such cases of obvious in-
justice courts sometimes looked beyond title "to unscramble the
ownership of property, giving to each spouse what... [was] eq-
uitably his."' 8 As time went by, some courts began to employ
property distribution for broader remedial purposes and gave a
wife property that she had not brought into the marriage to
make up for a husband's inability or unwillingness to pay ade-
quate alimony. In making such awards, courts typically looked
to the same factors-need, the marital standard of living, contri-
bution, and fault-that they utilized in setting an alimony
award. From this beginning the modern concept of equitable
property distribution developed.19
15 For a discussion of the history and development of the alimony concept in Ameri-
can law, see HomR H. CL.muc LAW OF DOmSTIC RELATONs 420-27 (1st ed. 1988) [herein-
after CLARK. (1st ed.)].
"See Hoism H. CLARK. LAW OF Domsc RFLA77oNs 650 (2d ed. 1987).
17 For a discussion of the factors traditionally governing alimony awards, see CLA
(1st ed.), supra note 15, at 441-47.
,8 Id. at 450. See also JACOB, supra note 1, at 111-13.
" The first state to adopt equitable distribution legislation was apparently Kansas,
which in 1889 enacted a statute providing for the "just and reasonable" division of prop-
erty "acquired by the parties jointly during their marriage." Section 4756, 1889 Kan.
Sess. Laws 1568, reprinted in Elizabeth A. Cheadle, Comment, The Development of
1991]
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The concept of equitable distribution was a departure from
common law principles in that it permitted a judge to ignore le-
gal title to the property. In this sense equitable distribution is
similar to community property,2 0 under which a spouse without
legal title also has rights to marital property. Unlike a commu-
nity property scheme, however, equitable property distribution
applied only at divorce; in an intact marriage, legal title pre-
vailed.2 Equitable distribution also aimed at individualized
property distribution, based on the equities of the particular
case, whereas the traditional community property rules gave
each spouse an equal share of marital property.
22
C. The Shift to Equitable Property Distribution and Its
Rationale
In the first half of the twentieth century equitable property
distribution gained acceptance in an increasing number of
states. But alimony was still viewed as a divorced wife's primary
economic entitlement; property distribution typically played a
limited ancillary role.23
Sharing Principles in Common Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1269,
1295 (1981). By 1928 there were some twenty-two states that gave judges discretionary
power in regard to property division at divorce. See Harriet S. Daggett, Division of Prop-
erty Upon Dissolution of Marriage, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1939, at 225, 227
(citing 2 VERNIER. AMERICAN FAMILY LAW SupP. 60 (1938 Supp.)).
20 For an overview of community property, see WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J.
VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); ROBERT L. MENNELL &
THOMAS M. BOYKOFF, COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1988). American states that utilize commu-
nity property principles are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington. MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra, at 2, 13-17. The Uniform Marital
Property Act, adopted in part by the state of Wisconsin, also rests in large part on com-
munity property principles. See UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, Prefatory Note, 9A
U.L.A. 97 (1987).
21 See CLARK, (1st ed.), supra note 15, at 590-91.
22 The civil law community property system, from which American community
property principles are derived, required an equal division of community assets. See
MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra note 20, at 6-9; Stephen J. Brake, Note, Equitable Distribu-
tion vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act,
23 B.C. L. REv. 761, 763 (1982). Most American community property jurisdictions now
permit deviation from an equal division. See Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Fam-
ily Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 23 FAM. L.Q. 495, 523-24 (1990) (Table IV).
Deviation was originally introduced to reflect common law fault concepts in divorce law
and, more recently, represents an infiltration of equitable distribution concepts. See
Cheadle, supra note 19, at 1295.
23 "Most courts gave limited scope to [equitable distribution] statutes, interpreting
them merely to protect the interests of a spouse who provided the capital to acquire a
[Vol. 57:621
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During the 1960s and 1970s, however, property distribution
became a focal point of wide-ranging divorce reform.2 ' Reform-
ers of this period called for the abolition of fault as a precondi-
tion to obtaining a divorce and as a factor in economic deci-
sions.25 Moreover, they urged, property should replace alimony
as a divorcing wife's primary economic entitlement:
[If a system for division of property between husband and wife upon
divorce... were adopted, and if the family has sufficient property to
divide, it would be possible to drastically reduce or eliminate alimony
as continued support for an ex-spouse. °
The reasons reformers gave for favoring property division
over alimony were numerous. First of all, they noted, alimony
was seldom awarded and even more infrequently paid. Surveys
consistently showed that no more than a quarter of divorced
wives were awarded alimony 27 and that even fewer actually re-
particular asset .... Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CoRN.L L
REV. 45, 72 (1981). Additionally, statutes often required judges to transfer property in
the guise of an alimony payment. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Anderson
Supp. 1967) (allowing an alimony award "in real or personal property... payable either
in gross or in installments as the court deems equitable") (current version at id. §
3105.18 (Anderson 1990)). See also Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, Marital Property
Reform in New York. Partnership of Coequals?, 8 Ft. L.Q. 169, 170 n.6 (1974).
24 For historical accounts of thd divorce reform movement during this period, see
HALEM. supra note 14, at 233-83; JACOB, supra note 1; Lawrence M. Friedman, Rights of
Passage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective, 63 OI. L REv. 649 (1984). Both report-
ers for the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (one of whom was also prominently in-
volved in the movement toward no-fault divorce in California) have also written accounts
of the period drawing on their personal recollections. See Kay, supra note 1; Robert J.
Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act - And Some Re-
flections About Its Critics and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rv. 43.
25 This position was advocated by the influential report of the California Governor's
Commission on the Family and the widely copied Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.
See ROBERT J. LEVY, UNiFORi MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATIOn. A PaawwNARY
ANALYSIS 88-95 (1968) (grounds for divorce); id. at 149-50 (alimony); id. at 169 (property
division); REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S CohimissIoN ON THE FAMILY 44-48 (1966).
28 CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WomEN. REoRT OF THE TAsk
FORCE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 8-9 (1968) [hereinafter Crrimzs' ADVISORY COUNCIL
REPORT]. See also LEvY, supra note 25, at 144-47.
27 Reported alimony rates have been consistently low throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. See, e.g., PAUL H. JACOBSON, AbmcAN MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE 127-28 (1959) (re-
porting that 9.3% of U.S. divorces included provisions for permanent alimony between
1887 and 1906, that alimony/property settlement awards for 13 states ranged from 10.7%
(Florida) to 42.2% (Nebraska) around 1939 and from 7.2% (Florida) to 48A% (Kansas)
around 1950, and concluding that "alimony or property settlement awards are now made
in about one fourth of the marriages dissolved in the United States"); MAxINE B. VITUE.
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ceived payments. Alimony critics-including many feminists and
women's advocates-also urged that the traditional emphasis on
fault and need in setting alimony awards perpetuated traditional
notions of women as dependents and failed to recognize the
value of a wife's contributions as a homemaker and parent.28
With ever increasing numbers of women in the workplace, the
notion of lifetime spousal support also began to seem anachro-
nistic. Reformers urged that marriage is a partnership of equals
and that the financial aspects of divorce should be remodeled
accordingly.29
The logical outcome of an equal partnership marriage model
is a community property system without alimony. No state went
this far, however, as reformers realized that women were not
equals in the marketplace, and that need thus could not be ig-
nored as a factor in divorce decision making.30 Alimony thus was
nowhere abolished, although many states enacted new standards
that emphasized the use of alimony for transitional, "rehabilita-
tive" purposes to limit its use and duration.3 1 Nor was equal
FAMILY CASES IN COURT: A GROUP OF FOUR COURT STUDIES DEALING WITH JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION 92 (1956) (alimony requested in only 7% of surveyed 1953 Illinois cases);
Youngerman, Report on Divorce Cases in the Middlesex County Probate Court for Jus-
tice for Divorced Mothers (August 1972) (unpublished), described in CALEB FOOTE ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 844 (2d ed. 1976) (alimony granted in 20% of
surveyed 1972 Massachusetts cases).
28 Although the women's movement was not prominently involved in the early
movement to institute no-fault divorce grounds, its views did play an important role in
the formulation of property distribution proposals. See LEVY, supra note 25, at 164-67
(citing the reasoning of the 1963 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN and the 1968 TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY LAW AND POLICY OF THE CITIZEN'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF
WOMEN in formulating Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act proposals on marital prop-
erty); Levy, supra note 24, at 56-57 n.51 ("the general proposals of these groups were at
the core of the property distribution recommendations of the Reporter").
29 For examples of the literature calling for alimony and property reform based on a
partnership model, see CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 26; CITIZENS'
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, RECOGNITION OF ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
OF HOMEMAKERS AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN IN DIVORCE LAW AND PRACTICE (1974);
LEVY, supra note 25, at 164-66; ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE ONTA-
RIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR ONTARIO ON CERTAIN As-
PErs OF THE PROPOSED DIVORCE LEGISLATION CONTAINED IN BILL C-187 (1968); Joan M.
Krauskopf & Rhonda C. Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution to an Ineffective
and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558 (1974); Susan Prager, Sharing
Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977).
30 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 25, at 146 (urging abolition of alimony except for spe-
cialized situations "in which a compelling need may... arise").
3' The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA), the leading model legislation of
[Vol. 57: 621
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property division widely introduced.32 Instead, reformers gener-
ally preferred a more flexible approach that could take account
of spousal needs and conduct on an individualized basis. 33
In most states reform efforts thus centered on equitable
property distribution as a means of achieving economic equity
between divorcing spouses.34 In states that already permitted
equitable distribution, legislatures and judges paid increasing at-
tention to determining what assets should be considered marital
property35 and elaborating factors to govern its allocation.3
States that did not provide for equitable distribution instituted
it, either through judicial decision or legislation.37 Today, no
this era, took the position that property division should be "the primary means of pro-
viding for the future financial needs of the spouses." UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DivoncE ACr
Prefatory Note, §308, 9A U.L.A. 147, 149 (1987). Under the UMDA, alimony is not to be
awarded unless the spouse seeking maintenance: "(1) lacks sufficient property to provide
for his reasonable needs; and (2) is unable to support himself through appropriate em-
ployment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appro-
priate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home." Id. §
308, 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987). By 1986, twenty-five states either specifically limited alimony
to a stated period or allowed a court to set a time limit on an alimony award by provid-
ing as a guideline the time necessary to acquire enough education or training to enable
the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment. See Fain. L. Rep. Ref.
File (BNA) 401:001-453:002 (1991) (summarizing the divorce laws of the fifty states, Pu-
erto Rico and the Virgin Islands).
32 See J. THoSs OLDHAM, DIVORCE. SEPARATION AND THE DzSTmRtnmoN OF PRoPErrY
§ 13.01[2][b] n.9 (1991) (listing states with equal distribution requirement or presump-
tion of equal distribution).
See, e.g., CrrIZENs' ADvISoRY COUNcIL REPORT, supra note 26, at 5 ("divorce
courts should be given discretion to determine a different proportion for each spouse,
based on factors such as respective contributions... each spouse made to the marriage,
economic dependency and age of the spouses"); Joan M. Krauskopf, A Theory for "Just"
Division of Marital Property in Missouri, 41 Mo. L REv. 165, 175-76, 178 (1976) (equita-
ble distribution "permits the court the necessary flexibility to adjust the property divi-
sion according to the actual economic needs of the parties"). See also LEvY, supra note
25, at 167 ("time is not yet ripe to insist upon a '50-50' formula").
" For a discussion of how the indeterminacy of equitable distribution contributed
to its political acceptability, see Isabel Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out: Reflections
on the History of Divorce Law Reform in New York State, 37 BUFF L REy. 375, 449-50
(1988/89).
"' See generally JOHN D. GREGORY. THE LAW OF EqurrABLE DIsTRIBUTION §§ 2.02-
3.06 (1989); OLDHAM, supra note 32, §§ 7.01-10.03; See also Freed & Walker, supra note
22, at 539-41 (describing legal developments on professional degrees and licenses as mar-
ital property); id. at 541-43 (pensions, IRAs and Keogh accounts); id. at 544 (personal
injury awards); id. at 533-38 (factors in determining property awards).
" For a description of typical factors, see GREGORY, supra note 35, §§ 8-3 to 8-19;
OLDHAM, supra note 32, § 13.02[1].
" Analysis of a compilation of state property division laws prepared by the Reporter
for the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act suggests that seventeen states and the Dis-
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state retains the traditional common law title system and many
community property states permit equitable distribution as
well.38
D. The New Reform Movement
In recent years the divorce reforms of the 1960s and 1970s
have themselves come under attack. Some commentators have
argued that the equitable distribution approach gives judges too
much discretion, thus producing unpredictable and sometimes
arbitrary results." Some women's advocates have also contended
that equitable distribution is not achieving equity for women.
They have claimed that women's contributions as homemakers
are typically undervalued and that women would be better off in
a community property system in which they are guaranteed half
of the marital property.40 Inadequate property distributions are
accompanied, they have claimed, by inadequate, short-term
maintenance awards. 41
trict of Columbia did not permit distribution of property to a spouse other than the
titleholder. See Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 4, at 12, n.40.
38 Freed & Walker, supra note 22, at 523-24 (Table IV). The widespread introduc-
tion of equitable distribution principles has, indeed, substantially eroded the traditional
distinctions between common law and community property jurisdictions. For a descrip-
tion of the trend toward convergence, see Cheadle, supra note 19, at 1306-08.
1, See, e.g., Brake, supra note 22, at 788 ("[E]quitable distribution... imposes high
costs upon both litigants and society in what may be an unproductive search for individ-
ualized justice .... [A] fixed rule system provides a property division method that is
inexpensive, predictable, and able to minimize the need for litigation."); Foster & Freed,
supra note 23, at 190 (equal distribution "more certainly gives each party what he or she
is entitled to, whereas extraneous elements (in fact) may influence a court's equitable
discretion"); Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV. 1553,
1555-57 (1984) (equitable distribution is unwieldy and unpredictable).
40 See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 108 ("Clearly, equitable distribution stan-
dards are not more favorable to wives. Wives are, in fact, likely to fare better under rules
that guarantee them an equal share of the marital property."); Fineman, supra note 4, at
852-55 (quoting various publications by Wisconsin women's advocates describing inequi-
ties of equitable distribution); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in
WOMEN AS SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE
WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 39, 45-47 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988). But
see MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DI-
VORCE REFORM 51-52, 175-80 (1991); Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property
Distribution and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L,
REV. 827, 909-10 (1988) (both arguing in favor of equitable property distribution).
" For examples of the literature describing the inadequacies in current spousal
maintenance patterns and calling for reform, see, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 184-
214; Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Alimony, 27 J.
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Recent research on divorce outcomes has contributed to a
growing sense that the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s them-
selves require remediation. Post-divorce income surveys have
uniformly shown that women's per capita income 2 and standard
of living ' tend to decline substantially following divorce, while
those of men tend to increase. While these income surveys have
not attempted to establish that outcomes have changed since the
reforms of the 1960s and 1970s, several comparative surveys, in
which alimony, child support, and property awards were ana-
lyzed before and after divorce reforms, have shown that divorced
FAhL L. 351 (1988-89); Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of
Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FA. LQ. 573 (1988); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L REv. 1103 (1989).
42 See BARBARA BAKER, FAury EQUITY AT ISSUE A STUDY OF TIE ECONOIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF DIVORCE ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN i (1987) (surveyed divorced wives in
Alaska experienced 33% decline in per capita income while men experienced 17% rise);
LESLIE J. BirET ET AL., WOMEN AND CHILDREN BSwARE THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
DIVORCE IN CONNECTICUT 7 (1990) (mean per capita income of surveyed divorced wives in
Connecticut fell by an average of 16%, while that of divorced husbands increased by
23%); WETZMAN, supra note 4, at 191-92 (reporting post-divorce per capita income of
California research sample by income groups and concluding that "husband is typically
permitted to retain two-thirds to three-quarters of that [pre-divorce] total, while the
wife (and children) are typically left with no more than one-third"); James B. McLindon,
Separate But Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 21
FA"L LQ. 351, 386-88 (1987) (in early 1980s average per capita income of divorced wives
in New Haven, Conn. was 69% of pre-divorce per capita median while average per capita
income of divorced husbands was 190% of pre-divorce per capita median); Heather R.
Wishik, Economics of Divorce: An Exploratory Study, 20 FAM. LQ. 79, 97-98 (1986) (af-
ter divorce, surveyed divorced wives in Vermont experienced 33% drop in per capita
income, children 25%, while men experienced a 120% increase).
11 See DAVID L CHAMBaRS, MAING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUP-
PORT 45-50 (1979) (97% of divorced mothers and children in their custody would have
less than lower standard budget income as compared to 10% of divorced fathers, if fa-
thers paid court-ordered support and mother tried to live on support only); WErrMAN,
supra note 4, at 337-43 (divorced wives experienced a 73% decline in their standard of
living while divorced husbands' standard of living improved 42%); Greg J. Duncan &
Saul D. Hoffman, A Reconsideration of the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolu-
tion, 22 DEMOGRAPHY 485, 488 (1985) (in the first year after divorce, the economic status
of divorced wives fell an average of 30%); Robert Hampton, Marital Disruption: Some
Social and Economic Consequences, in FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FA.,a~s: PArTmNs oF
ECONOMIC PROGRESS 171-74 (James N. Morgan ed., 1975) (47% of divorced husbands
were in the top three deciles of income as compared to only 20% of divorced wives); Saul
D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25
DEMOGRAPHY 641 (1988) (recalculation of Weitzman's data suggests that women exper-
ienced a 33% decline in their post-divorce standard of living); Robert S. Weiss, The
Impact of Marital Dissolution on Income and Consumption in Single-Parent House-
holds, 46 J. MARRIAGE & FAiL 115 (1984) (in the first year after divorce the economic
status of divorced wives fell an average of 30%).
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wives and children have generally fared worse under the new re-
gime. In most of the surveyed jurisdictions, research has shown
that the likelihood of an alimony award," the duration of ali-
mony awards,45 the amount of alimony and child support,46 and
the proportion of marital property47 awarded women decreased,
'" See WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 167 (20% of divorced wives in San Francisco &
Los Angeles, Cal. awarded alimony pre-reform (1968) as compared to 15% post-reform
(1972)); Robert E. McGraw et al., A Case Study in Divorce Law Reform and Its After-
math, 20 J. FAM. L. 443, 473 (1981-82) (26% of divorced wives in Cuyahoga County, Ohio
awarded alimony before reform (1972) as compared to 18% post-reform (1978));
McLindon, supra note 42, at 362 (59% of divorced wives in New Haven, Conn. awarded
alimony pre-reform (1970-71) as compared to 30% post-reform (1982-83)); Karen Seal, A
Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What It Has Meant Financially for Women in California,
1 FAM. ADvoc. 10, 12 (1979) (66% of divorced wives in San Diego, Cal. were awarded
alimony pre-reform (1968) as compared to 30% post-reform (1976)); Charles E. Welch
III & Sharon Price-Bonham, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce Revisited: California, Geor-
gia, and Washington, 45 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 411, 415 (1983) (15.4% of divorced wives in
Clark County, Ga. awarded alimony pre-reform (1970) as compared to 10.9% post-re-
form (1980); 9.7% of divorced wives in Spokane County, Wash. awarded alimony pre-
reform (1970) as compared to 7% post-reform (1980)). For a comparison of the reports,
see Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing Results, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 4, at 91 (Table 3.11).
" See WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 164 (62% of alimony awards in Los Angeles and
San Francisco, Cal. permanent pre-reform (1968) as compared to 32% post-reform
(1972)); McGraw et al., supra note 44, at 474-75 (60% of alimony awards in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio permanent pre-reform (1972) as compared to 30% post-reform (1978));
McLindon, supra note 42, at 364 (all but one alimony award in New Haven, Conn. per-
manent pre-reform (1970-71) as compared to 60% post-reform (1982-83)); Seal, supra
note 44, at 12 (46% of alimony awards in San Diego, Cal. permanent pre-reform (1968)
as compared to 37% post-reform (1976)). But see Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44,
at 415 (51.4% of alimony awards in Clark County, Ga. permanent pre-reform (1970) as
compared to 59.3% post-reform (1980); 37.9% of alimony awards in Spokane County,
Wash. permanent pre-reform (1970) as compared to 40% post-reform (1980)). For a com-
parison of the reports, see Garrison, supra note 44, at 91 (Table 3.11).
16 GLORIA STERIN ET AL., DIVORCE AWARDS AND OUTCOMES: A STUDY OF PATERN AND
CHANGE IN CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 1965-78 94-95, 132 (1981); McLindon, supra note 42,
at 369; Seal, supra note 44, at 12; Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 415. For a
comparison of the reports, see Garrison, supra note 44, at 96 (Table 3.13).
47 STERIN ET AL., supra note 46, at 112 (Table 6.2) (divorced wives in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio received less property post-reform (1972) as compared to pre-reform pe-
riod (1968) when divorce granted on no-fault ground of mutual agreement between
spouses, but not when divorce was granted on fault grounds or on no-fault ground of two
years separation); WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 74 (divorced wives received majority of
marital property in 86% of San Francisco, Cal. cases and 58% of Los Angeles, Cal. cases
pre-reform (1968) as compared to 35% of Los Angeles, Cal. cases and 34% of San Fran-
cisco, Cal. cases post-reform (1972)); McLindon, supra note 42, at 375 (in three of four
income categories in New Haven, Conn., wives received an average of 84% of marital
property pre-reform (1970-71) as compared to 57% post-reform (1982-83)); Seal, supra
note 44, at 12 (24% fewer wives in San Diego, Cal. received marital home, 30% fewer
received furniture, 10% fewer received automobile, 27% fewer exclusively awarded other
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while the proportion of family debt 48 ,women were required to
pay increased. The etiology of these changes in divorce out-
comes49 and their overall importance0 remain controversial. So
does the content of a new reform program. What standards
should govern the determination of alimony awards and the di-
vision of marital property? Family law scholars disagree."' Even
assets post-reform (1976) than in pre-reform period (1968)); Welch & Price-Bonham,
supra note 44, at 416 (divorced wives in Spokane County, Wash. received smaller share
of marital property post-reform (1980) than in earlier period (1970)). But see Welch &
Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 416 (divorced wives in Clark County, Ga. not more
likely to receive a smaller share of property post-reform (1980) than pre-reform (1970)).
" See Seal, supra note 44, at 12 (70% of divorced husbands in San Diego, Cal.
assigned joint debts pre-reform (1968) as compared to 42% post-reform (1976)); Welch &
Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 416 (divorced wives in Spokane County, Wash. received
larger share of marital debts post-reform (1980) than in pre-reform (1970) period);
WmrzhuN, supra note 4, at 102 (divorced husbands in Los Angeles & San Francisco, Cal.
assumed majority of marital debts in 88% of cases pre-reform (1968) as compared to
58% post-reform (1977)). But see McLindon, supra note 42, at 379 (divorced husbands
in New Haven, Conn. had average share of 78% of marital debts pre-reform (1970-71) as
compared to 84% post-reform (1982-83); Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 416
(divorced wives in Clark County, Ga. received larger share of joint debts post-reform
(1980) but smaller share of other liabilities).
49 A number of scholars have argued that divorced wives' declining fortunes result
from the fact that, with no-fault divorce grounds available, they have lost bargaining
power as they can no longer threaten to block a divorce. See, eg., WEnrzvsA, supra note
4, at 26-28, 383; Fineman, supra note 4, at 801-02; Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korn-
hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YAix LJ. 950,
968-69 (1979); Seal, supra note 44, at 11-12. Others have questioned this conclusion. See
JACOB, supra note 1, at 163-64; Garrison, supra note 44, at 100.
0 Compare WEITzmAN, supra note 4, at 400 (divorce today spells financial catastro-
phe for women and the children in their custody) with Jed H. Abraham, "The Divorce
Revolution" Revisited: A Counter Revolutionary Critique, 9 N. ILL. U. L. Ray. 251 (1989)
and Herbert Jacob, Faulting No-Fault, 1986 A.B.F. Ras. J. 773 and Marygold S. Meli,
Constructing a Social Problem: The Post-Divorce Plight of Women and Children, 1986
A.B.F. RES. J. 759 and Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests at Divorce, in
CROSSROADS. supra note 4, at 131-35; (all questioning whether women are importantly
worse off under no-fault regime as compared to prior fault regime). See also Greg J.
Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, Economic Consequences of Marital Instability, in MARrN
DAVID & ThtoTHy StmamNG, HomzoNrrA EQurry. UNCERTAINTY, AND ECONOMC WELL-
BEING 427, 437 (1985) (reporting that five years after divorce women who remarried had
a living standard 25% greater than in the year before their divorce while those who did
not remarry had a living standard 94% of that they had enjoyed in the year prior to
divorce).
" For a range of views on alimony, see, e.g., Ira M. Ellman, A Theory of Alimony,
77 CL L REv. 1 (1989); Mary E. O'Connell, Alimony After No-Fault: A Practice in
Search of a Theory, 23 N. ENG. L Rv. 437 (1988); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce:
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FoRomnA L REv. 539 (1990); Carl E. Schnei-
der, Rethinking Alimony, 1991 B.Y.U. L Ray. 197 (1991). For property division, see, e.g.,
FINE mh, supra note 40, at 36-52, 175-80; Grace G. Blumberg, Marital Property Treat-
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among women's advocates, no clear consensus has emerged on
the merits of equal property distribution as compared to equita-
ble, 2 or on standards for the determination of alimony awards. 3
The debate over reform has suffered from a relative lack of
good data on divorce outcomes. While Weitzman's well-publi-
cized research in California provides fairly detailed data on ali-
mony and property distribution, California is not a typical state.
The alimony reforms adopted by California are fairly main-
stream, but its property rules are atypical: California is a com-
munity property jurisdiction (one of only eight),54 and mandates
equal property distribution at divorce (as do only two other
states).5 Divorce research in equitable property distribution
jurisdictions has produced much less detailed data than Weitz-
man's.5 6 And even Weitzman's relatively thorough report fails to
discuss the determinants of property distribution or the rela-
tionship between alimony and property distribution.
My research in New York examined the consequences of a
change in the substantive rules governing property and alimony
apart from any change in the grounds for divorce. It provides
more detailed data on divorce outcomes in an equitable property
ment of Pensions Disability Pay, Worker's Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes;
An Insurance or Replacement Analysis, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1250 (1986); Joan M. Kraus-
kopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching for Solutions to the
Mystery, 23 FAm. L. Q. 253 (1989).
51 Compare, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 36-52 (arguing for need-based property
distribution) with WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 108 (arguing for equal distribution). One
result of the debate has been that women's organizations have lobbied for different prop-
erty division schemes from one state to the next. For example, in New York and Wiscon-
sin women's groups mainly lobbied for equal distribution, while in Pennsylvania they
campaigned for equitable distribution. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 843-71.
53 Compare, e.g., Kay, supra note 37, at 32-34 (favoring reimbursement alimony,
coupled with alimony based on loss of earning capacity during marriage for all but older
homemakers) with Rutheford, supra note 51, at 578 (favoring permanent alimony in
amount that would equalize post-divorce living standard of spouses).
See MENNELL & BOYKOFF, supra note 20, at 13-17.
"The others are Louisiana and New Mexico. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801
(West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (Michie 1989.) Some other states have adopted, by
statute or case law, a presumption favoring equal division. For a listing, see 0LDIAM,
supra note 32, § 13.02 n.9; Freed & Walker, supra note 22, at 523 (Table IV).
" Other reports that have examined the allocation of marital property under equita-
ble distribution laws are BAKER, supra note 42; BRErr ET AL., supra note 42, at 47-50
(marital home); STERIN gr AL., supra note 46; McLindon, supra note 42; Barbara R.
Rowe & Alice M. Morrow, The Economic Consequences of Divorce in Oregon After Ten
or More Years of Marriage, 24 WILLAMETrTE L. REV. 463 (1988) (marriages over ten
years); Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44; Wishik, supra note 42 (marital home).
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distribution state than have previously been available.
II. NEW YORK'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
A. Divorce in New York: The Adoption of the Equitable
Distribution Law
Prior to the 1980 reform, New York's divorce law was
among the most traditional of state divorce regimes. New York
was one of a handful of states without any marital property dis-
tribution scheme whatsoever; 7 absent a showing of grounds for
the imposition of a constructive trust upon the property, title
controlled. 58 Alimony rules were traditional and fault-based. 9
Divorce was obtainable only upon a showing of marital fault or
upon a comprehensive agreement between the spouses on cus-
tody and financial issues coupled with a one-year separation. 0
The new law brought New York closer to the mainstream by
establishing an equitable property distribution rule and intro-
ducing the concept of rehabilitative alimony. It did not alter the
grounds for divorce, however; New York is one of four remaining
states that permit divorce only upon a showing of fault or upon
spousal agreement.6
The new law had been the subject of lengthy debate, negoti-
ation, and compromise. Property distribution had been on the
legislative agenda for several years before a bill was finally en-
acted.2 Most women's advocates favored an equal distribution
57 In 1978 New York was one of only six states (Florida, Mississippi, New York,
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia) that awarded property to the titleholder.
See Doris J. Freed & Henry H. Foster, Jr., Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as
of 1978, 13 FAhL L.Q. 105 (1979).
" Former N.Y. Doll REL LAW § 234 (McKinney 1977).
" Under the former law, a wife who was guilty of misconduct sufficient to justify a
divorce was not entitled to either an alimony award or to exclusive occupancy of the
marital residence. See former N.Y. Dozi RE. LAW § 236A (McKinney 1986).
60 N.Y. Dom RF. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1986).
61 Id. The others are Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee. See Aim CODE ANN. § 9-
12-301(6), (7)(a) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991) (voluntary separation for 18 consecutive
months required or involuntary" separation for three years where caused by the insanity
of one partner); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2 (1972) (joint petition with separation agree-
ment required); TENN. CODE ANN. § 364-101(12) (1991) (separation agreement required
if the couple has minor children).
"2 For historical accounts of the New York equitable distribution law, see Isabel
Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex Gender System: Divorce Law Reform
in New York, 42 U. Mrutu L. REv. 55 (1987); Marcus, supra note 34, at 43841; Jessica C.
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law,13 while bar organizations generally favored some form of eq-
uitable distribution.6 4
The law that ultimately was adopted is a fairly typical equi-
table distribution statute. It applies only to property acquired
during the marriage and additionally excludes gifts (except be-
tween spouses), inheritances, and personal injury awards from
distribution.,Under the statute, the division of marital prop-
erty is based on a number of specified factors, 6 as well as a
catch-all "any other factor which the court shall expressly find
to be just and proper. '8 7 Although the legislation itself is silent
Brynteson, Note, Recent Developments: Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 ALB. L.
R-v. 483, 486-90 (1981).
63 See Marcus, supra note 34, at 441; Brynteson, supra note 62, at 488-89 n.21.
0' See Marcus, supra note 34, at 441 nn.266 & 267. See also Julia Perles, Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee Concerning Revisions of the Equitable Distribution Statute, 17
FAM. L. REV., Oct. 1985, at 21-22 (New York State Bar Association Committee reporting
that various bar organizations favored retention of equitable distribution as opposed to a
presumption of equal distribution).
11 See 1980 N.Y. Laws 434 (codified at N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236B(1)(d) (McKinney
1988)). For a comparison with other state rules on equitable distribution, see Fain. L.
Rep. Ref. File (BNA) 400:ii-453:002 (1991).
66 At the time the statute was enacted, the court was directed to consider:
1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the
time of commencement of the action;
2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties:
3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to
use or own its household effects;
4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage
as of the date of dissolution;
5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to
the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, in-
cluding joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career
potential of the other party;
7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any in-
terest in a business, corporation, or profession, and the economic desirabil-
ity of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or in-
terference by the other party ....
1980 N.Y. Laws 436 (codified at former N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(5) (McKinney Supp.
1981)). Since the enactment of the statute three additional factors (tax consequences,
wasteful dissipation of assets by a spouse, and transfer or encumbrance of a marital asset
made in contemplation of a divorce) have been added. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)
(McKinney 1986). For a comparison with other state standards on equitable distribution,
see Fam. L. Rep. Ref. File (BNA) 401-53 (1991).
11 1980 N.Y. Laws 436 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d)(13) (McKinney
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as to whether marital fault may be considered, the courts quite
quickly ruled that fault should play a role in distribution only
when egregious."8
The new property distribution law was linked with legisla-
tive changes in the determination of alimony awards. The legis-
lature specified that any alimony award (renamed maintenance
under the legislation) was a factor in determining a property
award.69 It also introduced consideration of the marital property
distribution into the alimony decision,70 along with spelling out
in more detail than did the previous statute factors for awarding
alimony 71 and eliminating fault as a basis for denying it and oc-
1986)).
I O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 589-90, 489 N.E.2d 712, 719,498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
750 (1985); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 292, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (2d
Dep't 1984).
69 N.Y. Dom Rma LAW § 236B(5)(d)(5) (McKinney 1986).
70 Id. § 236B(6)(a)(1).
7' The prior law provided that "the court may direct the husband to provide suit-
ably for the support of the wife as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having
regard to the length of the marriage, the ability of the wife to be self-supporting, the
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties." Former N.Y. Dom RE. LAw §
236 (McKinney 1977) The new alimony provisions directed that:
[Tihe court may order ... maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of a
party. . . in such amount as justice requires, having regard for the circum-
stances of the case and of the respective parties. In determining reasonable
needs the court shall decide whether the party in whose favor maintenance is
granted lacks sufficient property and income to provide for his or her reason-
able needs and whether the other party has sufficient property or income to
provide for the reasonable needs of the other .... In determining the amount
and duration of maintenance the court shall consider
(1) the income and property of the respective parties in including marital
property distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the present and future capacity of the person having need to be self-
supporting;,
(4) the period of time and training necessary to enable the person having need
to become self-supporting;
(5) the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of the
parties;
(6) the standard of living established during the marriage where practical and
relevant;
(7) the tax consequences to each party;,
(8) contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as spouse, par-
ent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of
the other party;,
(9) the wasteful dissipation of family assets by either spouse and;
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
1980 N.Y. Laws 436 (codified at N.Y. Doa REL LAw § 236B(6) (McKinney Supp. 1981)).
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cupancy of the marital residence.72
Although these changes would not, on their face, appear to
disadvantage divorced wives significantly, a legislative memoran-
dum explaining the new statute indicates that an award of main-
tenance "should rest on the economic basis of reasonable needs
and the ability to pay."'7 3 According to the memorandum, per-
manent maintenance may be necessary "in marriages of long du-
ration, or where the former spouse is out of the labor market
and lacks sufficient resources, or has sacrificed her business or
professional career to serve as a parent and homemaker, '74 but
the objective of maintenance is to "award the recipient spouse
an opportunity to achieve independence. ' 75 This language,
which has been cited approvingly by the New York Court of Ap-
peals,7 6 suggests that courts should, in general, award mainte-
nance for short-term, "rehabilitative" purposes.
The controversy over property distribution and spousal
maintenance has not abated since the law's enactment. The
law's impact has been the subject of heated debate," with some
divorce experts claiming that women are getting less than half
the marital property and less alimony than before the law's en-
actment,"' and others claiming that women have fared well
under the equitable distribution law.79 Prior to my research, re-
71 Compare former N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1977) with former N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 236B (McKinney Supp. 1981).
13 1980 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, MEMORANDUM OF ASSEMBLYMAN
GORDON W. BURROWS 130.
74 Id.
75 Id.
"' O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 585, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743,
747 (1985).
1 In 1985 the New York State Legislature held joint public hearings on the equita-
ble distribution law (see Joint Public Hearings on New York Equitable Distribution
Law (Doam. Rel. Law § 236) Before the New York State Assembly (Mar. 6 & 15, 1985))
as did the New York State Task Force on Women in the Courts. The Task Force con-
cluded that "f[m]any lower court judges have demonstrated a predisposition not to recog-
nize or to minimize the homemaker spouse's contributions to the marital economic part-
nership." NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REPORT 121 (1986)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
7' See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 98-120 (describing testimony of
witnesses at public hearings and results of attorney survey); Harriet N. Cohen & Adria S.
Hillman, Analysis of Seventy Select Decisions After Trial Under New York State's Equi-
table Distribution Law from January 1981 Through October 1984 3-4, 16-17 (1984) (copy
on file with the author) (reporting that "wives generally were being treated as less than
full partners at the time of dissolution of the marriage partnership").
79 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 97-98 & 98 n.160 (describing
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views of reported judicial decisions and anecdotal accounts were
the only available evidence of how the law had actually affected
divorcing couples.
Although concern over the law's impact on alimony awards
led the legislature to amend the spousal maintenance rules in
1986,80 the basic scheme for property division and alimony that
the equitable distribution law established remains in effect
today.81
B. Research Methodology
From the research I hoped to learn how New York's new
property division and alimony rules would affect property and
alimony awards. In addition to this major issue, I hoped that the
research would shed light on several related questions: (1) To
what extent would alimony and property awards under the new
law be consistent and predictable? (2) What factors, if any,
would predict the distribution of property and award of ali-
mony? (3) How would property and alimony awards under the
equitable distribution law compare to awards under equal distri-
bution rules?
In order to examine these issues, data were drawn from the
testimony of witnesses at public hearings); id. at 109-18 (describing responses of attorney
survey respondents); Henry H. Foster, Jr., A Second Opinion: New York's EDL is Alive
and Well and Being Fairly Administered, 17 FAih. L. REv., Apr. 1985, at 3, 4-5 (criticiz-
ing Hillman and Cohen as "deceptive when they manipulate New York cases to fit a
priori conclusions. and ... unfair in their condemnations of the EDL and New York
courts").
"1 1986 N.Y. Laws 436-37 (codified at N.Y. Dom. RF.L LAW § 236B(6) (McKinney
1986)). The amendments were designed to "inform the trial courts that long-term main-
tenance awards were to be considered." Myrna Felder, Courts, Legislature Struggle to
Answer Property Questions, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1, 4. The amendments changed
the law in several respects: the "where practical and relevant" limitation on the marital
standard of living factor was deleted (N.Y. Doai REL LAw § 236B(6)(a)); "the ability of
the... [applicant] to be self-supporting" was added to the factor requiring the court to
consider "the time and training necessary . .. to become self-supporting" (id. §
236B(6)(b)(4)); the court was newly required to consider "reduced or lost lifetime earn-
ing capacity of the party seeking maintenance as a result of having foregone or delayed
education, training, employment, or career opportunities during the marriage" (id. §
236B(6)(b)(5)); and a provision explicitly authorizing permanent maintenance vas added
(id. § 236B(6)(c)).
The only major change in the substantive rules governing divorce entitlements
has been the enactment of child support guidelines. For a discussion of those guidelines
and their possible impact on outcomes under the prior law, see notes 345-50 and accom-
panying text infra.
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files of approximately 900 divorces filed in 1978, two years before
enactment of the equitable distribution law, and from the files
of approximately 900 divorces filed in 1984, four years after the
law's passage. In order to determine whether there was regional
variation in divorce outcomes, the cases were selected in equal
numbers from three diverse counties: New York County (Man-
hattan), Onondaga County (Syracuse, New York, and its imme-
diate environs), and Westchester County (a largely suburban
county within commuter distance of New York City).
In order to test the impact of the type of divorce action
upon outcomes, cases were chosen, within each county, on the
basis of case category: 100 contested,82 100 consensual,83 and 100
default s4 divorces were randomly selected from each county for
each research year. These proportions do not reflect the actual
representation of cases in each category. Overall, somewhat more
than 60% of divorce actions in the three research counties fell
into the default category, a little more than 20% were consen-
sual, and a little less than 20% were contested.85
Cases were sampled in different proportions than their rep-
resentation in the actual pool of divorces both in order to ensure
an adequate number in each category for comparative analysis
and because of wide variation in the availability of case informa-
tion depending on case category. Cases in the default sample
typically provided little information on property distribution
and, in New York County (where they also were most numerous
proportionally), often failed to include information on child sup-
port as well. On the other hand, because of a statutory require-
ment that parties to a contested divorce file affidavits of net
worth,"' it was possible, for the contested group, to collect com-
82 A divorce was considered contested if initiated on fault grounds (N.Y. Dom, REL,
LAW § 170 (1)-(4)) and the defendant answered the complaint. The vast majority of con-
tested cases are ultimately settled.
83 A divorce was considered consensual if sought on the basis of a written s6paration
agreement between the parties or judgment of separation coupled with a one-year sepa-
ration. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 170(5)-(6).
84 A divorce was considered default if initiated on fault grounds (N.Y. Dom. REL,
LAW § 170(1)-(4)) and the defendant failed to answer.
85 There was substantial variation by county in the proportion of cases in each cate-
gory. See Table 2 infra.
88 New York's financial reporting requirement applies only to contested divorce ac-
tions. See N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236A(2) (McKinney 1986) (actions filed prior to July
1980); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(4) (McKinney 1986) (actions filed after July 1980).
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prehensive data, including detailed financial information on
spousal income and assets, occupation, education, and health.
The consensual case files contained more information than did
the files of the default group but considerably less than the con-
tested case files; it was typically impossible to ascertain spousal
income or the value of assets owned and transferred. 87
Because the sample does not contain the same percentage of
cases in each category as occur in the divorce population, cases
in each category were appropriately weighted when computing
statistics for the total divorce population for the research areas.
Because the value of the dollar was not constant over the re-
search period, all money figures are reported in constant 1984
dollars.s8
C. Characteristics of the Research Sites and Sample
The three counties that were selected for the research pro-
ject were chosen because of their diversity. (See Table 1.) New
York County (Manhattan) is the most urban county within the
state. It also presents extremes of wealth and poverty, as well as
considerable racial and ethnic diversity. Although the per capita
income of New York County is comparable to that of wealthy
Westchester County,89 it also has the lowest median family in-
come9" and by far the highest proportion of poor households""
and poor minor children9 2 of the three research sites. New York
County residents are also far more likely to be members of
minority groups93 and to have emigrated from another state or
7 As the court files yielded few judicial decisions on either spousal maintenance or
property distribution, this report will not address judicial decision making under the
equitable distribution law. Another statewide sample of judicial decisions, at the trial
and appellate level, will be the subject of a subsequent report.
The multiplier was obtained by dividing the consumer price index for 1978 by the
consumer price index for 1984. See STATSTcAL ABSTRAC, supra note 6. at 467 (Table
756).
89 US. DEP'T OF CohniERcF, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. COUNTY AND CmTY DATA BOOK.
1988 358 [hereinafter 1988 COUNTY AN Crrv DATA BOOK]. The figures in Table 1 infra
are for 1979, the last year for which the Bureau of the Census reported complete income
data. In 1985 the per capita income of New York County was S17,319, while that of
Westchester County was $17,649 and that of Onondaga County was $11,472.
90 U.S. DEP'T OF CoMmERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. COUMTY AND CmTY DATA BooK.
1983 390 [hereinafter 1983 COUNTY AND CrrY DATA BOOK].
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 1988 COUNTY AND CrrY DATA BOOK, supra note 89, at 354.
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country 4 when compared to residents of Onondaga and West-
chester counties. The county's urban lifestyle also affects the
typical asset pool. Relatively few residents own their own
homes' 5 or cars e" in comparison to residents of Westchester and
Onondaga Counties. The New York County divorce rate is also
approximately triple that of the other two research counties.9 7
The differences between Onondaga and Westchester counties
are less extreme but still substantial. Westchester County,
within commuter distance from New York City, is predomi-
nantly suburban. It is also extremely affluent: the median family
income of Westchester County residents is not only the second
highest in the state, it is among the highest in the nation.es The
number of households with annual incomes over $40,000 is more
than triple that of Onondaga County,99 and aggregate bank de-
posits within the county are more than double. °00 Onondaga
County, in upstate New York, is home to Syracuse, a mid-sized
city, and small rural communities. Thirty-six percent of Onon-
daga County is still agricultural land, as compared to only three
percent in suburban Westchester County.101
, 1983 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 90, at 383.
g' 1988 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 89, at 358. In the research sample
the same pattern was evident. Thirty-three percent of the New York County sample
owned a home in 1978; 42% did in 1984. By contrast, 85% owned a home in both years
in Onondaga County and 70% in both years in Westchester County. The home owner-
ship rate for the sample was, in all counties, higher than the rate according to the Census
data.
06 In 1980 in New York County 1.4% of households had two or more automobiles, as
compared to 43.2% of Onondaga County households, and 43.4% of Westchester County
households. 1988 COUNTY AND CrTy DATA BOOK, supra note 89, at 358. The Bureau of the
Census does not report the rate of ownership for one car. The research sample exhibited
a similar pattern: 106 cars were listed by the New York County sample in 1984, as com-
pared to 236 by the Westchester sample and 272 by the Onondaga sample.
Id. at 356. The reported rate at Table 1 infra is for 1984.
98 The only county in New York with a higher median family income is Nassau
County. 1983 COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK, supra note 90, at 390. Westchester County
was ranked 68th of all American counties in median household income in 1979, the last
year for which the Bureau of the Census reported such data.. Id. at lvii.
" Id. at 390.
10' Id. at 394 (in 1981 $8,669,700,000 in Westchester County as compared to
$3,278,100,000 in Onondaga County).
Id. at 395.
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TABLE 1
RESEARCH COUNTIES BY SELECTED POPULATION
CHARACTERISTICS*
Population New York Onondaga Westchester
Characteristic County County County
Per capita
income $10,776 $ 7,286 $10,603
Median family
income $16,326 $18,174 $27,278
% households with
income < $10,000 38 27 20
% children living
in poverty 41 14 10
% households with
income > $40,000 12 8 22
% pop. minority 29 9 16
% pop. born in state 45 77 68
% pop. owning home 8 62 52
% land rural 0 36 3
Divorce rate
(per 1000 pop.) 11 3 4
*All information in this chart is derived from U.S. Census data. All money figures are in
$1979.
There is also a widespread perception in New York that le-
gal culture is distinctively different in upstate areas like Onon-
daga County and downstate. Upstate New York is believed to be
more conservative and traditional than New York City, with
suburban areas like Westchester falling somewhere in between.
In regard to politics, there is some truth to the assertion. New
York City is solidly Democratic; nonurban upstate areas typi-
cally vote Republican. 0 2
Do these differences affect the divorce process? Some dis-
tinctive differences among the three locales did emerge. (See Ta-
ble 2.) The length of time necessary to process a contested case
was, in each research year, at least a third greater in Westches-
ter and New York counties than in Onondaga County.103 The
allocation of divorces among the three case categories also varied
markedly; contested cases, for example, were ten times as nu-
merous in Onondaga County as in New York County. Similarly,
102 For example, in the 1980 presidential election 62% of Manhattan voters chose
the Democratic ticket, while 51% of Onondaga and 54% of Westchester voters chose the
Republican ticket. Id. at 394.
1o It was 38% higher in 1978 and 33% higher in 1984.
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the rate of pro se representation was considerably higher in New
York County than in Westchester County;104 in 1984, cases
where both parties were represented by counsel were more than
four times as numerous in Westchester as in New York County.
The proportion of cases in which the wife was the plaintiff va-
ried less dramatically.'05
TABLE 2
THE DIVORCE PROCESS BY COUNTY
New York Onondaga Westchester Combined
County County County Counties
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
Avg. duration
contested case
(years) 1.3 1.5 .8 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.3
Pro se rate
(wives)* 26 25 - - 15 14 - -
Pro se rate
(husbands)* 31 31 - - 26 33 - -
% cases
both parties
represented
by counsel 24 11 - - 54 47 - -
% divorces
contested 5 3 22 33 14 16 14 17
% divorces
consensual 19 6 22 27 27 25 23 19
% divorces
default 75 92 55 40 59 60 63 64
% wife
plaintiff"* 53 57 76 72 69 71 66 67
*Based on weighted data for each case category within each county.
**In fault-based (contested and default) samples.
-This information was not available for this county. See note 105 supra.
The sample also shows some significant regional differences.
(See Table 3.) In both research years the New York County
104 Information on the type of representation was missing from a high proportion of
Onondaga default files in both research years, making conclusions difficult.
'16 In all three counties husbands were more likely to be plaintiffs in default cases
(40%) than in contested cases (29%) in 1978. By 1984 this difference had evaporated.
Husbands were plaintiffs in 33% of the cases in both categories.
In both years in all counties the most frequent fault allegation was cruel and inhu-
man treatment (58% in 1978, 56% in 1984), with abandonment in second place (35% in
1978, 41% in 1984). For both years, however, an allegation of abandonment was far more
likely in default cases; among the defaults, abandonment and cruelty allegations were
about equal (48% abandonment 1978, 50% 1984).
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sample had the lowest average marital duration and the smallest
number of children. The Onondaga County sample consistently
was the youngest and had the most children.
TABLE 3
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF DIVORCE
POPULATION,* BY YEAR AND COUNTY
New York Onondaga Westchester Combined
County County County Counties
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
Avg. marital
duration
(years) 9.8 8.9 11.3 10.3 12.3 11.4 11.1 10.2
Avg. number
minor
children .7 .6 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0
% with
minor
children 39 33 71 66 53 52 58 50
*Based on weighted data for each case category within each county.
Family incomes for the contested category (the only group
for which such information was available) also varied by county.
(See Table 4.) In 1984 the average family income for the New
York County contested sample was more than double that of
Onondaga County, with Westchester in the middle."' The num-
ber of high status professionals among husbands in the New
York County sample was also approximately triple that of the
other two counties; the number of wives with high status em-
ployment was also greater. 107
,08 Average family incomes for the 1984 contested sample were $79,800 (New York
County), $36,700 (Onondaga County), and $56,700 (Westchester County). The high New
York County average reflects a small number of cases with extremely high incomes; me-
dian family income was actually lower in New York County than in Westchester County,
See Table 4 infra.
107 To some extent this is a reflection of the relatively high proportion of the New
York County population that is college educated. According to 1980 Census data, 33.2%
of the residents of New York County had sixteen or more years of education, as com-
pared to 19.4% in Onondaga County and 28% in Westchester County. 1983 CouNi m' D
Crry DATA BOOK supra note 90, at 388.
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TABLE 4
SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
OF CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
BY YEAR AND COUNTY
New York Onondaga Westchester All Contested
County County County Cases
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
Avg. age
husband (years) 41.3 43.6 38.4 36.8 41.4 42.3 40.4 40.9
Avg. age
wife (years) 37.7 39.8 35.8 35.0 38.3 39.6 37.3 38.1
Median husband
income ($1000s) 31.6 29.6 28.8 24.7 34.8 30.6 30.6 28.3
Median wife
income ($1000s) 11.6 6.9 8.0 9.8 5.8 13.8 8.5 10.2
Median family
income ($1000s) 48.1 39.9 37.4 33.4 41.6 43.5 40.2 39.5
% wives
employed 59 62 66 74 66 80 64 73
% husband
high status
occupationle8  10 30 1 12 6 11 5 18
% wives
high status
occupation ' " 2 5 0 3 0 1 0 3
% wives
homemaker 26 22 30 22 32 18 30 21
% husbands
college or
more educ. - 51 - 18 - 50 - 37
% wives
college or
more educ. - 39 - 14 - 37 - 30
All money figures are in $1984.
-Educational information was not required by the net worth affidavits in use in 1978.
Population characteristics also varied quite dramatically by
case category. (See Table 5.) The average marital duration for
couples in the default sample was consistently lower than that of
the couples in the contested and consensual categories. In 1984,
58% of contested and 52% of consensual cases involved mar-
riages of ten or more years; only 33% of default cases did.
Couples in the default sample also had fewer children than their
108 The following occupations were classified as high status: architects, business ex-
ecutives, dentists, engineers, government officials and managrs, lawyers, military officers,
physicians, professors, and scientists.
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counterparts in the contested and consensual groups.
TABLE 5
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE,
BY YEAR AND CASE TYPE
Complete
Contested Consensual Default Sample
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
Avg. marital
duration
(years) 13.3 12.7 11.1 11.8 9.7 8.6 11.7 11.1
Avg. number
minor
children 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.1
% with minor
children 76 70 64 58 51 42 60 56
Both the sample and the total pool of divorcing couples
within the three research counties had a relatively long average
marital duration and more children than national samples of di-
vorced couples described in Census data.1" 9 But the sample's av-
erage marital duration and family size were relatively close to
those reported for other divorce samples in the Northeast. 10
The contested sample also appears to be older" and thus
wealthier1 2 than the national population of divorcing couples
and to have relatively high incomes when compared to Census
109 STATISTICAL ABsTRAcT, supra note 6, at 88 (Table 131) (reporting national me-
dian marital duration at first divorce of 6.9 years in 1984; average of .92 children in-
volved in each divorce action).
10 See Rosalyn B. Bell, Alimony and the Financially Dependent Spouse in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland, 22 FAiL LQ. 225, 265 (1988) (median marital duration at
divorce of 9.5 years in Maryland in 1984 and 9A years in 1985); McLindon, supra note
42, at 357 (11.8 year average marital duration; average of 1.3 children per divorce in
surveyed New Haven, Conn. population in 1980); Wishik, supra note 42, at 83 (10.6 year
average marital duration in several surveyed Vermont counties in 1982). California re-
searchers have reported a much lower average marital duration. See Seal, supra note 44,
at 11-12 (reporting average marital duration among divorcing couples in San Diego, Cal.,
of 6.1 years).
-, See Table 4 supra. Nationally, the median age of men divorced in 1978 was 32.0
years; of women 29.7 years. The median age of men divorced in 1984 was 34.3 years;
women 31.7 years. STATSTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 88 (Table 131).
"' Individual net worth is correlated with age, (see US. BuREAu OF THE CENSUS.
HOUSEHOLD WEALTH AND AssEr OWNRSHM 1984 3-4 (1986) (Current Population Re-
ports, Series P-70, No. 7) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD NET WorrH]), as is the value of mari-
tal property.
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Bureau samples for each research county 13 and married couple
households nationally.114 In both years the gap between hus-
bands' and wives' average earnings was also somewhat larger
than the earnings gap of married couples generally.11
Although most population characteristics of the sample re-
mained fairly stable over the research period, the later sample
had a shorter average marital duration, fewer children, and a
higher rate of employment among women. Because of the higher
rate of employment among women, and a slight decline in hus-
bands' earnings when inflation was taken into account, women's
earnings also made up a slightly higher percentage of total fam-
ily income in the post-equitable distribution period.,1 These
trends, with the exception of marital duration and the decline in
the value of husbands' earnings, are consistent with national
patterns1 and those reported by other divorce researchers over
the same time period.118
113 The Census Bureau reports that, in 1979, median household income was $13,904
in New York County; $17,574 in Onondaga County, and $22,725 in Westchester County.
1988 CrTY AND CouNTY DATA BooK, supra note 89, at 358.
14 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 445 (Table 718) (married couple house-
holds where the husband was the householder had median income of $34,782 in 1988).
1' In 1978 sample husbands' average income was $50,681, while sample wives' aver-
age income was $14,472. In 1984, sample husbands' average income was $45,475 while
sample wives' average income was $15,130. For married couples nationally, in 1981, hus-
bands' mean earnings were $20,866 while wives' mean earnings were $8598, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 455 (Table 736).
'1 Wives' earnings accounted for an average of 21% of family income in 1978 and
24% in 1984 when inflation was taken into account. Id.
117 Id. at 88 (Table 131) (reporting decline in average number of children per di-
vorce from 1.01 in 1978 to .92 in 1984); id. at 385 (Tables 636 & 637) (reporting increase
in percentage of married women in labor force between 1975 (44.5%) and 1985 (54.3%));
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND LIVING An-
RANGEMENTS 15 (Current Population Reports Series P-23, No. 104) (1980) (reporting that
proportion of married couple income earned by the wife rose from 20% to 26% between
1960 and 1978); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 455 (Table 736) (reporting in-
crease in mean earnings of husbands and wives in constant dollars between 1981 and
1987); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, March 1991 Current Population
Survey (unpublished worktables 1991) (proportion of married couple income earned by
wife in 1991 was 33.5%).
" See McLindon, supra note 42, at 357-58 (reporting smaller number of children
per marriage and higher women's employment rate but longer average marital duration
for 1980s divorce sample in New Haven, Conn. than for 1970s sample).
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D. The Impact of the Equitable Distribution Law
1. The Divorce Process
The change in the law was not associated with any major
changes in case processing. The percentage of husbands and
wives with lawyers did not increase. The likelihood that a case
would be contested increased markedly only in Onondaga
County; indeed, in New York County the rate of contested cases
declined by almost half over the research period. It was impossi-
ble to ascertain from the case files whether these regional varia-
tions are due to differing local practice norms in relation to the
equitable distribution law or to other factors.
The average duration of a. contested divorce action did go
up slightly over the survey period, from 1.3 to 1.5 years. This
change was consistent across the three research counties. It was
impossible to ascertain whether this tendency toward increased
case processing time increased legal fees as well, as information
on legal fees in the case files was too incomplete to make any
meaningful analysis." 9
The contested group in the post-equitable distribution pe-
riod also included a substantially higher number of high-status
professionals than in the earlier research period. In 1978 only 5%
of husbands in this case category described their jobs as profes-
sional or managerial. In 1984, 18% did so. The greatest change
was in New York County, where three times as many husbands
described their employment as professional or managerial in the
post-equitable distribution period as did previously. There were
similar, although more modest, changes in the employment sta-
tus of wives. The reasons for this shift are unclear.
2. Property Distribution
It was generally expected that the equitable distribution law
would increase the share of assets that divorced wives typically
received. This result was anticipated for several reasons. The law
expanded the pool of property available for distribution by per-
mitting judges to disregard legal title to an asset.120 Moreover,
courts in other equitable distribution jurisdictions had begun to
1 Anecdotal evidence suggests that legal fees have risen. See note 328 infra.
120 1980 N.Y. Laws 434, 436 (codified at N.Y. Dom. REL LAw § 236(B)(1)(c), (5)(c)-
(d) (McKinney 1986)).
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expand the definition of property to include nontransferable as-
sets like pensions;12' such developments were possible in New
York as well. The new equitable distribution law also explicitly
required the court to consider contributions as a homemaker
and parent in asset distribution, 122 as well as each spouse's fu-
ture expectations and a variety of other need-based factors. 12 3
This emphasis on need and nonmonetary contributions was also
expected to benefit women.
Population surveys support this expectation. With respect
to need, among white married couples aged 25 to 64, three out of
four husbands earn more than their wives; in half of these mar-
riages the wife's wage is less than two-thirds that of her hus-
band. 2 4 Even when both spouses are the same age and have the
same education, the odds that the wife will earn more than her
husband are three to one. 25 With respect to contribution, hus-
bands, by virtue of their larger incomes, have typically contrib-
uted more dollars to the marriage. But when nonmonetary con-
tributions as a parent and homemaker are taken into account as
the equitable distribution law mandated, 28 surveys reveal that
married women today contribute at least as many hours of work
to the household as their husbands;127 although women work
121 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (holding
that nonvested pension constituted marital property subject to division). Some of the
cases on pension benefits are collected in Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Pension or
Retirement Benefits As Subject to Award or Division by Court in Settlement of Prop-
erty Rights Between Spouses, 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979).
Other nontransferable assets that have been the subject of litigation under equitable
distribution laws include professional degrees and licenses, disability benefits, celebrity
goodwill, worker's compensation benefits, and personal injury claims. For a discussion of
judicial treatment of these assets under equitable distribution laws, see generally OLD-
HAM, supra note 32, at §§ 7-87 to -93, 8-3 to -31.
122 1980 N.Y. Laws 436 (codified at N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d)(6) (McKinney
1986)).
"1 1980 N.Y. Laws 436 (codified at N.Y. DoM REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d)(1)-(5) (McKin-
ney 1986)).
124 VICTOR R. FucHs, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 52 (1988).
125 Id.
12 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a)(8) (McKinney 1986).
,2 See FUCHS, supra note 124, at 78 (Table 5.1); LEVITAN & BELOUS, supra note 6, at
100. Moreover, as women's labor force participation rate has increased, their hours of
work in the home have not declined proportionately. In 1960 women worked 91% of the
hours worked by men. By 1986 they worked 104% of the hours worked by men. The
change was particularly great for married couples. On average, wives increased their total
workload by 4 hours per week while husbands deceased theirs by 2.5 hours. FucHs, supra
note 124, at 80.
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fewer hours outside the home than do men, the number of hours
they spend on housework and childcare makes up for the
difference.12
Did the equitable distribution law benefit divorced wives as
reformers anticipated it would? The reformers' assumptions
were certainly accurate with respect to need and nonmonetary
contributions. The average income of husbands in the contested
group was approximately three times that of wives12 and income
potential was similarly skewed; 18% of husbands had high-sta-
tus managerial or professional jobs, while only 3% of wives held
similar positions. Wives also assumed the role of custodial par-
ent in at least eight out of ten cases." 0 But some of the other
assumptions upon which reformers relied proved to be highly
flawed.
a. Who Owns the Property?
The drafters of the equitable distribution law assumed that
husbands owned more property than wives and that a rule per-
mitting legal title to be disregarded would thus significantly ex-
pand the pool of assets available for distribution.13' Sample
couples bear out the first part of this assumption: husbands did
own more property than wives. (See Table 6.)
Overall, in both research years, 30% of listed assets were
owned jointly.132 Among the 70% that were solely owned, hus-
bands were owners more frequently than wives, although the
wife's percentage did increase over the research period.' 33
12 For studies of women's disproportionate share of homemaking responsibilities,
see PATRICIA A. Roos, GENDER AND WORK: A COMPARATivE ANALYs OF INDUSTmRU SOCIE-
•ms 16-29 (1985); GRLAHsi L STAiNms & JOSEPH H. PLECE, THE IMPACT OF WORK SCHED-
ULES ON THE FA mY 63 (1983). See also LEvrrAN & BELous, supra note 6, at 100 (men
spend less than 3 hours per week on housework as compared to 18 hours per week for
women).
2 In 1984 husbands' average income was $45,475 while that of wives was $15,130.
130 See Table 52 infra.
"I See, e.g., Alan D. Scheinkman, 1981 Practice Commentary, N.Y. DoL Rn, Low §
236B ("the title concept worked a great hardship on a spouse (typically the wife) whose
mate accumulated property during the marriage and held title in his or her name
alone").
1M2 The likelihood of joint ownership varied fairly dramatically among case catego-
ries, however. In 1984 only 25% of listed assets were jointly owned in the contested
group, as compared to 54% in the consensual group. (Sixty-five percent of the listed
assets in default cases were joint, but listings were rare for this category.)
'3 In 1978 husbands were listed as owners of 43% of all assets, compared to 26%
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The likelihood of husband, wife, or joint ownership varied
dramatically by asset type. (See Table 6.) Husbands were more
likely than wives to report owning assets in most categories: cars,
pensions, businesses, real estate, nonliquid assets, and liquid as-
sets other than bank accounts were all owned disproportionately
by husbands.13 4 Listed jewelry, not surprisingly, was dispropor-
tionately owned by wives. Listed bank accounts were owned by
husbands and wives in almost equal numbers. The marital home
and household goods and furniture were most typically held in
joint ownership.
TABLE 6
ASSET OWNERSHIP, BY ASSET TYPE,
YEAR, AND CASE CATEGORY 35
Case Category All Listed
Asset Type Contested Consensual Assets
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
AUTOMOBILES (n=365) (n=408) (n=88) (n=126) (n=476) (n-566)
Husband 65 56 47 40 61 51
Wife 32 36 18 29 28 34
Joint 2 9 35 31 10 16
BUSINESS ASSETS (n=67) (n=75) * * (n=71) (n=88)
Husband 94 77 92 76
Wife 1 13 1 12
Joint 4 9 7 11
HOUSEHOLD GOODS
& FURNITURE (n=272) (n=293) (n=66) (n-84) (n=356) (n-391)
Husband 19 14 - 1 15 11
Wife 19 18 - 1 15 14
Joint 61 69 100 98 70 75
(continued)
for wives; in 1984 husbands were listed as owners of 39% of all assets, compared to 30%
for wives. The likelihood of husband or wife ownership was not markedly different be-
tween case categories. In 1984, in the contested group, husbands were 23% more likely
than wives to own any asset (42.2% husband ownership, 32.7% wife ownership); in the
consensual group, husbands were 29% more likely to own property than wives (26.5%
husband ownership, 18.8% wife ownership).
'3 This was true both when assets were counted individually, and when they were
counted by category. Table 6 shows asset ownership counting each listed asset individu-
ally; thus if a spouse reported owning three cars, each was included. It is highly probable
that, particularly for the consensual group, the listed assets do not include all of the
couple's assets. See note 167 infra.
13' There were insufficient listings in the default category for independent analysis.
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JEWELRY
Husband
Wife
Joint
LIQUID ASSETS
Bank Accounts
Husband
Wife
Joint
Other
Husband
Wife
Joint
NONLIQUID ASSETS
Pensions
Husband
Wife
Joint
Other
Husband
Wife
Joint
MARITAL HOME
Husband
Wife
Joint
OTHER REAL
ESTATE
Husband
Wife
Joint
OTHER ASSETS
Husband
Wife
Joint
ALL ASSETS
Husband
Wife
Joint
MARITAL DEBTS
Husband
Wife
Joint
(n=65)
20
80
(n=623)
43
42
15
(n=220)
62
25
14
(n=39)
82
19
(n=96)
66
26
8
(n=171)
12
4
84
(n=93)
38
10
53
(n=172)
59
23
18
(n=99)
22
67
11
(n=664)
41
44
15
(n=245)
47
40
11
(n=77)
78
22
(n=142)
51
38
11
(n=184)
10
5
85
(n=118)
47
14
38
(n=219)
43
22
35
(n=1983) (n=2524)
48 42
29 33
22 25
(n=872)
50
28
22
(n=993)
44
32
24
0 0
(n= 101)
18
17
45
(n=32)
34
16
44
(n-=86)
29
26
45
(n-36)
44
14
42
* S,
(n=173)
5
3
92
(n=172)
5
3
92
(n-38)
11
13
76
(n=63) (n-82)
21 17
5 10
75 73
(n=532) (n=692)
21 27
14 19
64 54
(n=147) (n= 183)
16 25
17 20
67 55
(n=70)
20
80
(n=745)
39
38
22
(n=262)
58
23
19
(n=40)
83
18
(n=108)
65
27
8
(n-392)
8
4
88
(n=104)
22
67
11
(n=731)
41
43
20
(n-278)
47
37
16
(n-92)
78
22
(n=165)
50
39
10
(n-399)
7
4
89
(n-126) (n- 165)
30 38
11 15
58 48
(n=244) (n306)
49 36
17 18
34 46
(n=2890) (n=3284)
43 39
26 30
30 30
(n=1059) (n-1217)
44 40
26 30
31 31
*There were insufficient listings in this asset category for analysis.
Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
At least among the contested sample (the only group for
whom asset valuations were typically available), husbands also
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tended to own more valuable property.13 (See Table 7.) Hus-
bands thus owned, on average, a signficantly larger proportion of
a couple's total asset value than did wives.
137
TABLE 7
MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF INDIVIDUALLY OWNED ASSETS
AND DEBTS IN 1984 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY
GENDER OF SPOUSE
Asset Type
Automobiles
Business Assets
Household Goods
Jewelry
Liquid Assets
Bank Accounts
Other
Nonliquid Assets
Pensions
Other
Real Estate
Other Assets
All Individual Assets
All Individual Debts
Individual Assets/
Total Family Assets
Individual Net Worth
Total Family Net Worth
Wife
Median Value
$ 2,400
$10,000
$ 2,500
$ 2,000
(n)
(125)
(7)
(48)
(58)
$ 499 (268)
$ 4,419 (75)
$ 6,600 (6)
$ 3,000 (54)
$40,000 (25)
$ 4,000 (40)
$ 1,700 (315)
$ 2,759 ( 77)
7%
$ 124 (315)
1%
Owner
Husband
Median Value (n)
$ 2,000 (185)
$39,700 ( 33)
$ 2,394 ( 34)
$ 1,100 ( 21)
$ 500 (251)
$ 4,750 (96)
$20,390 (23)
$ 4,462 (63)
$25,000 (59)
$ 2,300 (65)
$ 2,500 (315)
$ 7,500 ( 76)
11%
$ 50 (315)
9%
But percentages do not tell the whole story. The actual dol-
lar difference between the median value of reported husband
and wife owned property in 1984 was only $800. Even in 1978,
where the spread was greater, it was less than $2000. Further-
" In 1978 the mean value of assets individually owned by the husband was
$160,627 while the mean value of assets individually owned by the wife was $10,036. In
1984 the mean value of assets individually owned by the husband was $152,308, while the
mean value of assets individually owned by the wife was $23,638. If zero valuations are
eliminated, the differences are even more striking. For husbands in the contested sample
who declared solely owned property, the median value of that property was $7696 in
1978 (n=237) and $8000 in 1984 (n=223); for wives in the contested sample who de-
clared solely owned property, the median value of that property was $3256 in 1978
(n=207) and $4662 in 1984.
' In 1978 the differential was much greater than in 1984. Compare Appendix Ta-
ble 1 and Table 7.
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more, husbands also had larger debts than did wives. Although a
substantial number of couples in both research years declared no
individual debts, among those couples who did, the median
value of husband's unsecured debts was approximately double
that of wives in 1978,138 and approximately triple that of wives
in 1984.139 This tendency for husbands to have larger debts
eroded, to some extent, their property advantage. In 1984 the
median individual net worth (assets minus debts) of wives was
thus slightly higher than that of husbands.
The relatively small differential between the median net
worth of husbands and wives in the sample population reflects,
in part, the pattern of asset ownership among the group. The
types of property most commonly declared were, with one excep-
tion, not those disproportionately owned by husbands. (Compare
Tables 6 and 15.) In both the contested and consensual case cat-
egories, 14 couples were most likely to declare a marital resi-
dence, household furniture, a bank account, and a car. Except
for cars, none of these were assets disproportionately owned by
husbands. Assets that husbands did own disproportionately were
declared'relatively infrequently. For example, in 1984 husbands
and wives declared as assets 614 cars, 437 collections of house-
hold furniture, and 800 bank accounts or cash.14 1 By contrast,
only 96 pensions and 88 businesses were declared by couples
during that year.142
The most important point to be drawn from the asset and
net worth valuations, however, is the relative scarcity of valua-
ble, individually owned assets. Less than half of the surveyed
husbands owned property worth as much as $2500 even in the
relatively wealthy contested sample; only about a third of the
group owned property worth $10,000.143 Indeed, more than half
12 See id. The median value of joint debts was $2720 (n=105).
In 1984, among couples in the contested case sample who declared debts, the
median value of joint debts was $3264 (n=108).
14' Information on marital assets was too frequently lacking in the default cases to
permit meaningful analysis.
14 In 1978, 524 cars, 468 collections of household furniture, and 770 bank accounts
or cash were listed by couples in the sample.
"1 In 1978 even fewer pensions (43) and businesses (71) were listed by sample
couples.
"' In 1978, 35% of husbands owned property worth $10,000 or more; in 1984, 33%
did. Among wives, in 1978, 18% owned property worth $10,000 or more; in 1984, 25% did
SO.
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of husbands had individual net worth of less than $50. For this
group, the equitable distribution law's promise of expanding the
pool of assets by ignoring title was simply chimerical.
b. How Much Are Their Assets Worth?
A second assumption implicit in the expectation that equi-
table distribution would benefit divorced wives is that the typi-
cal divorcing couple has enough property-owned individually
or jointly-so that its distribution could make a significant dif-
ference in the economic well-being of each spouse. Was this as-
sumption correct?
Because asset valuations typically were not provided by
couples in the consensual or default case samples, values could
only be determined for the contested group. As this group listed
relatively high incomes in comparison to Census income figures
for the overall population of the research counties,4 it is likely
that these couples had more assets, and more valuable assets,
than the average divorcing couple in that county. Even for this
relatively wealthy group, however, the median value of listed as-
sets was only $32,717 in 1984.145 Their median net worth (assets
'minus debts) was $23,591.141 A substantial number of sample
couples, indeed, had negative net worth (their debts exceeded
the value of their assets). (See Table 8.)
"' See note 89 & Table 1 supra.
4" In 1978 the median gross value of declared assets was $39,005; the mean value
was $218,282. The median net value of declared assets was $33,723; the mean value was
$201,965.
... The pattern was similar in 1978. See Appendix Table 1.
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VALUE ($1984)
TABLE 8
OF ASSETS REPORTED
CASE SAMPLE
BY 1984 CONTESTED
Gross Market Value Net Worth
of Assets (Including Debts)
Property Value % Cumulative % % Cumulative %
(n=315) (n-=315)
(Negative value) (18) (18)
$0-$4999 22 22 13 31
$5000-$9999 7 29 6 37
$10,000-$19,999 11 39 9 46
$20,000-$29,999 9 48 9 55
$30,000-$39,999 6 53 4 58
$40,000-$49,999 6 60 4 63
$50,000-$99,999 16 75 14 77
$100,000-$199,999 9 84 6 83
$200,000-$299,999 6 89 7 90
$300,000+ 11 100 11 100
Cumulative percentages may not add correctly due to rounding.
Median $ 32,717 $ 23,591
Mean $239,244 $215,616
These values are higher than those reported by Weitzman
for her sample of divorcing couples in California, but they are
highly consistent with McLindon's New Haven, Connecticut, di-
vorce sample, which had a similar average marital duration. (See
Table 9.)
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TABLE 9
MEDIAN VALUE OF DIVORCING COUPLES' ASSETS ($1984),
BY RESEARCH SITE
Median Gross
Value
Median Net Worth
Value
Anchorage, Alaska'47  $142,550 $ 72,000
Los Angeles &
San Francisco, California1 48  $ 21,756 $ 16,132
New Haven, Connecticut $ 32,891 $ 23,922
New York/Onondaga/
Westchester, New York $ 32,717 $ 23,591
All U.S. married
couples' 50 - $ 50,116
c. How Much Property Is Unavailable for Distribution?
How many of these assets were unavailable for distribution
because they were acquiredbefore the marriage or through gift
or inheritance and thus would be classified as separate property?
In 1984,151 37% of the contested sample (the only group for
which separate property -information was typically available)
listed at least one item of separate property. This is a considera-
bly higher rate of separate property ownership than that re-
ported by Weitzman in California. 52 The types of property most
frequently claimed as separate were bank accounts or other liq-
uid assets. Fully 40% of assets declared as separate fell into one
of these two categories. Cars accounted for another 15% of the
total.
The median value of total separate property for those
couples who reported it was $8050.153 Among those couples
where at least one spouse claimed separate property, the value
147 BAKER, supra note 42, at 5 (Table 4).
WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 56 (median gross asset value $14,700, median net
asset value $10,900 in 1977-78; figures in the table have been converted to $1984).
"' McLindon, supra note 42, at 381 (median gross asset value $30,455, median net
worth $22,150 in 1982-83; figures in the table have been converted to $1984).
110 HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH, supra note 112, at 6 (Table 1).
,' In 1978 this information was typically not provided.
... WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 55 (less than 14% of sample listed assets claimed as
separate).
113 The mean total value was $40,421.
Research
Site
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of that property represented an average of 26% of the value of
all listed property.16 ' These couples also tended to be wealthier
than the average sample couple.1 5
Wives were somewhat more likely than husbands to claim
separate property. In 1984 wives owned 60% of the assets
claimed as separate property. The mean value of property
claimed by wives as separate was also slightly higher than that
claimed by husbands, 56 although the median value was only half
of that for husbands. (See Table 10.)
TABLE 10
OWNERSHIP AND VALUE ($1984) OF SEPARATELY OWNED
ASSETS IN 1984 CONTESTED SAMPLE, BY ASSET TYPE
Asset Type Percentage Owned by Each Spouse and Median Value
(n) Wife Husband
Automobiles (40) 52% $ 1,000 48% $ 3,175
Liquid Assets
Bank accounts (55) 66% $ 715 34% $ 595
Other (53) 65% $ 4,531 35% $ 6,909
Nonliquid Assets (14) 50% $ 6,543 50% $12,000
Real Estate (26) 46% $52,800 54% $23,000
Other Assets (76) 61% $ 2,500 39% $ 1,900
ALL SEPARATE
ASSETS (265) 60% $ 2,500 40% $ 4,325
Although the difference was not statistically significant,
couples married less than five years were somewhat more likely
to claim that at least one item of property was separate. Fifty-
two percent of this group so claimed, as compared to 35% for
the rest of the sample.1 57 The average ratio of separate to total
property (value of separate property divided by total property
value) for this group was also more than double that for the rest
of the sample. (See Table 11.)
The median value was 12%.
The median value of their marital property was $53,033 and the mean value
$412,990.
" The mean value of separate property reported by wives was $18,693 (n-133); the
mean value of separate property reported by husbands was $16,985 (n-81).
157 Separate property was claimed by 32% of couples married between five and ten
years (n=71); 32% of couples married between ten and fifteen years (n=68); 33% of
couples married between fifteen and twenty years (n=51); and 40% of couples married
more than twenty years (n=78).
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TABLE 11
AVERAGE RATIO OF SEPARATE PROPERTY TO TOTAL
PROPERTY IN 1984 CONTESTED SAMPLE (COUPLES
DECLARING SEPARATE PROPERTY),
BY MARITAL DURATION
Marital Duration (n) Average Ratio
Separate Property/All Property
0-5 years (44) 21%
5-9 years (71) 10%
10-14 years (68) 10%
15-19 years (51) 7%
20+ years (78) 8%
d. What Is the Value of Marital Property?
After the elimination of separate property, how much was
left to divide? As Table 12 shows, not much. The gross value of
marital property for the 1984 contested case sample was $26,400;
the median net worth (marital assets minus marital debts)
$23,591.
TABLE 12
VALUE ($1984) OF MARITAL PROPERTY REPORTED BY 1984
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
Property Value Gross Value Net Worth
% Cumulative % % Cumulative %
(Negative value) (22) (22)
$0-$4999 23 23 14 35
$5000-$9999 10 34 6 41
$10,000-$19,999 11 44 10 51
$20,000-$29,999 9 53 8 59
$30,000-$39,999 6 59 4 63
$40,000-$49,999 5 64 5 68
$50,000-$99,999 14 78 12 80
$100,000-$199,999 8 86 7 87
$200,000-$299,999 5 91 4 92
$300,000+ 10 100 8 100
Cumulative percentages may not add correctly due to rounding.
Median $ 26,400 $ 18,266
Mean $224,231 $200,602
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As one would expect, the value of marital property in-
creased with marital duration."" The median net asset value of
couples married twenty or more years was more than fifteen
times greater than that of couples married less than five years.
(See Table 13.)
TABLE 13
MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN 1984
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY MARITAL DURATION
Length of Marriage (n) Gross Value Net Value
0-5 years (44) $11,522 $ 2,885
5-9 years (71) $12,962 $ 4,500
10-14 years (68) $27,220 $19,540
15-19 years (51) $44,449 $35,449
20+ years (79) $57,869 $52,969
The value of marital property was also strongly correlated
with family income.159 (See Table 14.) Families with a yearly in-
come under $25,000 had a median net asset value of less than
$2000, while those with a yearly income in excess of $75,000 had
a median net asset value of more than $200,000.
TABLE 14
MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF MARITAL PROPERTY IN 1984
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY FAMILY INCOME ($1984)
Median Income Gross Assets Net Assets
Yearly Family Income (n) (In Group) (Median) (Median)
Less than $25,000 (41) $ 19,500 $ 6,195 $ 1,791
$25,000-$49,999 (103) $ 36,816 $ 6,000 $ 22,425
$50,000-$74,999 (28) $ 55,190 $ 81,735 $ 73,021
$75,000+ (33) $100,000 $362,981 $245,995
At the lowest income level, yearly income typically exceeded me-
dian net worth by a substantial margin. The hypothetical me-
dian couple in this group could earn the entire value of their net
I The relationship was statistically significant. Pearson's R=.1294; p=.011. Simi-
lar patterns have been reported by other divorce researchers. See Wrrzm, supra note
4, at 58; Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 470.
"I The relationship was statistically significant. Pearson's R.7437; p-'.000. Simi-
lar patterns have been reported elsewhere. See BAaa, supra note 42, at 7; HousmmLD
NET WORTH, supra note 112, at 5 (Table G); WErrzuAN, supra note 4, at 59-60.
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worth in about a month and a half. At the upper end of the
income scale, by contrast, net worth typically exceeded yearly
income. In this group, it would take two and a half years to earn
the value of median net worth. The median family income for
the entire contested case sample was $39,464; for this group it
would take about seven months to earn median net worth. These
figures, strikingly similar to those Weitzman reports for her Cal-
ifornia divorce sample,160 point up both the relative scarcity of
valuable marital property among divorcing couples and the low
value of property in relation to income.
e. What Types of Assets Do Divorcing Couples Own?
The typical divorcing couple's assets are not simply small in
relation to their income; much of their net worth represents as-
sets that are not liquid and thus difficult to utilize for future
consumption needs. (See Table 15.) The only types of assets
that were reported by more than half of the 1984 contested case
sample were automobiles, household goods and furniture, and
the marital residence.161 Income-producing assets such as a busi-
ness or real estate, or liquid assets other than a bank account
were infrequently listed.
"' WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 59-60. See also HOUSEHOLD NET WORTH, supra note
112, at 5 (Table G) (showing similar relationship between household net worth and
monthly income).
1"I The figures for 1978 were fairly comparable. See Appendix Table 3.
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TABLE 15
OWNERSHIP AND MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF ASSETS
REPORTED, BY 1984 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
% Median
Asset Type Owning Value*
Automobiles 79 S 3,250
Business Assets 18 $29,750
Household Goods
& Furniture 83 S 4,000
Jewelry 24 $ 2,000
Liquid Assets
Bank Accounts 82 S 1,288
Other 37 S 5,419
Nonliquid Assets
Pensions 20 $13,801
Other 30 S 5,088
Marital Home 60 $39,000
Other Real Estate 25 $36,500
Other Assets 39 $ 4,000
Debts 82 $ 6,670
*Excluding zero valuations.
For most of the couples in the contested sample, the marital
home was by far the most important asset: not only did 60% of
the sample list a marital residence as an asset, but the median
value of the marital residence exceeded that of any other.22
This can be seen more graphically in Figure 1, which shows the
distribution of asset value by asset type. For the 1984 contested
sample, the value of the marital home represented an average of
30% of a couple's total asset value. Indeed, if those couples who
did not own a home are eliminated from the analysis, the mari-
tal home represented an average of 61% of total asset value. If
the value of the average couple's car and household furniture is
added to that of the marital home, these assets represent fully
59% of overall marital property value. Liquid assets-bank ac-
counts, stocks, and bonds-by contrast comprise only 19% of
I'l The importance of the marital residence as a component of overall asset values
has also been noted by other divorce researchers. See BAKm, supra note 42, at 6; WE=E-
z.AN, supra note 4, at 61-62; McLindon, supra note 42, at 375-76; Rowe & Morrow, supra
note 56, at 470 (Table 2).
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FIGURE 1
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSET VALUES
IN 1984 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
Cars (6%)
Liquid
Household Assets (19%)
Goods (23%)
...... Other(7%)
Marital
Home (30%)
Asset value distribution patterns could not be constructed
for the consensual and default samples16 3 given the relative in-
frequency of asset valuations in these files. But as the asset own-
ership pattern'1 4 and valuations6 5 for the contested group gen-
erally follow those reported by other divorce researchers,' 6 there
103 For the reported asset ownership rates for the consensual case sample, see Ap-
pendix Table 4. Assets were too infrequently reported in the default group to permit
analysis.
164 For a comparison of the reported asset ownership rates for the contested sample
with those reported by other divorce researchers, see Appendix Table 5.
' e For a comparison of median asset values in the 1984 contested case sample with
the values reported by other divorce researchers and the U.S. Census Bureau for married
couples nationally, see Appendix Table 6.
se One difference is worth noting. The reported asset ownership rates for the con-
tested sample are higher than those described by most other divorce researchers, while
those of the consensual sample are, for most categories, lower. Does this mean that the
contested group owned more property than the consensual group, or simply that they
reported more? The differential appears to represent both the relative wealth of the con-
tested sample, and underreporting on the part of the consensual group. Weitzman has
noted the tendency of couples with relatively insubstantial assets to distribute them pri-
vately without recording them on court documents. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 63-64.
The lack of an asset reporting requirement would tend to exacerbate this tendency
among the consensual group. That group's low reported ownership rate for some asset
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is no reason to presume a markedly different distribution in
these other case categories.
Analysis of the property ownership pattern for sample
couples thus reveals that some of the assumptions behind the
equitable property distribution law were highly flawed. Although
the average value of property individually owned by husbands
was greater than that individually owned by wives, most divorc-
ing husbands did not own significant individual assets. Indeed,
most sample couples did not have significant marital assets in
any form of ownership, and a relatively high proportion of their
meager marital property represented the value of nonliquid
property.
The scarcity of marital property, and the tendency for it to
be concentrated in nonliquid assets, suggest that a change in
property distribution rules would, for many divorcing couples,
fail to make any significant change in their economic well-being.
If a couple's marital property is worth only $26,400-the median
value for couples in the 1984 contested sample-getting two-
thirds of the property instead of one-third produces a dollar in-
crease of less than $9000. When one considers that much of that
marital property represents assets like furniture and a car
which, for most, cannot readily be sold and converted into capi-
tal, it is apparent that no property distribution scheme could
provide a real cushion for the transitional period following
divorce.
For the relatively small group of divorcing couples with sub-
stantial assets, the change in property distribution rules, could,
of course, make a significant difference. The next section de-
scribes the changes in property distribution that did occur after
the new law.
categories where one would expect nearly universal ownership-notably household goods
and furniture-also suggests underreporting. See Appendix Table 4 For the contested
group, however, the reported asset ownership rates approximate or exceed those reported
by Weitzman on the basis of interview data. while we cannot be sure that this group has
reported all assets, the evidence suggests relatively good compliance with the reporting
requirement.
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E. The Distribution of Assets and Debts
1. Methodological Issues In Property and Debt Division
Analysis
What impact did the law have on the distribution of marital
assets and debts? It is important to state at the outset that this
is an easier question to ask than to answer. Because the consen-
sual and default case files typically did not contain asset valua-
tions, percentage distributions of marital property to husband
and wife could not be calculated except for the contested group.
The most detailed information on property distribution in this
report is thus confined to the contested case sample, the group
that, given its relative wealth, had the most at stake.
Even here, many of the case files contained substantial
amounts of missing data, which made overall percentages diffi-
cult to compute. Two important asset categories (pensions and
spousal businesses) lacked reliable valuations more often than
not. In another important asset category, household goods and
furniture, asset valuations were often suspect; because of the
range of possible valuation approaches, husband and wife valua-
tions sometimes deviated from each other by substantial mar-
gins.1 67 Assets listed in one or another spouse's net worth state-
ment were not necessarily listed again in the stipulation of
settlement or judicial decree. Or, conversely, property listed in
the settlement or decree-without valuation-might not be
listed in the initial net worth statements. As a result of these
varying information problems, most of even the contested cases
contained one or more items of missing or suspect information.
To eliminate all cases except those with complete informa-
tion would have reduced the sample size to the point that more
complex analysis of the property data to determine the effect of
characteristics such as marital duration or income on distribu-
tion would have been largely precluded. In order to enlarge the
sample size sufficiently to permit more detailed analysis, distri-
butional percentages for property and net worth were therefore
tabulated both for cases in the contested sample with complete
information on assets and debts (the A Group) and for cases
167 Given the range of possible valuation approaches--market value, replacement
cost, and acquisition cost-it is not hard to see why such major discrepancies would turn
up.
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with complete distributional data for at least 90% of the known
pool of assets and/or debts, and no more than one missing valua-
tion (the B Group). 8 Both of these case subsets appear to be
fairly representative of the contested sample as a whole.1 60
Moreover, while a percentage distribution for the B group could
only be approximated, overall trends for the A and B groups
were quite consistent. The distribution of marital property and
debt for the combined A and B groups was also analyzed using a
variety of assumptions regarding missing data; results varied lit-
tle.'70 I have thus used the combined case sets (described as the
Valid Group) for most of the property division analysis.
The problem of incomplete information was compounded by
the fact that percentage distribution often gave a misleading im-
pression of case outcome. Consider the couple with more debts
than assets. In such a case of negative net worth, percentage dis-
tribution generally conveys an impression that is the opposite of
distributional consequences. Suppose, for example, that a couple
has $10,000 in debts and $7000 in assets and that wife receives
$5000 in debts and $4000 in assets, while husband receives $5000
in debts and $3000 in assets. While wife has actually fared bet-
ter than husband, the percentages tell a different tale: wife has
received 33% of net worth (-$1000/-$3000), husband 67%
(-$2000/-$3000). Because of this problem, cases involving nega-
tive net worth were eliminated from most analyses of net worth
distribution. Even when net worth is positive, the percentages
can convey an impression quite different than the dollar reality
when net worth is small. Consider, for example, a couple with
$1000 in assets and $900 in liabilities where wife receives the
assets and husband gets the debts. On a percentage basis, wife
has received 1000% of net worth ($1000/$100) while husband
has received -900% (-900/100); the dollar gap however, is only
'" Cases with a missing valuation for the marital home, other real property, a busi-
ness, or a pension were additionally excluded, given the relatively high mean and median
value for assets in these categories.
1" For a comparison of the A group, B group, and complete contested sample by
selected variables, see Appendix Tables 9 & 10.
170 For a demonstration of how differing assumptions would alter the overall results
with respect to the distribution of net worth and the marital estate, see Appendix Tables
7 & 8. All distributional data reported in the text that includes the B group was com-
puted on the basis of the following protocols: any debts or assets with missing valuations
were excluded from the analysis; debts or assets with missing distributions were assumed
to be distributed equally to each spouse.
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$1900. In order to avoid giving undue weight to cases like this
where a net worth percentage produces extreme values, and in
order to bring the negative net worth cases back into the analy-
sis, the distribution of property and debt was also analyzed by
adding debts to assets and calculating each spouse's share of this
pool on a 100 point scale.1"1 (For lack of a common term describ-
ing such a distribution, I have described it here as the distribu-
tion of the marital estate.) Using this approach, the spouse who
received all the assets and no debt would get 100% of the pool;
the spouse who received all of the debts and no assets 0%.172
This approach creates a more uniform measurement by narrow-
ing the percentage range through the elimination of negative
percentages and those in excess of 100%. While it is less intui-
tive than looking at net worth distribution, it may convey better
information. For most of the property division analysis, informa-
tion on net worth distribution is provided in the text and infor-
mation on marital estate distribution is provided in the Appen-
dix and footnotes.
2. The Overall Distribution of Assets and Debts
Overall, there was little change in the percentage distribu-
tion of marital property after the passage of the equitable distri-
bution law. (See Table 16.) In neither the group of cases with
complete asset information nor the Valid Group was there any
statistically significant shift in property distribution. Both
groups did evidencb an increase in the number of cases where
approximately equal division occurred, which appears to reflect
a decrease in the number of cases in which the husband received
the majority of the assets.
11 I am indebted to Professor Neil Cohen for suggesting this approach.
12 Using this approach for the first example in the text, wife receives 53% of
the marital estate (($-1000+$10,000)/$17,000, while husband receives 47%
(($-2000+$10,000)/$17,000).
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TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ASSETS IN THE CONTESTED
CASE SAMPLE (COUPLES WITH MARITAL ASSETS), BY
YEAR AND CASE GROUP
Case Group 1978 1984 Difference
Cases with cdmplete asset
information (n=84) (n=68)
Majority to wife 41 49 + 8
Relatively equal 11 19 + 8
Majority to husband 49 32 -17
Median % to wife 45 59 +14
Average % to wife 49 58 + 9
Wife received 50% or more 49 60 +11
Valid Group (n=140) (n=130)
Majority to wife 39 40 + 1
Relatively equal 16 26 +10
Majority to husband 45 34 -11
Median % to wife 50 51 + 1
Average % to wife 49 51 + 2
Wife received 50% or more 51 52 + 1
Majority = More than 60%
Relatively equal = Between 40% and 60%
The same pattern was apparent in the distribution of debts.
(See Table 17.) Although there was an increase in relatively
equal debt distribution, which appears to reflect a decrease in
the number of cases where the husband received the majority of
the debts, the wife's average and median debt share remained
remarkably constant. No shifts were statistically significant.
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TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF NET UNSECURED DEBT IN THE
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (COUPLES WITH UNSECURED
DEBT), BY YEAR AND CASE GROUP
Case Group 1978 1984 Difference
Cases with complete debt
information (n= 177) (n= 158)
Majority to wife 27 26 - 1
Relatively equal 6 13 + 7
Majority to husband 67 61 - 6
Median % to wife 8 10 + 2
Average % to wife 33 34 + 1
Wife received 50% or more 31 31 + 0
Valid Group (n=113) (n=106)
Majority to wife 23 24 + 1
Relatively equal 8 15 + 7
Majority to husband 69 61 - 8
Median % to wife 7 9 + 2
Average % to wife 31 31 + 0
Wife received 50% or more 29 31 + 2
Majority = More than 60%
Relatively equal = Between 40% and 60%
When the distribution of both debts and assets was consid-
ered, the same general tendencies held constant: for those sam-
ple couples with positive net worth,1 3 there was an increase in
the number of relatively equal division cases and a decrease in
the number of cases in which the husband received the majority.
Again, no changes demonstrated statistical significance. (See Ta-
ble 18.)
"' Couples with negative net worth were excluded from this portion of the analysis
because a percentage distribution has the opposite meaning than it does in the positive
net worth cases (i.e., getting 100% of the "worth" would mean getting all of the debts)
and thus is not directly comparable.
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TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF NET WORTH IN THE CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE (COUPLES WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH), BY YEAR
AND CASE GROUP
Case Group 1978 1984 Difference
Cases with complete asset
& debt information (n=60) (n=44)
Majority to wife 48 50 + 2
Relatively equal 8 16 + 8
Majority to husband 43 34 - 9
Median % to wife 55 62 + 7
Average % to wife 59 56 - 3
Wife received 50% or more 52 61 + 9
Valid Group (n=120) (n=104)
Majority to wife 46 45 - 1
Relatively equal 12 19 + 7
Majority to husband 43 37 - 6
Median % to wife 56 54 - 2
Average % to wife 56 55 - 1
Wife received 50% or more 53 57 + 4
Majority -- More than 60%
Relatively equal = Between 40% and 60%
Average = Trimmed mean (most extreme 5% of cases eliminated)' 7'
The distribution of the marital estate exhibits similar ten-
dencies: there was a trend toward approximately equal division,
which appears to primarily represent a decrease in the number
of cases in which the husband received a majority, and relative
constancy in the wife's median and average share. (See Table
19.) No shifts were statistically significant.
'"' The trimmed mean is reported because the mean was strongly skewed by a few
extreme cases. These extremes were most common in the net worth division percentages
when one spouse assumed most of the debts while the other received most of the assets;
while the dollar differential was generally modest, the percentage differential was often
extreme.
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TABLE 19
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE (THE SUM OF
ASSETS PLUS DEBTS) IN THE CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE,
BY YEAR AND CASE GROUP
Case Group 1978 1984 Difference
Cases with complete asset
& debt information (n=76) (n=55)
Majority to wife 50 46 - 4
Relatively equal 15 31 + 16
Majority to husband 36 24 -12
Median % to wife 60 58 - 2
Average % to wife 56 56 + 0
Wife received 50% or more 55 66 +11
Valid Group (n=141) (n = 134)
Majority to wife 47 44 - 3
Relatively equal 19 28 + 9
Majority to husband 34 28 -12
Median % to wife 57 58 + 1
Average % to wife 55 55 + 0
Wife received 50% or more 56 63 + 7
Majority = More than 60%
Relatively equal = Between 40% and 60%
One notable fact about these results is their failure to sup-
port the popular myth that women typically receive less than
half of the couple's net worth. The sample wives' median and
average shares of net worth were at least 50% both before and
after passage of the equitable distribution law; in both time peri-
ods, more than half of the sample wives received at least 50% of
net worth. The average share of marital property received by
women in the research population was, indeed, markedly similar
to that reported by Weitzman for Los Angeles and San Fran-
cisco, California, an equal division jurisdiction. 117 It is lower
than the average share reported by some researchers in other
equitable distribution jurisdictions. (See Table 20.)
,7' Weitzman reports that sample divorced wives received an average of 62% of the
marital property in San Francisco and 51% in Los Angeles in 1972. She does not report
the distribution of net worth. WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 74.
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TABLE 20
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET WORTH
TO DIVORCED WIVES, BY RESEARCH SITE
Research Average Percentage of Net
Site Worth to Divorced Wives
Anchorage, Alaska (1984-85)176
Divorces by dissolution 29%
Divorces by traditional divorce 50%
procedure
New Haven, Connecticut (1982-83)"77 68%
New York/Onondaga/Westchester Counties,
New York (1984)
(contested cases) 55%
Cuyahoga County, Ohio (1978)178
Divorces on fault grounds 77%
Divorces on basis of 61%
separation agreement
Three Urban Counties, Oregon (1982)170
(marriages of ten or more years)
When home owned 50%
When home not owned 64%
The other notable fact about the overall results is their con-
stancy. While the equitable distribution law was associated with
an increased tendency toward equal division, the overall picture,
for the surveyed contested group, did not change significantly
after passage of the new law.
As it was impossible to calculate overall distributional per-
centages for the consensual and default cases, we cannot be sure
that the pattern for the contested category applies to these
groups as well. But the distribution of specific assets and debts
listed by the research population does suggest a fairly similar
pattern. (See Table 21.)
176 BAKR, supra note 42, at 8.
1I McLindon, supra note 42, at 383.
178 STRmN ET EL, supra note 46, at 112.
179 Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 475.
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TABLE 21
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS TO SAMPLE
WIVES, BY YEAR AND ASSET TYPE
Asset Type
Percentage
Distribution 1978 1984 Difference
to Wife
Automobiles
50%
51% - 99%
100%
Business Interests
50%
51% - 99%
100%
Household Goods
& Furniture)180
50%
51% - 99%
100%
Jewelry
50%
51% - 99%
100%
Liquid Assets:
Bank Accounts
50%
51% - 99%
100%
Other
50%
51% - 99%
100%
(n=507)
1
0
44
45
(n=50)
2
0
10
12"
(n= 240)
10
0
57
67
(n=71)
0
0
77
77
(n=686)
9
1
44
54
(n=273)
15
0
27
2
(n=599)
1
0
4748*
(n-70)
4
0
16
20
(n=209)
7
0
63
70
(n=97)
0
0
77
77
(n=722)
7
1
48
56
(n=267)
7
0
41
48
(continued)
ISo There were large amounts of missing data in this category. In 174 instances in
1978 and 206 in 1984, couples listed household furniture but failed to indicate how it was
divided.
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Nonliquid Assets:
Pensions (n=41) (n=85)
50% 0 11
51% -99% 0 1
100% 15 19
15 31" +16
Other (n=99) (n=159)
50% 2 6
51% -99% 0 1
100% 24 49
26 56 +30
Marital Residence (n=-288) (n=304)
50% 24 22
51%- 99% 4 7
100% 47 43
75 72 -3
Other Real Estate (n=116) (n= 160)
50% 14 10
51% - 99% 1 0
100% 22 30
37 40 +3
Other Assets (n=207) (n=231)
50% 5 5
51% - 99% 0 1
100% 30 39
35 45 +10
* Some proportion of awards in this category were to children. '0
In all asset categories except jewelry, where no change occurred,
the percentage of cases in which the wife received a 50% or
greater share increased. In most asset categories, however, the
increases were trivial and statistically insignificant. In only two,
pensions and other nonliquid assets, was the difference greater
than ten percentage points and assets in these categories were
not typically owned by couples in the sample.
The trend toward wives receiving 50% or more of listed as-
sets was also offset to some extent by an increased tendency for
wives to shoulder 50% or more of listed debts. Overall, sample
wives were 18% more likely to shoulder 50% or more of a speci-
fied debt in 1984 than they were in 1978. (See Table 22.) The
tendency for wives to obtain somewhat more property was thus
1SI In 1978, 8% of business interests were awarded to children. In 1984, 1% of auto-
mobiles and 1% of pensions were awarded to children.
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counterbalanced to some extent by an increased tendency to
shoulder more debt.
TABLE 22
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEBTS TO SAMPLE
WIVES, BY YEAR AND DEBT TYPE
Debt Type 1978 1984 Difference
Bank Loans (n=234) (n=219)
50% 6 5
51% -99% 0 0
100% 26 24
32 29 -3
Credit Card Debts (n=256) (n=431)
50% 4 4
51% - 99% 0 1
100% 32 44
36 49 +13
Other Bills (n= 198) (n=141)
50% 7 13
51% - 99% 1 1
100% 31 26
39 40 +1
Other Loans & (n=388) (n=441)
Debts
50% 8 5
51% - 99% 0 0
100% 22 30
30 35 +5
All Debts (n=1076) (n-1232)
50% 6 6
51% - 99% 0 0
100% 27 33
33 39 +6
In overall terms, the data suggest that the equitable distribution
law had no more than a modest impact on the percentage distri-
bution of marital property and debt.
Nor did the equitable distribution law produce any dollar
gain for sample wives. In constant 1984 dollars, the median
value of net worth received by wives in the contested sample
actually declined over the research period from $8880 in 1978 to
$7500 in 1984. While the average value of the wife's net award
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did increase substantially'1 2 this difference is largely due to a
few atypical cases. In 1978, 75% of wives in the contested sam-
ple received a net award of less than $34,416; in 1984, 75% of
wives in the contested sample received a net award of less than
$37,504.
3. The Distribution of Some Specific Assets: A Closer Look
Continuity tended to prevail over change with respect to the
distribution of specific assets as well as in overall distributional
patterns.
a. The Marital Home
In both 1978 and 1984 approximately two-thirds of sample
couples owned a home. 8 3 In both research years the home was
jointly owned in 88% of all cases. Average equity for the con-
tested sample8 ' was $61,665 in 1978 and $83,968 in 1984.185
Change in the disposition of the family home, whether
rented or owned, was fairly modest between the two research
years. Among renters, wives were slightly more likely to keep the
family home in 1984 than they were earlier, but the change was
not statistically significant. (See Table 23.) This overall picture
masks some considerable disparities between counties and be-
tween case categories, however. In 1984, for example, the likeli-
hood of a wife receiving the rented home ranged from 69% in
the Westchester contested sample to 36% in the Onondaga con-
sensual sample. Overall, the likelihood of an award of a rental
home to a wife declined in consensual cases and increased in
contested cases. Awards to husbands and the vacancy rate corre-
spondingly declined in contested cases and increased in consen-
sual cases.
182 The average was $29,183 in 1978 and $84,537 in 1984.
18 Sixty-four percent of couples in the consensual and contested samples reported
owning their homes in 1978 as compared to 68% of this group in 1984. Because of the
large amount of missing data in the default files, the proportion of home owners could
not be determined for this group.
I" Equity could not be determined for the consensual or default cases.
188 The average masks substantial differences between counties. For both years
equities were lowest in Onondaga County ($35,198 in 1978, $26,346 in 1934) and highest
in New York County ($135,768 in 1978, $223,420 in 1984).
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TABLE 23
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL HOME (WHEN RENTED),
BY CASE TYPE 180 AND YEAR
Complete
Distribution Contested Consensual Sample*
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
%. %% %% %
To Wife 46 64 56 48 52 57
To Husband 29 18 29 33 29 24
Vacated 25 18 15 19 19 19
*Includes listings from default category.
Among home owners, husbands were slightly more likely to
retain occupancy 8 7 of the marital home under the new regime as
compared to the old one, but once again the difference was sta-
tistically insignificant. (See Table 24.) The increase in husband
ownership has come largely at the expense of occupancy orders
on behalf of wives, which declined by 50% over the research pe-
riod. On the other hand, the increase in husband ownership was
largely offset by cash settlements with wives. Thus, generally
speaking, the modest shift in the distribution of the marital
home that occurred between 1978 and 1984 seems to be one in
which wives lost occupancy but gained money instead.""'
280 Information on the disposition of a rental home was typically lacking in default
cases.
187 Occupancy of the marital home includes situations in which a spouse obtains sole
title, with or without paying a cash/settlement to the other spouse, and situations in
which ownership remains constant and a spouse is granted the right to live in the marital
home until some future contingency (e.g., the emancipation of the children) occur.
"I The overall changes in ownership and occupancy patterns were not completely
consistent across case categories, however. Although the probability of husbands receiv-
ing ownership or occupancy increased across all categories, the probability of wives re-
ceiving ownership was not constant. In the contested sample, wives were actually more
likely to receive outright ownership in 1984 (36%) than in 1978 (30%). The reason for
this difference is that the decline in occupancy awards was much more dramatic in the
contested (21% in 1978 to 8% in 1984) than in the consensual (16% in 1978 to 14% in
1984) cases, and within the contested category wives as well as husbands benefited from
the shift.
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TABLE 24
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL HOME (WHEN OWNED),
BY CASE TYPE1 89 AND YEAR
Distribution Contested Consensual Complete
Sample*
1978 1984 1978 1984 1978 1984
(n=175) (n=188) (n-184) (n=180) (n=407) (n=413)
% % % % ,%_ 0 %7
Title to W
w/o payment to H 29 29. 29 23 30 29
Title to W
with payment to H 4 4 3 3 3 4
Occupancy
to W 20 9 15 11 18 9
TOTAL
OCCUPANCY
TO WIFE 53 42 47 37 51 42
Title to H
w/o payment to W 14 18 14 13 14 16
Title to H
with payment to W 7 11 5 15 5 12
Occupancy
toH 3 3 1 3 2 3
TOTAL
OCCUPANCY
TO HUSBAND 24 32 20 31 21 31
Current Sale 23 21 34 31 27 26
*Includes listings in the default category.
The decline in occupancy awards was not matched by any
increase in the probability that the home would be sold.190 Nor,
when the home was sold, was there any decline in the proportion
of the net proceeds received by sample wives. 19' In terms of eq-
uity distribution there was, similarly, almost no discernible
change. In 1978 sample wives received an average of 63% of the
home equity; in 1984 they received an average of 61%.
189 Information on the disposition of the marital home was provided too infre-
quently in the default category to permit independent analysis.
190 Although sales did increase in the default category (from 18% in 1978 to 27% in
1984), the number of cases is too small for meaningful analysis.
181 In 1978 wives received less than 50% of the proceeds of a current eale in 6% of
the cases, exactly 50% in 73% of the cases, and more than half in 20% of the cases; in
1984, they received less than 50% in 8% of the cases, exactly half in 72% of the cases,
and more than half in 20% of the cases.
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Despite the overall lack of dramatic change over the re-
search period in regard to the disposition of the marital home,
long-married wives were adversely affected to a surprising de-
gree. (See Table 25.) Although marital duration was a significant
positive predictor of the marital home's disposition in both re-
search years,192 wives married twenty or more years suffered a
large, and statistically significant, 'decline in the likelihood of re-
ceiving the home. The decline in awards to these wives is largely
accounted for by a corresponding increase in awards to hus-
bands.1 93 The direction of change was consistent across case cat-
egories, although it was more pronounced in the consensual and
default cases than in those that were contested. 194
TABLE 25
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES AWARDED OCCUPANCY OR
OWNERSHIP OF MARITAL HOME (WHEN OWNED), BY YEAR
AND LENGTH OF MARRIAGE
Length of Marriage 1978 1984
% (n) % (n) Difference
Under 5 years 23 (39) 27 (44) + 4
5-9 years 40 (85) 34 (88) - 6
10-14 years 52 (92) 38 (89) -14*
15-19 years 61 (80) 55 (78) - 6
20+ years 64 (118) 50 (112) -14*
Total Sample 52 (414) 43 (411) - 9
*p <.05
The relationship between custody and disposition of the
marital home varied less substantially over the survey period.
An award of custody was a significant predictor of the disposi-
tion of the marital home in both research years.195 Occupancy
192 In 1978 chi-square-27.042 D.F.=4; p=.0000. In 1984 chi-square- 15.05364
D.F.=4; p=.0046.
193 Sales of the marital home increased by only 2% among couples married 20 or
more years.
'" In contested cases the likelihood of wives married 20 or more years obtaining the
home declined from 63% to 59%. In the consensual category it declined from 59% to
39%, and among defaults it declined from 54% to 40%. Given the relatively small num-
ber of default cases with complete information on disposition of the marital home and
marital duration (n=40 1978, n=32 1984), the default data does not permit definitive
conclusions.
19" In 1978 chi-square=35.41387 D.F.=4; p=.0000. In 1984 chi-square= 28.99461
D.F.=4; p=.0000.
[Vol. 57:621
NEW YORK'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW
awards did not vary significantly over the research period when
custody was taken into account.19 6
b. Pensions
Pensions were never distributed to the spouse without title
prior to the equitable distribution law, but as a result of judicial
interpretation of the new statute,9 they now may be. As hus-
bands are far more likely to own a pension than wives,"8 the
possibility of transfer is a significant advantage to women.
In the post-equitable distribution period, only 14% of sam-
pie wives received half or more of a husband's pension, however.
The wife's average share of a husband's pension was only 10%.
Among the contested sample, for whom the value of pension in-
terests was available, the average value of pension interests re-
ceived by wives did almost triple, from $4653 in 1978 to $11,679
in 1984. But the average value of pension interests received by
husbands also went up, from $31,013 to $61,741. While these
averages are based on very small samples, they suggest that
wives were still not receiving anything close to an equal share of
pension interests.
c. Businesses
Another asset category that the equitable distribution law
might have significantly affected is business assets. Like pen-
sions, businesses are typically held individually rather than
jointly and in the contested sample, where ownership informa-
tion was most frequently available, husbands individually owned
the family business in 88% of the 1978 cases and 80% of the
1984 cases. Despite the possibilities inherent in the equitable
distribution law for wives to receive a share of a business, this
19 In 1978, 62% of wives with sole custody (n-266) obtained occupancy of the mar-
ital home (when owned) as compared to 35% of wives without sole custody (n-150). In
1984, 55% of wives with sole custody obtained occupancy (n-219) as compared to 32%
of wives without sole custody. Husbands were also more likely to obtain occupancy when
they had sole custody (64% in 1978 (n-12), 78% in 1984 (n=23)) than were husbands
without sole custody (21% in 1978, 30% in 1984). Sale of the marital residence (20% in
1984) was also somewhat less likely when there were minor children.
19 See, e.g., Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481, 463 N.E.2d 15, 474 N.YS.2d
699 (1984) (vested pension is marital property).
198 Eighty-three percent of listed pensions were owned by husbands in 1978, as were
78% in 1984.
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did not occur. In both years wives received no share of a family
business 78% of the time.19 This result occurred despite an in-
crease in the number of businesses recorded. 20 0 The average
value of business interests received by wives in the contested
sample did increase, however.0 1
4. Typical Asset Distribution Patterns: What Kind of As-
sets Do Wives Receive?
The relative lack of change in the disposition of assets by
category meant that the "asset package" which wives typically
received remained relatively consistent over the research period.
In both research years, the assets that wives were most likely to
receive were the marital home and household goods and furni-
ture. (See Table 21.) This distributional pattern is extremely
similar to that reported by Weitzman in California, an equal dis-
tribution jurisdiction. o2
For the contested sample, it was possible to perform a more
detailed analysis of the composition of the award to divorced
wives. (See Figure 2.) In both research years the value of distrib-
uted equity in the marital home and household goods and furni-
ture made up at least 40% of the wife's average award. When
couples who did not own the marital home were excluded, the
wife's award was even more heavily affected by that asset. In
1984, among homeowners, the wife's share of the marital home
comprised an average of 50% of the value of her net award. 20 3
"' Although the proportion of cases in which wives received 50% or more of a busi-
ness went up by eight percentage points in 1984, the difference is accounted for by a
decline in awards to children.
200 Seventy-one businesses were listed by couples in the sample in 1978 as compared
to 88 in 1984.
20" In 1978 the average value of business interests received by wives in the contested
case sample was $29,322 (n=7); in 1984 it was $53,822 (n=10).
202 See WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 98 (reporting that wife received a "majority" of
assets in the following percentages of cases: automobiles 44%, businesses 20%, household
furniture 93%, liquid assets 76%, marital residence 81%, marital debts 42%. As Weitz.
man defines majority as more than 40%, exact comparisons are impossible).
202 In the 1984 Valid Group. In 1978 the percentage for this group was 61%.
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FIGURE 2
COMPOSITION OF PROPERTY AWARD TO WIVES
IN 1984 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID
GROUP), BY ASSET TYPE
Marital
Home (29%)
Liquid
Assets (26%)
*Other
(10%)
Household
Goods (11%).... .... ' Pensions,
~etc. (5%)
Automobiles
(17%)
F. Winners and Losers: Variation and Its Rationality
While the equitable distribution law thus appears to have
achieved little change in property distribution, these overall sim-
ilarities could mask some significant changes among groups, or
some changes in the variability of awards.
One issue is whether percentage distributions tended to cen-
tralize to a greater extent. Analysis of the frequency of different
percentage distributions shows that the distributional pattern
did move slightly toward an equal distributional norm, but that,
overall, the range of variation did not change substantially.2 4 In
both research years less than a third of sample couples divided
their assets and debts relatively equally (between 40% and
60%). Moreover, approximately the same percentage of wives re-
ceived less than 30% of the marital estate as received 80% or
more. (See Table 26.) The same pattern is evident in the distri-
bution of marital net worth.20 5 The equitable distribution law
was simply not associated with any marked decrease in the vari-
204 In 1978 variance for the distribution of the overall marital estate for the Valid
Group equaled .0940, kurtosis equaled -.9237. In 1984 these figures were quite similar.
variance equaled .0942, kurtosis -.7780.
20" See Appendix Table 11.
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ability of awards. The only other equitable distribution research
reporting the proportion of relatively equal distributions de-
scribes a similar pattern; slightly less than a quarter of that sam-
ple divided their property relatively equally.208
This variability in property distribution contrasts with the
pattern reported recently by a scholar who analyzed a substan-
tial group of judicial decisions on property division under equi-
table distribution statutes in six states.0 7 She found that courts
seldom deviated from an equal division except in extraordinary
cases, which usually involved a spouse in poor health.0 8 When
deviation did occur it was generally minimal, involving a sixty/
forty distribution.0 9 It thus appears that judges are far more in-
clined toward equal division than are litigants who settle their
cases themselves.
TABLE 26
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE (VALUE OF
ASSETS PLUS DEBTS) IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
(VALID GROUP), BY YEAR
Wife's Percentage 1978 1984
% cumulative % % cumulative %
(n=141) (n 134)
Less than 10% 13% 13% 13% 13%
10% - 19% 4% 17% 6% 19%
20% - 29% 5% 22% 1% 20%
30% - 39% 12% 34% 8% 28%
40% - 49% 10% 44% 10% 37%
50% - 59% 9% 53% 19% 56%
60% - 69% 14% 67% 14% 70%
70% - 79% 9% 75% 8% 78%
80% - 89% 10% 85% 8% 85%
90%+ 15% 100% 15% 100%
Cumulative percentages may not add correctly due to rounding.
The fact that the distribution of marital property is highly
variable need not necessarily mean that it is unpredictable or
2 See Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 475 (23% of the sample divided property
so that each spouse received between 40% and 59%).
207 Reynolds, supra note 40, at 844-66 (evaluating 138 judicial opinions).
208 Id. at 854-55.
209 Id. at 855.
[Vol. 67: 621
NEW YORK'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW
irrational, of course. The central notion behind equitable-distri-
bution is individualized determination. New York's equitable
distribution law, like most, suggests that the size of each
spouse's property award should reflect his or her individual cir-
cumstances: the spouse's needs, as measured by income, income
potential, age, health, and assumption of the role of custodial
parent; the spouse's contributions to the marriage, as measured
by marital duration, contribution as both a wage earner and as a
spouse, parent, and homemaker; and the spouse's future expec-
tations, as measured by the couple's past standard of living and
the loss of future inheritance and retirement prospects.2 10
Given the range of factors an asset award might reflect, it is
possible that the variability in distribution results from legiti-
mate individualized tailoring. This section examines the rela-
tionship of several factors that might influence the size of an
award-marital duration, custody, employment status, income,
an award of alimony-to determine whether the equitable distri-
bution law was associated with a significant change in the pat-
tern of award decision making, and whether these factors can
explain some of the variability in asset distribution.
1. The Relationship Between Marital Duration and Prop-
erty Distribution
One factor that might play a significant role in determining
the distribution of property and debt is marital duration. In a
marriage of long duration, it is likely that a wife's contributions
as a homemaker and parent will be substantial and thus offset a
lower monetary contribution to marital property. A preliminary
issue, of course, is the extent to which marital duration influ-
enced the size of a wife's property award before equitable distri-
bution. Were wives in long marriages more likely to receive a
larger share of the marital property then? Table 27 shows that,
in 1978, sample wives in longer marriages were awarded a higher
median share and were more likely to receive half or more of the
net marital property than their counterparts married for short
periods of time. This tendency was not, however, strong enough
to be statistically significant.211
210 N.Y. DoM. RE. LAW § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney 1986).
21 Marital duration was not significantly correlated with the wife's net property
percentage. Pearson's R=-.0032; p=.486. The correlation between marital duration and
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The tendency of long-married wives to receive a greater
share of marital property than wives in short marriages dissi-
pated after the equitable distribution law's enactment. In 1984,
sample wives married for less than ten years were actually more
likely to receive half of the net marital property than those mar-
ried twenty or more years.212 The distribution of the overall
marital estate (assets plus debts) evidenced a similar pattern. 13
The enactment of the equitable distribution law thus was not
associated with any increase in the percentage of net marital
property awarded to long-married wives; the group that bene-
fited was wives in marriages of less than ten years.
TABLE 27
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND MARITAL DURATION
Marital Duration Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0-9 years 44% 34% 56% (39) 66% 73% 71% (35)
10-19 years 48% 59% 59% (44) 47% 48% 51% (47)
20+ years 61% 65% 57% (43) 61% 54% 59% (33)
2. The Relationship Between Custody and Property
Distribution
The larger net property percentages registered by wives in
shorter marriages during the post-equitable distribution period
does not appear to reflect increased deference to the needs of a
custodial parent. In 1978, although the relationship was not sta-
tistically significant, sample wives with sole custody obtained
higher median and average percentages of net worth than their
counterparts without minor children or those whose husbands
the wife's percentage of the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) was also statis-
tically insignificant. Pearson's R=.0245; p=.387.
212 The correlation between marital duration and the wife's net property percentage
was still statistically insignificant. Pearson's R=-.1201; p=.113. The relationship be-
tween marital duration and the wife's percentage of the marital estate (the sum of assets
plus debts) also remained insignificant. Pearson's R=-.0756; p=.194.
212 See Appendix Table 10:
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obtained custody.214 In the later research period, the median
percentage of the group with sole custody and the group without
minor children was almost identical. 15 (See Table 28.)
TABLE 28
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND CUSTODY STATUS
Custody Status Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Wife sole 61% 67% 72% (69) 61% 59% 70% (51)
custody
Husband 42% 45% 56% (12) 25% 59% 5% (12)
custody*
No minor 41% 25% 45% (39) 61% 57% 53% (41)
children
*Includes joint or split custody.
3. Need and Contribution: The Relationship Between Em-
ployment Status, Spousal Income, Alimony, and Prop-
erty Distribution
Employment status, income, and alimony are related factors
that might also significantly influence property distribution, al-
though the role they might play is ambiguous. The wife who is
employed and has a high income evidences little need, but has
likely made a major monetary contribution to the acquisition of
marital property. The wife who is unemployed or has a low in-
come evidences need, but likely has made a less significant mon-
etary contribution. An award of alimony similarly signifies need
and thus might signal a larger net worth percentage based on
that factor or a lower one based on the fact of receiving alimony.
The intent of the drafters of the equitable distribution law
2 4 Pearson's R=.103; p--.117. The relationship between custody and the wife's per-
centage of the marital estate (sum of assets plus debts) was also positive and approached
statistical significance. Pearson's R=.1286; p-.064.
2' Both the correlation between custody and the wife's net property percentage
(Pearson's R=.0925; p=.175) and the wife's percentage of the marital estate (the sum of
assets plus debts) (Pearson's R=.0013; p=.494) remained positive but statistically
insignificant.
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was not ambiguous, however: the new law was intended both to
recognize nonmonetary contributions to the marriage and to per-
mit consideration of need.2 e This suggests that unemployed
wives and those with low incomes would benefit from the equi-
table distribution law. Did they?
Before the equitable distribution law, among couples in the
contested case sample, employed wives received a slightly higher
average and median percentage of net marital property than
their unemployed counterparts.217 After the change in property
distribution rules, the median percentage and proportion of un-
employed wives receiving at least 50% of net marital property
did increase; surveyed unemployed wives now had a higher me-
dian share than those who were employed .2 1 But that increase
was not statistically significant. (See Table 29.) Nor, in either
time period, was employment status significantly correlated with
the wife's net worth percentage.
TABLE 29
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Wife's Employment Wife's Percentage Share
Status 1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Employed 56% 58% 62% (68) 56% 54% 68% (64)
Unemployed 50% 50% 56% (34) 68% 65% 60% (28)
The results were similar when the wife's income was taken
into account. (See Table 30.) Before equitable distribution, sam-
ple wives in the highest income group had a slightly higher me-
dian and mean net property percentage than did those in the
lowest income group;219 after equitable distribution this was no
216 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d) (McKinney 1986).
217 Both the correlation between the wife's employment and her percentage of net
marital property (Pearson's R=.0545; p=.293) and between the wife's employment and
her percentage of the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) (Pearson's R-.1049;
p=.130) were slightly positive but statistically insignificant.
22' The correlation between the wife's employment and her net property percentage
was now slightly negative but still statistically insignificant. Pearson's R-.0797;
p=.225. The correlation between wife's employment and distribution of the marital es-
tate (assets plus debts) was also insignificant. Pearson's R=.0324; p-.364.
229 Both the correlation between the wife's income and her percentage of net marital
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longer true. But the difference was not significant, nor was the
wife's income significantly correlated with her net worth per-
centage in either time period.220
TABLE 30
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND WIFE'S INCOME ($1984)
Wife's Income Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0-$10,000 51% 51% 58% (57) 56% 58% 85% (41)
$10,000- 67% 68% 71% (30) 63% 61% 79% (35)
$19,999
$20,000+ 56% 64% 68% (16) 64% 54% 49% (14)
Nor was the equitable distribution law correlated with any
significant changes in property distribution based on the hus-
band's income. (See Table 31.) In the earlier period, sample
wives of higher income husbands tended to obtain a higher per-
centage share of net marital property than their counterparts
married to low-income husbands. 22 ' In the post-equitable distri-
bution period this relationship was no longer apparent,222 but in
neither time period was the property distribution significantly
related to the husband's income.
property (Pearson's R=.0599; p=. 2 74 ) and between the wife's income and her percent-
age share of the marital estate (assets plus debts) (Pearson's R=-.0967; p-.147) were
statistically insignificant.
20 Both the correlation between wife's income and her net property percentage
(Pearson's R=-.0138; p=.449) and between the wife's income and her percentage of the
marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) (Pearson's R-.0919; p=.161) remained sta-
tistically insignificant.
11 The correlation between husband's income and the wife's net property percent-
age was positive, but escaped statistical significance. Pearson's R=.1485; p=.070. The
relationship between the husband's income and the wife's percentage of the marital es-
tate (the sum of assets plus debts) was also insignificant Pearson's R=.0919; p=.1 6 1.
"' The correlation between husband's income and the wife's net property percent-
age was now slightly negative but still statistically insignificant. Pearson's R-.0572;
p=.311. The relationship between the husband's income and the wife's percentage of the
marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) was also insignificant. Pearson's R-.1007;
p=.156.
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TABLE 31
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND HUSBAND'S INCOME ($1984)
Husband's Income Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0-$20,000 39% 30% 54% (28) 42% 37% 32% (19)
$20,000-.
$39,999 50% 50% 60% (40) 53% 53% 105% (34)
$40,000+ 50% 53% 59% (32) 46% 42% 54% (24)
Both husband and wife income, taken alone, are weak in-
dicators of a spouse's needs or monetary contributions, however.
A more accurate measure is the ratio between the wife's and
husband's income, which takes into account the relative earning
potential of both spouses. Before equitable distribution, sample
wives with higher. income ratios tended to receive a larger per-
centage of net marital property than their low ratio counter-
parts.22 3 (See Table 32.) The only exception to this pattern was
wives whose incomes represented less than 10% of total family
income. This suggests, again, that monetary contributions were
accorded greater weight than need in property distribution dur-
ing this period, except in the most extreme cases. After equita-
ble distribution this tendency was less clear.22' Moreover, de-
clines in the mean and median net property percentage were
registered both by the group with the highest income ratio
(those who had contributed the most monetarily), and the group
with the lowest income ratio (the neediest).
223 The correlation between the ratio of wife's income/family income and her net
property percentage was positive and almost statistically significant. Pearson's R-.1656;
p=.064. The correlation between the ratio of wife's income/family income and her per-
centage of the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) was insignificant, however.
Pearson's R=.0511; p=.306.
.2 The correlation between the ratio of the wife's income/family income and her net
property percentage was no longer positive but still statistically insignificant. Pearson's
R=-.0394; p=.379. The correlation between the ratio of the wife's income/family income
and her percentage of the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) was positive,
however, and approached statistical significance. Pearson's R=.1534; p='.078.
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TABLE 32
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND INCOME RATIO
(WIFE'S INCOME/FAMILY INCOME)
Income Ratio Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0%-9% 53% 64% 60% (40) 48% 42% 46% (23)
10%-29% 41% 44% 54% (22) 47% 50% 150% (19)
30%-49% 56% 540 64% (16) 64% 55% 55% (14)
50%+ 63% 78% 105% ( 8) 50% 49% 52% ( 8)
While this result is not susceptible to any obvious interpre-
tation,225 one possible explanation would take into account the
receipt of an alimony award. Particularly as the equitable distri-
bution law explicitly suggests linkage between the two, it is pos-
sible that tradeoffs in property for alimony, and vice versa, oc-
curred more frequently under the new regime. Table 33 shows,
however, that at least among the contested sample, alimony/
property bargains do not appear to have been struck more fre-
quently after equitable distribution than before the law went
into effect. The group that was awarded alimony in the post-
equitable distribution research year had a higher mean and
mean net worth percentage than did the group of wives who
were not awarded alimony. This result deviates from the earlier
pattern, where the two groups were awarded comparable shares
of net marital property. In neither year, however, was the award
of alimony a statistically significant predictor of the wife's net
property award.2 2
225 Given the small size of the sample and the range of variation in outcomes, it may
simply be due to chance.
226 In 1978 both the correlation between alimony and the wife's net property per-
centage (Pearson's R=-.0083; p=.464) and between alimony and the wife's percentage of
the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) (Pearson's R=-.0738; p-.1 9 2) were
statistically insignificant. In 1984 the correlation between alimony and the wife's net
property percentage was positive (Pearson's R=.1252) and approached statistical signifi-
cance (p=.102). The correlation between alimony and the wife's percentage of the mari-
tal estate (Pearson's R=.0580) was not statistically significant, however (p-. 253).
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TABLE 33
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND ALIMONY STATUS
Alimony Status Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Alimony 52% 54% 61% (60) 64% 68% 97% (36)
No Alimony 53% 56% 62% (60) 53% 52% 59% (68)
The tendency for sample wives who were unemployed, low
income, or who were awarded alimony to receive a larger share
of net marital property in the post-equitable distribution period
than before suggests that need-based factors were given greater
weight in property distribution than in the pre-equitable distri-
bution period. But this tendency was slight and not statistically
significant; moreover, those wives with the lowest incomes in re-
lation to their husbands received smaller mean and median
awards in the post-equitable distribution period than in the ear-
lier research period. Overall it does not appear that the equita-
ble distribution law was associated with any major change in
property distribution based on need.
4. Other Factors: Fault, Net Worth
While the equitable distribution law was not correlated with
.any significant change in property distribution based on spousal
need or monetary contribution, the law does appear to have had
a more substantial impact in reducing the consequences of a
fault judgment. In the earlier period, a judgment against the
wife alone was negatively, and significantly, correlated with the
size of her net property percentage.227 In the later period, a judg-
ment against the wife alone was neither a significant predictor of
her net property percentage, nor was it negatively correlated
with the size of the wife's percentage share of net marital prop-
erty.22s (See Table 34.)
227 In 1978 a judgment against the wife was negatively, and significantly, correlated
with her net property percentage (Pearson's R=-.1688; p=.033) and her percentage of
the marital estate (the sum or assets plus debts) (Pearson's R=-.2016; p=.008).
228 In 1984 a judgment against the wife was positively correlated with her net marl-
tal property percentage (Pearson's R-.1922; p=.025) although not with her percentage
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TABLE 34
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND MARITAL FAULT JUDGMENT
Divorce Wife's Percentage Share
Judgment 1978 1984
Against %Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Husband 60% 63% 66% (84) 62% 59% 60% (76)
Wife 47% 47% 70% (19) 37% 0% 63% (19)
Both 24% 17% 30% (17) 56% 50% 187% (9)
One other factor-the value of the couple's net marital
property-was significantly, and negatively, correlated with the
size of the wife's net property percentage in the pre-equitable
distribution period.229 Although the relationship escaped statisti-
cal significance in 1984,230 the wife's percentage share still
showed some tendency to fall as the couple's net worth in-
creased. In both research years, the mean percentage award to
sample wives in the lowest positive net worth category was ap-
proximately double the mean percentage award in the highest
net worth category. (See Table 35.)
of the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) (Pearson's R-.1167; p-.090).
19 In 1978 the correlation between the wife's net marital property percentage and
net worth was negative and significant (Pearson's R=-.2020; p=.013) as mas the correla-
tion between net worth and the wife's percentage of the marital estate (the sum of assets
plus debts) (Pearson's R=-.2831; p=.000). The likelihood of the wife obtaining at least
50% of the net marital property was also significantly related to net worth. Chi-
square=17.56238 D.F.=5; p=.0035.
13 In 1984 both the correlation between the wife's net marital property percentage
and net worth (Pearson's R=-.0461; p=.321) and between the wife's percentage of the
marital estate and net worth (Pearson's R-.0817; p=.174) were statistically insignifi-
cant. The likelihood of a wife obtaining at least 50% of the net marital property was
significantly related to net worth, however. Chi-square-17.69153 D.F.-5; p-.0034.
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TABLE 35
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL PROPERTY
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND NET WORTH ($1984)
Net Worth Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Negative 24% 0% - (21) 20% 0% - (30)
0-$9999 50% 53% 71% (36) 65% 100% 141% (23)
$10,000-
$39,999 62% 67% 67% (29) 60% 60% 56% (25)
$40,000-
$99,999 69% 67% 62% (16) 67% 56% 60% (24)
$100,000-
$149,999 65% 70% 70% (17) 44% 42% 42% (9)
$150,000+ 23% 34% 33% (22) 39% 42% 42% (23)
In other words, as marital net worth grew large enough to
make an appreciable difference, women tended to get less. This
tendency, which has also been reported by another researcher,231
helps to explain the widespread perception that women receive
less than half of the marital assets: in the cases that are likely to
receive publicity, they often do.
5. Summary
Overall, the changes in property distribution associated with
the equitable distribution law were modest. The new law was
correlated with a slightly greater tendency toward relatively
equal division. The role of fault in determining the property dis-
tribution also appears to have been curtailed. But the law failed
to make any major impact on the variability of property awards.
Outcomes were highly variable under the new law and not signif-
icantly correlated with factors, such as marital duration or in-
come, that might expectedly produce disparate results. 23 2 The
promise of individualized equity under the statute thus does not
appear to have been realized.
231 See McLindon, supra note 42, at 382 (Table 22).
232 The tendency for equitable property distribution decisions to lack significant
predictive relationships with variables such as those described in this section has been
reported by other divorce researchers. See Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 475 (only
significant predictor of property award was whether couple owned marital home).
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G. The Impact of the Law on Alimony and Child Support
1. The Frequency and Duration of Alimony Awards
In contrast to the relative stability in property distribution
before and after the equitable distribution law, dramatic change
in the frequency and duration of alimony awards occurred after
the passage of the new law. Over the research period, the pro-
portion of cases in which alimony was awarded in the three re-
search counties declined by fully 43%.233 This decline was statis-
tically significant,2 3  and occurred consistently in all case
categories and counties.235 (See Table 36.)
TABLE 36
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY
YEAR AND CASE CATEGORY
Case Category 1978 1984 Difference
(n=926) (n=946)
Contested 45 30 15**
Consensual 38 23 -15**
Default 9 6 - 3
Total Sample 32 21 11**
Total Divorce Pop.e 21 12 - 9
E) Based on weighted data for each case category within each county.
* p <.01.
An even more dramatic change occurred in the duration of
alimony awards. (See Table 37.) In 1978 approximately four out
of five alimony awards were permanent. In 1984 about half that
'3 Because the sample is not an accurate representation of the total population of
divorcing couples in the research counties, the number of alimony awards in each case
category within each county were appropriately weighted to create percentages applica-
ble to the total population.
134 Chi-square=39.25454 D.F.=2; p=.0000.
'- In 1978, 27% of divorced wives in the New York County sample, 31% of those in
the Onondaga County sample, and 39% of those in the Westchester County sample were
awarded alimony. In 1984, 21% of divorced wives in the New York County sample, 16%
of those in the Onondaga County sample, and 21% of those in the Westchester County
sample were awarded alimony. When the number of alimony awards in each case cate-
gory within each county was appropriately weighted to create a percentage applicable to
the total divorce population of the county, it appeared that the percentage of divorced
wives awarded alimony declined from 11% to 4% in New York County, from 24% to
15% in Onondaga County, and from 29% to 18% in Westchester County over the re-
search period.
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number were; the majority of awards were for a limited dura-
tion. The change was, again, statistically significant 236 and con-
sistent across case categories and across counties. 23 7
TABLE 37
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS THAT
WERE PERMANENT, BY YEAR AND CASE CATEGORY
Case Category 1978 1984 Difference
(n=289) (n =186)
Contested 75 31 -44**
Consensual 81 44 -37**
Default 82 41 -41*
Total Sample 78 37 -41**
Total Divorce Pop.@ 81 41 -40
9 Based on weighted data for each case category within each county.
** p <.01
* p <.001
The average duration of nonpermanent awards did not vary
substantially over the research period, however. In 1978 the av-
erage was 4.5 years; in 1984 it was 4.7 years.23
These striking changes in the frequency and duration of ali-
mony awards should not be surprising. The legislative memoran-
dum explaining the new statute indeed declared that the objec-
tive of the new alimony standards was to "award the recipient
spouse an opportunity to achieve independence 2 3 and sug-
gested that permanent maintenance should be restricted to long-
married wives and those who are unemployed or have sacrificed
238 Chi-square=79.50405 D.F.=1; p=.0000.
23. In New York County the percentage of permanent awards declined from 68% to
30% of the total. In Onondaga County permanent awards declined from 87% to 45% of
the total. In Westchester County permanent awards declined from 78% to 38% of the
total.
238 The averages did vary substantially by county and case category. In the Onon-
daga County sample, for example, during both research years the average duration of a
time-limited alimony award was much higher in consensual (8.1 years 1978, 7.7 years
1984) than in contested cases (3.8 years 1978, 3.8 years 1984). By contrast, in the New
York County sample, awards in consensual cases averaged 2.8 years in 1978 and 5.9 years
in 1984; awards in contested cases averaged 5.0 years in 1978, 3.8 years in 1984. In the
Westchester County sample, awards in consensual cases averaged 6.7 years in 1978 and
5.7 years in 1984; awards in contested cases averaged 5.3 years in 1978 and 5.4 years in
1984.
238 1980 NEw YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, supra note 73, at 130.
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career opportunities to serve as a parent and homemaker.2' Sev-
eral other researchers have also reported similar results follow-
ing the adoption of new alimony rules emphasizing the use of
maintenance for rehabilitative purposes in other states. 1
While the change is not surprising, it is controversial. Com-
mentators in New York 242 and across the nation 24 3 have sug-
gested that the new alimony norms are being unfairly applied in
inappropriate cases. The next section describes the data relating
to this issue.
2. Who Gets Alimony: The Relationship Between Marital
Duration, Employment, Income, Custody, and Alimony
Awards
The new rules, some have claimed, are not only being ap-
plied to wives who can achieve meaningful independence, but
also to those who, as a result of long-term marriage and minimal
participation in the paid labor market, have dubious earning
capacity.244 A preliminary issue, of course, is how such wives
fared under the previous regime; even before the passage of the
equitable distribution law, only 21% of divorced wives within
the three research counties were awarded alimony. Who received
an alimony award under the old rules? Were alimony awards
predictable or inconsistent? How have the new rules altered the
prior patterns? This section examines the effect of marital dura-
tion, employment, income, and custody on the award of alimony
before and after passage of the new law.
a. Marital Duration
Mafital duration was, in both research years, a significant
predictor of an alimony award.2 " Wives married for twenty or
240 Id.
2"1 See note 42 supra.
242 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 77; Harriet N. Cohen & Adria S. Hill-
man, New York Courts Have Not Recognized Women as Equal Marriage Partners, 5
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION REP. 93 (1985).
242 See, e.g., WErizMAN, supra note 4, at 388-91; Goldfarb, supra note 41; Krauskopf,
supra note 41.
2" See, e.g., Cohen & Hiliman, supra note 78, at 14.
245 In 1978, Pearson's R=.3166; p=.0000. In 1984, Pearson's R=.2125; p-.0006.
For the 1984 contested sample, however, marital duration was not a significant predictor
of alimony. Pearson's R=.04964; p=.1907. A similar relationship between marital dura-
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more years were, in both time periods, more than three times as
likely to receive an alimony award as their counterparts married
for fewer than five years. But the greatest impact of the decline
in alimony awards also fell on long-married wives. 246 (See Table
38.) In 1978, 54% of sample wives married twenty or more years
received an alimony award, while in 1984 only 34% did. The de-
cline for wives married less than five years, by contrast, was
much smaller.247
TABLE 38
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES
BY YEAR AND MARITAL
AWARDED ALIMONY,
DURATION
Length of Marriage 1978 1984 Difference
% (n) % (n)
0 - 4 years 14 (188) 11 (231) - 3%
5 - 9 years 26 (246) 17 (231) - 9%*
10 -14 years 37 (160) 24 (176) -13%*
15 -19 years 43 (128) 28 (127) -15%**
20+ years 54 (184) 34 (179) -20%**
* p <.05
p <.01
Nor was the movement toward durational maintenance con-
fined to wives in short marriages. In 1984, among wives married
for twenty or more years who were awarded alimony, more than
half were awarded alimony for a time-limited period. (See Table
39.)
tion and the likelihood of an alimony award has been reported by other divorce research-
ers. See STERIN Er AL., supra note 46, at 140; WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 169; McLindon,
supra note 42, at 363; Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 476; Wishik, supra note 42, at
88 (Table 4).
246 The decline was statistically significant. Chi-square= 10.82680 D.F.- 1; p -. 0010.
The decreased tendency for longer-married wives to be awarded alimony was present in
all case categories, although it was greatest in the contested group. Here 70% of wives
married twenty or more years were awarded alimony in 1978 as compared to only 36% in
1984. The change was also constant across all counties.
2"7 Nor was the decline for this group statistically significant.
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TABLE 39
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS THAT
WERE PERMANENT,
BY YEAR AND MARITAL DURATION
Length of Marriage Percentage of Awards Permanent
1978 1984
% (n) % (n) Difference
0 - 4 years 48% (23) 11% (18) -37*
5 - 9 years 74% (61) 36% (36) -38***
10 -14 years 80% (53) 32% (41) -48***
15 -19 years 86% (51) 28% (29) -58***
20+ years 84% (97) 53% (58) -37***
p <.05
p < .001
Moreover, the decline in permanent awards was just as great for
the long-married group as for wives married for less than five
years.
b. Wife's Employment and Income
In both research years, unemployed wives were significantly
more likely to receive an alimony award than their employed
counterparts.2 48 (See Table 40.) But higher levels of employment
among wives in the later research period does not account for
the decline in alimony awards. In the contested case sample (the
only group for which employment information was available),
wives' employment did increase by nine percentage points over
the research period. If the earlier relation between alimony and
employment held constant, one would expect alimony awards to
decline by three percentage points.249 But awards within the
contested group instead declined by three times that amount.210
141 For the 1978 contested sample, chi.square= 16.411385 D.F.=1; p=.0001. For the
1984 contested sample, chi-square=15.80078 D.F.=1; p==.0001. A similar relationship
between the wife's employment and the likelihood of an alimony award has been re-
ported by other divorce researchers. See Vrrzi'N, supra note 4, at 177; McLindon,
supra note 42, at 363.
141 In 1978, for wives with available employment information, 377% of those em-
ployed (63/169) and 64% of those unemployed (61/95) received alimony, or 47% (124/
264) of the total. If the same percentages applied in 1984, one would anticipate that 37%
of those employed (77/208) and 64% of those unemployed (51/79) would receive alimony,
for an overall alimony rate of 44% (128/287).
21o From 45% of the contested group in 1978 to 30% in 1984.
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Moreover, awards to the unemployed and employed groups fell
by approximately the same amount between the two research
years, although the decline for the unemployed group escaped
statistical significance.251
TABLE 40
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
AWARDED ALIMONY,
BY YEAR AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Employment 1978 1984
Status % (n) % (n) Difference
Employed 37 (169) 26 (208) -11*
Unemployed 64 (95) 52 (79) -12
* p <. 05
When one looks at awards to wives specifically described as
housewives or homemakers the same pattern is apparent. Sev-
enty-one percent of these wives were awarded alimony in 1978,
as compared to 59% in 1984. Unemployed wives married ten or
more years also suffered a loss in the likelihood of an alimony
award greater than that of their employed counterparts and em-
ployed wives married less than ten years. (See Table 41.)
TABLE 41
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
AWARDED ALIMONY, BY MARITAL DURATION,
EMPLOYMENT STATUS, AND YEAR
Marital Duration and 1978 1984
Employment Status % (n) % (n) Difference
Unemployed wives 67% (61) 49% (47) -18
married ! 10 years
Unemployed wives 56% (34) 50% (32) - 6
married < 10 years
Employed wives 40% (115) 27% (132) -13*
married >__ 10 years
Employed wives 30% (54) 21% (73) - 9
married < 10 years
* p <.05
251 For employed wives, chi-square= 6.20315 D.F.=I; p-.0128. For unemployed
wives, chi-square =2.80620 D.F.-=1; p=.0939.
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These unemployed, long-married wives also increasingly re-
ceived time-limited maintenance under the new regime. In 1978,
81% of alimony awards to wives in this group were permanent;
in 1984, only 32% were permanent. 52
c. Spousal Income
The decline in alimony awards also a~fected wives at all in-
come levels. Although, in both research years, the wife's income
was a highly significant predictor of alimony,53 for the contested
case sample (the only group with income information) the de-
cline in awards was not confined to the high income group. Al-
though sample wives earning less than $10,000 per year suffered
the smallest decline in alimony awards, the loss for wives earn-
ing between $10,000 and $20,000 was slightly higher than that
for their higher income counterparts. (See Table 42.)
TABLE 42
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
AWARDED ALIMONY, BY YEAR AND WIFE'S INCOME ($1984)
Wife's Income 1978 1984
% (n) % (n) Difference
$0- $9,999 61 (150) 47 (135) - 14*
$10,000 - $19,999 33 ( 86) 17 ( 94) - 16*
$20,000+ 15 (34) 9 (47) - 6
* p <.05
In both research years, the likelihood of an alimony award
to a wife in the contested case sample was also strongly affected
In 1978, 74% of awards to employed wives married for ten years or more were
permanent; for unemployed wives married less than ten years, 63% were permanent; for
employed wives married less than ten years, 75% were permanent.
In 1984, 31% of awards to employed wives married for ten or more years were per-
manent; for unemployed wives married less than ten years, 38% were permanent; for
employed wives married less than ten years, 13% were permanent.
11 In 1978, Pearson's R=-.2734; p-.000. In 1984, Pearson's Rf'-.3725; p-.000. A
similar relationship between the wife's income and an alimony award has been docu-
mented by other divorce researchers. See WErrzmAAN, supra note 4, at 179 (38% of sam-
ple wives in Los Angeles and San Francisco, Cal. earning less than $10,000 obtained
alimony, as compared to 20% of those earning $10,000 or more); Bell, supra note 110, at
294, 296 (only 12% of wives in contested divorce sample earning $20,000 or more ob-
tained an alimony award, as compared to 48% for the entire contested sample); Rowe &
Morrow, supra note 56, at 477 (66% of wives earning less than $10,000 awarded alimony,
as compared to 31% of wives earning more than $10,000).
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by her husband's income. 54 (See Table 43.) Wives of husbands
in the high income group were, in both time periods, signifi-
cantly more likely to be awarded alimony than their counter-
parts married to low-income husbands.2 5 The impact of the de-
cline in awards was felt relatively equally, however, across all
income groups.
TABLE 43
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
AWARDED ALIMONY, BY YEAR AND HUSBAND'S INCOME
($1984)
Husband's Income 1978 1984
% (n) % (n) Difference
$0 - $19,999 33 ( 61) 20 ( 66) - 13%
$20,000 - $39,999 44 (108) 30 (108) - 14%*
$40,000+ 61 ( 83) 51 ( 61) - 11%
* p <.05
When husband and wife income are compared, it is clear
that, in both research years, the more of the family income a
wife contributed, the lower her chances of an alimony award.
(See Figure 44.) The wife's percentage of family income was a
highly significant predictor of alimony in both time periods. 20
254 In 1978, Pearson's R=.1696; p=.003. In 1984, Pearson's R-.1077; p-. 003.
"' A similar pattern has been reported by other divorce researchers. See WEITZMAN,
supra note 4, at 179 (15% of sample wives whose husbands earned less than $20,000
received an alimony award as compared to 62% of those with husbands earning $30,000
or more); Bell, supra note 110, at 294 (15% of wives in contested case sample whose
husbands earned less than $20,000 received an alimony award as compared to 76% of
those with husbands earning $40,000 or more); Rowe & Morrow, supra note 56, at 477
(Table 8) (28% of sample wives whose husbands earned less than $20,000 were awarded
alimony as compared to 59% of wives whose husbands earned between $20,000 and
$29,000).
2I In 1978, Pearson's R=-.3853; p=.000. In 1984, Pearson's R=-.4510; p-.000. A
similar pattern has been reported by other divorce researchers. See STERIN ET AL., supra
note 46, at 140-41; McLindon, supra note 42, at 363-64.
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TABLE 44
PERCENTAGES OF WIVES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
AWARDED ALIMONY, BY YEAR AND WIFE'S INCOME
PERCENTAGE (WIFE'S INCOME/FAMILY INCOME)
Wife's Income/ 1978 1984
Family Income % (n) % (n) Difference
Less than 10% 68% (101) 58% (76) - 10
10%-29% 46% (52) 31% (49) - 15
30%-49% 24% (59) 12% (57) - 12
50%+ 21% (19) 4% (23) - 17
This relationship became more pronounced over the re-
search period. In the 1984 contested case sample, a wife contrib-
uting less than 10% of the family income was almost fifteen
times more likely to be awarded alimony than a wife contribut-
ing 50% or more of the family income. Although the absolute
difference in the likelihood of an alimony award over the re-
search period was approximately the same for each group (be-
tween 12 and 17 points), in percentage terms, the wives who had
contributed the most to family income were most affected.
Awards to wives in this group, who contributed 50% or more of
the family income, declined by fully 81%.
d. Child Custody
Wives with custody of minor children were, in both research
years, significantly more likely to obtain alimony than were
wives without custody.257 The decline in alimony awards also af-
fected the group with custody as much as the group without.
(See Table 45.)
257 In 1978, chi-square= 30.69749 D.F.=1; p=.0000. In 1984, chi.square-13.155560
D.F.=2; p=.0014.
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TABLE 45
PERCENTAGES OF SAMPLE WIVES AWARDED ALIMONY, BY
YEAR AND CUSTODY STATUS
Custody Status e 1978 1984 Difference
% (n) % (n)
Wife with sole custody 39 (471) 25 (378) - 14**
Wife without custody 19 (337) 13 (409) - 6*
o Cases involving split or joint physical custody are excluded. Wife without custody
category includes cases where there were no minor children and cases with husband
custody.
* p < .05
p <.0O1
3. Variation in Alimony Decision Making and its
Rationality
In both research years, the most important predictor of an
alimony award was the wife's family income percentage.25 8 Other
variables that significantly predicted an alimony award in both
years were the wife's employment status and income (which, not
surprisingly, were highly correlated with her family income per-
centage), the husband's income, marital duration, custody, the
case category, whether the wife was awarded occupancy of the
marital home, and the type of legal representation in the case.20
With the exception of case category and legal representation,
each of these factors relates to spousal need or contribution and
thus is rationally related to the decision to award alimony.
Under no alimony regime would we expect a wife whose income
exceeds that of her husband in a short, childless marriage to be
awarded alimony. Under any alimony regime we would expect
an older homemaker in a lengthy marriage whose husband has
ample income to receive an alimony award. To some extent,
then, alimony awards followed predictable, rational patterns.
258 See Appendix Table 21.
25 For the correlations between all of these variables and an alimony award, by
year, see Appendix Table 21. For some variables the correlation table includes only the
contested case sample as the information was unavailable for the other case categories.
For the 1978 contested and default sample, a divorce judgment against the wife was also
significant, negative predictor of an alimony award (Pearson's R-.1587; p'.003). For
the contested group, the wife's age, the couples' net worth, and the wife's percentage of
the marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts) were also significant predictors in 1978.
The significance of these correlations disappeared in the later research period.
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But while most of the factors that predicted an alimony
award were rational ones, there still appeared to be a considera-
ble amount of inexplicable variance in alimony decision making.
For example, in 1984, 45% of wives in the contested case sample
whose incomes represented 20% of family income or less were
not awarded alimony. Is there a rational explanation for this re-
sult? Marital duration was not significantly correlated with an
award of alimony in this group; indeed, among this group, the
average marital duration of those wives who were not awarded
alimony was identical to that of wives who were awarded ali-
mony. Nor were the wife's income, the husband's income, the
wife's age, custody, the size of the child support award, or the
amount of net marital property received by the wife significantly
correlated with an alimony award in this group. (See Table 46.)
There are, in short, no obvious reasons why some wives with
very low incomes in relation to those of their husbands were
awarded alimony, and some were not.
The effect of the decision to award alimony can be clearly
seen, however, in the circumstances of the group after divorce.
Wives who were awarded alimony had an average post-divorce
per capita income that was three times as high as that of their
counterparts who were not awarded alimony.
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TABLE 46
CHARACTERISTICS OF COUPLES IN 1984 CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE WHERE WIFE'S INCOME WAS NO MORE THAN 20%
OF FAMILY INCOME, BY ALIMONY DECISION
Awarded Alimony Not Awarded Alimony
(n=46) (n-38)
BEFORE DIVORCE
Average Age (years)
Husband 40.6 42.2
Wife 38.7 38.6
Average Income ($ per year)
Husband $68,489 $74,087
Wife $ 2,479 $ 4,336
Per Capita $25,052 $22,850
Average Marital Duration
(years) 15.2 15.2
Average Net Worth $25,868 $27,435
AFTER DIVORCE
Average Child Support
Award ($ per month) $ 514 $ 378
Wife's Median Net
Property Award $14,510 $ 5,330
Average Per Capita Income
Husband's Household $47,306 $50,634
Wife's Household $13,258 $ 4,367
The same pattern prevailed with respect to the permanency
of awards. Overall, in both research years, wives in longer mar-
riages were significantly more likely to be awarded permanent
alimony than were wives in shorter marriages.280 But, in 1984,
55% of alimony awards to wives married for twenty or more
years were not permanent. The average age, income, and family
income percentages of the wives in this long-married group who
were awarded durational.maintenance were not, however, mark-
edly different than those of the group who were awarded perma-
nent maintenance.281 Nor were the wife's age, income, family in-
come percentage, custody, or the husband's income significantly
related to the decision to award permanent as opposed to dura-
'D In 1978, Pearson's R=.1468; p=.045. 1984, Pearson's R=.2344, p-.012.
281 Among wives in the contested case sample married for twenty or more years who
received permanent maintenance, the wife's average income was $5757, the husband's
average income was $52,679, the average wife's income percentage was 12% and the aver-
age wife's age was 46.5 years. Among wives in this group who received durational mainte-
nance, the wife's average income was $7458, the husband's average income was $77,358,
the average wife's income percentage was 11%, and the average wife's age was 44.4 years.
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tional maintenance among the entire 1984 contested case sam-
ple.262 (See Table 47.)
TABLE 47
CHARACTERISTICS OF COUPLES IN 1984 CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE, BY ALIMONY DECISION
Alimony Decision
None Durational Permanent
n=217 n=60 n=27
Average Age (years)
Husband 41.0 39.2 43.6
Wife 37.9 38.0 40.3
Average Income ($ per year)
Husband $39,270 $58,501 $54,515
Wife $13,926 $ 5,621 $ 4,255
Wife's Income % 31% 12% 9%
Average Marital
Duration (years) 13.8 13.8 18.2
Although the chance of receiving an alimony award did not
significantly vary by county within the sample, when the cases
were weighted by category to approximate the actual category
proportions in each county, the chances of an alimony award
were markedly different. When the sample was so weighted, only
4% of divorced wives in New York County received an alimony
award in 1984, as compared to 15% in Onondaga County and
18% in Westchester County. Alimony decision making also ap-
peared to vary regionally to some extent. For example, in 1984,
marital duration was a highly significant predictor of alimony in
Onondaga and Westchester counties, 63 but not in New York
County.2 ' Indeed, the only factors that were significant
predictors of alimony in New York County during 1984 were the
wife's income265 and her family income percentage. 200 Nor is
there any obvious reason why, in 1984, only 30% of sample ali-
262 In 1978 husband's income (Pearson's R=.1802; p-.025) and custody (Pearson's
R=.1801; p=.018) were significantly correlated with the decision to award permanent as
opposed to durational maintenance. In 1984 neither the wife's income, husband's income,
wife's family income percentage, wife's age, or custody were significantly correlated with
the decision to award permanent as opposed to durational maintenance.
2'3 In Onondaga County, Pearson's R=.2350; p-.000. In Westchester County, Pear-
son's R=.1857; p=.002.
26, Pearson's R=.0728; p=.14 9.
2 6 Pearson's R=-.4001; p=.002.
26 Pearson's R=.4473; p=.00O.
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mony awards in New York County were permanent as compared
to 45% of those in Onondaga County.
Variation in alimony decision making was also marked, and
significant, when case type was taken into account. In 1984 fully
five times as many alimony awards were made within the con-
tested case category as within the default category. Although the
average marital duration for the default group was also lower
than that of the contested or consensual group, the difference
prevailed even for wives in lengthy marriages; among wives mar-
ried for twenty or more years in the 1984 sample, 63% of those
in the contested group were awarded alimony as compared to
only 20% of the default group. We know nothing, of course,
about the incomes of couples in the default sample, and it is
highly likely that differences in income levels account for some
of this variation. But it is hard to believe that a difference of
this magnitude would result from that factor alone.
Another factor that may partially explain the varying levels
of alimony awards by case category is legal representation. In
both research years, whether the parties were represented by
counsel was another, highly significant predictor of an alimony
award.2"7 In 1984, for example, 30% of wives were awarded ali-
mony when both parties were represented by counsel, while not
one alimony award was made when neither party was repre-
sented by counsel. (See Table 48.) Given the much lower rate of
legal representation among the default sample,ee it is possible
that the lower alimony rate for this group reflects legal represen-
tation more than case type.269
.M In 1978 chi-square=63.60809 D.F.=3; p=.0O00. In 1984 chi-square"-68.68281
D.F.=6; p=.0000.
28 In 1984, for cases with information about legal representation, both spouses were
represented by counsel in 97% of cases in the contested sample (n=261), 75% of cases in
the consensual sample (n=255), and 19% of cases in the default sample (n-249). In
1978 both spouses were represented by counsel in 98% of the contested sample (n= 279),
74% of the consensual sample (n=272), and 24% of the default sample (n-215). Case
type was significantly correlated with the type of legal representation in both research
years (p=.0000).
16 Legal representation is also likely to be affected by income and asset levels. For
example, in both research years legal representation was positively correlated with home
ownership (in 1978 Pearson's R=.0774; in 1984 Pearson's R=.0971), and the amount of
combined alimony and child support (in 1978 Pearson's R=.2591; in 1984 Pearson's
R=.2549). The latter relationship was statistically significant in both years (p-.000).
Given the lack of information on income and asset values in the consensual and default
files, it is impossible to determine how heavily legal representation was influenced by
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TABLE 48
SAMPLE ALIMONY AWARDS, BY YEAR AND LEGAL
REPRESENTATION
Legal 1978 1984
Representation % Awarded Alimony (n) % Awarded Alimony (n)
Both represented 44% (524) 30% (492)
Husband represented 14% ( 66) 6% ('70)
Wife represented 19% (126) 7% (150)
Neither represented 6% ( 50) 0% ( 53)
In sum, while there were some significant, rational
predictors of alimony for the sample population, alimony deci-
sion making cannot be completely explained on the basis of
those factors. An older, long-married wife whose income is low in
relation to that of her husband is the best candidate for alimony,
but many wives with all of these characteristics still fail to ob-
tain an alimony award. A permanent award is, again, more likely
in a long marriage, but is by no means guaranteed. Moreover,
the likelihood of an award is strongly correlated with the type of
divorce action and the couple's representation by legal counsel,
factors that may bear no relationship to the appropriateness of
an alimony award. Alimony decision making appears to be
partly rational, but to rest as well on factors that are inexplica-
ble from the information at hand.
4. The Value of Alimony and Child Support
a. The Value of Alimony Awards
The average alimony award declined slightly in each re-
search county between 1978 and 1984. (See Table 49.) Even when
zero awards were included, the drop in the average award for the
weighted sample (which approximates the actual divorcing pop-
ulation in the three research counties) was modest. This relative
constancy in the value -of alimony awards contrasts with what
appears to be a more substantial decline in the value of alimony
nationally.27 0 For both years the alimony averages varied sub-
these factors.
270 Census data and other time-series studies have uniformly reported declining ali-
mony awards. Between 1979 and 1986 the mean alimony payment received by Census
Bureau respondents declined from $4701 to $3733 in constant 1985 dollars, a 21% drop.
See US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. CILD SUPPORT AmN AAMO.1985
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stantially among categories and counties, however.7 1
TABLE 49
AVERAGE ALIMONY AWARDS ($1984 PER MONTH),
BY YEAR AND CASE CATEGORY
Case 1978 1984 %
Category $ per month (n) $ per month (n) Change
Contested $ 917 (141) $ 779 ( 98) -15%
Consensual $ 741 (121) $ 986 ( 72) +33%
Default $ 685 (29) $ 640 ( 22) - 7%
ALL ALIMONY
AWARDS
Total sample $ 824 (291) $ 841 (192) + 7%
Total divorce pop.e $ 652 606 - 7%
ALL SAMPLE CASES
Total sample $ 276 (923) $ 171 (948) -38%**
Total divorce pop.e $ 101 $ 93 - 8%
9 Based on weighted data for each case category within each county.
** p <.01
In neither time period was the value of the alimony award fre-
quently enhanced through provision for payment of specified ex-
penses, except for continuation of medical insurance coverage.
In 1984, 54% of alimony awards required the obligor to maintain
medical insurance for a spouse . 27  But only sixteen alimony
awards (8%) included provisions for the payment of other speci-.
fled expenses.2 " Provisions for increases in the award based on
the cost of living or on increases in the obligor's salary were also
extremely rare. In the post-equitable distribution period, wives
were also increasingly required to shoulder their own attorneys'
fees. Seventy-two percent of cases in which counsel fees were al-
located required the wife to pay her own fees, as compared to
6 (Current Population Reports Series P-23, No. 154) (1989). Local time-series studies
also show declines, although more modest ones. See STERIN sT AL., supra note 46, at 94-
95, 132; McLindon, supra note 42, at 369; Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 415.
For a comparison of the declines in alimony awards reported in these time-series studies,
see Garrison, supra note 44, at 96 (Table 3.13).
271 In 1978 the averages were: $1303 in New York County, $885 in Westchester
County, and $493 in Onondaga County. In 1984, the averages were: $1170 in New York
County, $801 in Westchester County, and $464 in Onondaga County.
272 In 1978, 42% of alimony awards required the obligor to maintain medical insur-
ance coverage for his or her spouse.
27 In 1978, 24 awards (8%) had such provisions. In both years the most frequently
mentioned payments were for uninsured medical expenses.
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53% in the earlier period.274
b. The Value of Child Support Awards
Although the value of the average alimony award did not
decline substantially over the research period, the value of the
average child support award declined by 25%. The inclusion of
implicit child support 27 5 did not appreciably raise the average in
either time period. 276 The decline was also consistent across case
categories (see Table 50) and counties (see Table 51).
In 1984 (n=661), 16% required payment of the wife's counsel fees by the hus-
band; 12% required joint payment. In 1978 (n=653), 34% required payment of the
wife's counsel fees by the husband; 13% required joint payment.
"' Payments denominated spousal maintenance were considered to be implicit child
support whenever their termination was explicitly tied to an emancipation event, such as
reaching the age of majority.
The incentive to mislabel child support as alimony derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961), which held that spouses
could denominate payments intended for the benefit of children as alimony and claim
the alimony deduction. For an example of tax-planning strategy under the Lester princi-
ple, see JuDrr APEEN. CASES AND MATERALS ON FAbuLn LAw 689 (1978). The Lester
decision was overturned by Congress in the domestic relations tax reform provisions of
the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, codified at I.R.C. § 71(a)(2)(A) (1984). This may have
reduced the incentive to mislabel in some of the 1984 cases.
276 With such implicit child support included, the overall averages were $562 in 1978
and $450 in 1984. Even among the contested cases, where such implicit awards were
most frequent, the 1978 average was raised by only $16, and the 1984 average by only $2
when such awards were included.
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TABLE 50
AVERAGE CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS ($1984 PER
MONTH), BY YEAR AND CASE CATEGORY
Case Category 1978 1984 % Change
(n=475) (n=410)
Contested (n=211) (n=196)
per family $526 $382 - 27%**
per child $290 $239 - 17%*
Consensual (n'=198) (n = 164)
per family $492 $394 - 20%
per child $267 $206 - 23%*
Default (n= 66) (n- 50)
per family $458 $293 - 36%*
per child $273 $216 - 21%*
TOTAL SAMPLE (n=475) (n=410)
per family $502 $376 - 25%***
per child $273 $216 - 21%**
* p <.05
** p <.01
p <.001
TABLE 51
AVERAGE CHILD SUPPORT AWARDS ($1984 PER MONTH),
BY YEAR AND COUNTY
County 1978 1984 % Change
Onondaga (n=202) (n= 181)
per family $425 $278 - 35%
per child $212 $148 - 30%
Westchester (n = 163) (n= 136)
per family $548 $427 - 22%
per child $293 $245 - 16%
TOTAL DIVORCE POP.e (Onondaga and Westchester only)277
per family 480 342 - 29**
per child 248 190 - 23**
E) Based on weighted data for each case category for each county.
** p <.01
In neither research year was the value of child support fre-
quently enhanced through provision for other specified expenses,
"2 An average could not be computed for the 1984 New York County sample be.
cause the default case sample in that year included only five cases with complete infor-
mation on child support. For most of the default cases in that year involving minor chil-
dren, it was unclear whether there was an existing Family Court order on child support,
or whether the lack of data indicated a zero award. Default cases also made up the vast
majority of divorces in New York County during that year.
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except the continuation of medical insurance coverage for the
children, which was mandated in more than half of the cases
involving the custody of minor children in both research
years.278 A provision for college expenses was included in roughly
a quarter of the cases."" Explicit provisions for other expenses
(such as private school, camp, childcare, or uninsured medical
expenses), were extremely rare in both years,2 80 as were provi-
sions for automatic increases in the level of child support, based
on the cost of living or obligor's salary.28'
In both research years the obligor's income was the best
predictor of the size of the child support award, and the com-
bined alimony and child support award.282 The recipient's in-
come, on the other hand, was not significantly correlated with
the size of the child support award in either research year and
was significantly correlated with the combined award in only the
later research period.85
Other significant predictors of the value of child support
and alimony were the case category284 and whether the parties
had legal representation.8 5 In 1984, for example, the average
"8 In 1978, 58% of sample cases with provisions for the custody or support of minor
children (n=538) required that one or both parents pay medical insurance premiums. Of
those cases where such was required (n=310), 88% required the father to make the pay-
ments. In 1984, 64% of sample cases with provisions for the custody or support of minor
children (n=519) required one or both parents to pay medical insurance premiums. Of
those cases where such was required (n=301), 78% required the father to make the
payments.
2 In 1978, 20% of cases involving the custody of minor children contained provi-
sions for the payment of college expenses. Seventy-five percent of those payment provi-
sions required payment by the father, the rest called for joint payment. In 1984, 31% of
these cases contained college expense provisions. 44% required payment by the father,
2% by the mother, and 54% called for joint payment.
I" Provisions for child care expenses were found in 7% of 1984 cases and 3% of
1978 cases.
"I Only 23 cases contained such a provision in 1984 as compared to 18 in 1978.
2U In 1978, for child support, Pearson's R=.6298; p"=.000; for combined alimony
and child support, Pearson's R=.5192; p=.000. In 1984, for child support, Pearson's
R=.4216; p=.000; for combined alimony and child support, Pearson's R=.6099; p=.000.
2" In 1984, for child support, Pearson's R-.0040; p=.480. For combined alimony
and child support, Pearson's R=-.1919; p=.001.
I In 1978, Pearson's R=.2892; p=.000. In 1984, Pearson's R='.2252; p-.000. In
neither year was casetype a significant predictor of the size of the child support award
alone.
28 In 1978, for the child support award, Pearson's R=.1471; p-.002. For the com-
bined alimony and child support award, Pearson's R-.2625; p=.000. In 1984 the child
support award alone was not significantly correlated with legal representation, but was
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combined award was $721 per month when both parties were
represented by counsel as compared to $269 when only one
party was represented.28 s Another group of researchers has re-
cently reported that child support awards in three states were
similarly correlated with legal representation.8
The declining levels of child support over the research pe-
riod are consistent with those reported on a national basis in
Census data288 and in local surveys. 289 As there was no alteration
in the standards relating to child support under the 1980 equita-
ble distribution law, the explanation for the decline cannot be
found there, however. Nor, indeed, is an explanation readily ap-
parent from the research data.
The decreases in child support awards cannot be explained,
for example, by changes in custody outcomes. Overall trends in
regard to the custody of minor children were quite modest with
one exception: provisions for joint legal custody rose dramati-
cally. (See Table 52.) Moreover, child support awards when the
mother had sole custody declined by approximately the same
amount as did child support awards overall.29 0
for the combined alimony and child support award, Pearson's R=.2546; p-.00O0.
288 To some extent the difference in average awards may reflect the fact that, when
both parties are represented by counsel, it is likely that the family has a higher income
and more assets than when both parties are not represented. See note 270 supra. But see
Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 340-41 (1991) (Ta-
ble 10) (reporting significant correlation between child support award and legal represen-
tation at all income levels.).
2.. Id. at 340-41 (Table 10).
288 See 1985 CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY CENSUS REPORT, supra note 270, at 4 (re-
porting decline in mean child support payment received by survey respondents from
$2966 in 1979 to $2215 in 1985, in $1985, a 25% drop).
289 See STERIN Er AL., supra note 46, at 94-95, 132; McLindon, supra note 42, at 361,
369; Seal, supra note 44, at 12. But see Welch & Price-Bonham, supra note 44, at 415
(reporting small increase in level of child support in Spokane County, Wash. between
1970 and 1980). For a comparison of these reports, see Garrison, supra note 44, at 96
(Table 3.13).
210 The average child support award when the mother had sole custody declined by
23% (from $541 in 1978 to $412 in 1984), which was significant at the .001 confidence
level.
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TABLE 52
CUSTODY DECISIONS, BY YEAR
Physical Custody Legal Custody
1978 1984 1978 1984
(n=538) (n=467) (n-532) (n=466)
Wife sole 88 82 71 53
custody
Husband sole 5 9 4 5
custody
Split custody 4 4 3 1
Joint custody 3 5 22 42
Nor does the loss in the value of child support appear to
result simply from the smaller families of the later sample. Al-
though the average number of minor children did decline over
the research period from 1.3 to 1.1 minor children per couple,
the decline in the level of support per minor child was almost as
great as the per family loss.
c. Child Support and Alimony in Relation to Income
While the falling levels of child support that occurred over
the research period are thus not readily explicable, the decline
represented not only a dollar loss, but also a drop in the propor-
tion of the noncustodial parent's income paid in support. In
1978, noncustodial parents in the contested case sample (the
only group for whom such percentages could be calculated) paid
an average of 22% of their gross income in child support; 1984,
the average support percentage for this group was 18%.
In both years, noncustodial parents in higher income brack-
ets paid a smaller fraction of their income in child support than
did their low income counterparts. The inclusion of alimony
payments eroded this difference to some extent. (See Table 53.)
But noncustodial parents earning more than $40,000 per year
nonetheless paid, in both research years, a somewhat smaller
fraction of their gross income in combined alimony and child
support than did their low income counterparts. Indeed, the
value of the obligor's income was a significant, negative, predic-
tor of size of the child support percentage in both research years
and, in 1984, of the combined alimony and child support per-
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
centage as well.291 The increased frequency of short-term ali-
mony awards in 1984 might also increase this gap over time, as a
greater percentage of the high income parent's payments was
made in the form of alimony. This tendency for higher income
parents to pay less has also been noted in other jurisdictions. 2 2
TABLE 53
PERCENTAGE OF OBLIGOR'S GROSS INCOME PAID IN
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT (CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE), BY YEAR AND OBLIGOR'S INCOME ($1984)
Noncustodial Parent's 1978 1984
Income cs%/comb.% (n) cs%/comb.% (n)
$0 - $19,999 30/37% ( 36) 22/25% ( 45)
$20,000 - $39,999 20/28% ( 78) 18/22% ( 66)
$40,000+ 15/26% ( 54) 11/20% ( 26)
TOTAL SAMPLE 21/29% (168) 18/23% (137)
Cases with joint or split custody and no child support award excluded.
Another predictor of the value of child support and alimony
in relation to obligor income was the recipient's income. In both
research years the recipient's income was negatively correlated
with the child support and combined alimony and child support
percentages; in 1984 both correlations were significant.29 3 (See
Table 54.)
291 For the relationship between the obligor's income and the child support percent-
age in 1978, Pearson's R=-.1588; p-.020. In 1984 Pearson's R=-.2874; p=-.000. For the
relationship between the obligor's income and the combined percentage in 1984, Pear-
son's R=-.1791; p=.020. In 1978 the correlation was negative (-.0956) but not statisti-
cally significant (p=.109).
292 See, e.g., WErrzMAN, supra note 4, at 462-69 (California); McLindon, supra note
42, at 371-72 (Connecticut). Thoennes et al., supra note 286, at 336 (Table 6) (reporting
that sample cases from Colorado and Hawaii conformed to this pattern while sample
cases from Illinois did not).
"I In 1984, for the relationship between the child support percentage and the recipi.
ent's income, Pearson's R=-.1777; p=.026. For the same relationship in 1978, Pearson's
R=-.1056; p=.093. In 1984, for the relationship between the combined alimony and
child support percentage and the recipient's income, Pearson's R--.2559; p-.002. For
the same relationship in 1978, Pearson's R=-.1156; p=.073.
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TABLE 54
PERCENTAGE OF OBLIGOR'S GROSS INCOME PAID IN
ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT
(CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE),
BY YEAR AND RECIPIENT'S INCOME ($1984)
Recipient's Income 1978 1984
cs%/comb% (n) cs%/comb% (n)
$0 - $9,999 23/34% (98) 19/26% (62)
$10,000 - $19,999 19/22% (38) 22/24% (40)
$20,000+ 14/21% (23) 11/15% (19)
Cases with joint or split custody and no child support award excluded.
In neither year, however, was the ratio of recipient to family in-
come-the best measure of the parents' comparative income po-
tential-a significant predictor of the combined income
percentage.294
The averages also fail to reveal the considerable variation in
the support percentage, even among families with the same
number of children and similar income ratios. For example, in
1984, among families with one child where the wife obtained sole
custody and the wife's income percentage was between 10% and
19%, the combined support percentage ranged from 0% to 27%.
While the adoption of child support guidelines may have re-
duced such variation in the level of child support,0 5 it could not
have any effect on the level of alimony, where awards also
tended to be highly variable. In 1984, among couples with no
minor children where the wife's income percentage was 10% or
less, the alimony percentage ranged from 0% (for cases in which
2 The recipient's income percentage was a significant predictor of the child sup-
port percentage alone. In 1978 Pearson's R=.2026; p=.005. As the size of the recipient's
income in relation to family income increased, so did the value of the child support
award in relation to the obligor's income. This counterintuitive correlation probably re-
sults from the smaller likelihood of an alimony award as the recipient's income increases.
295 Child support guidelines establishing a presumption of support as a fixed per-
centage of the obligor's gross income were adopted by the New York legislature in 1989.
Ch. 567, §§ 6, 7, 1989 N.Y. Laws 1096, 1098-99 (codified at N.Y. Dom RxL LAw § 240.1-b
(McKinney Supp. 1991)). Some researchers have recently reported that the adoption of
child support guidelines reduced the variability of child support awards in some states.
See Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The
Child Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. RIv. 209, 232-33 (1991) (summarizing reports);
Thoennes et. aL, supra note 286, at 339-40 (Table 7) (describing research results in three
states).
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no alimony was awarded) to 36% of the obligor's income.29 6
d. The Effect of Income Transfers on Post-Divorce
per Capita Income
It has been widely reported that divorce is a financial catas-
trophe for women and the children in their custody. Researchers
have generally found that the per capita income of divorced
wives and children in their custody declines by about a third
following divorce, while that of husbands actually improves. 217
An examination of post-divorce per capita income for the con-
tested sample revealed a similar pattern in New York. (See Ta-
ble 55.) In both research years, divorced wives and children in
their custody emerged from the divorce with an average per cap-
ita income approximately two-thirds that which they had en-
joyed prior to the divorce, while the per capita income of hus-
bands rose by a substantial margin.
TABLE 55
AVERAGE PER CAPITA INCOME ($1984) BEFORE AND AFTER
DIVORCE AMONG FAMILIES IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE,
BY YEAR
Average Per Capita 1978 1984
Income $ per year (n) $ per year (n)
Predivorce Family $19,138 (231) $19,380 (205)
Postdivorce:
Husband $38,875 (238) $33,860 (221)
Avg. pct. of
per capita
predivorce income 215% 182% (196)
Wife $10,956 (258) $11,210 (262)
Avg pct. of
per capita
predivorce income 68% (219) 68% (196)
These changes in post-divorce per capita income are roughly
comparable to those reported by most other researchers. (See
... Marital duration does not explain the variation within this group. While marital
duration was significantly correlated with the alimony percentage for contested cases in
1978 (Pearsdn's R=.2939, p=.000), in 1984, both for the cases in this group (n-15) and
the contested sample, the relationship was not statistically significant.
297 See note 42 supra.
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Table 56.)
TABLE 56
POST-DIVORCE PER CAPITA INCOME OF DIVORCED
HUSBANDS AND WIVES, BY RESEARCH SITE
Research Husband Wife
Site (Average % Change) (Average % Change)
Anchorage, Alaska 298  + 17% - 33%
New Haven, Connecticut"9  + 90% - 31%
Los Angeles &
San Francisco, California0 0  - - 21%
Five Counties,. Vermont'0 ' + 120% - 33%
New York/Onondaga/
Westchester, New York + 82% - 32%
These changes were not felt uniformly across the sample,
however. In both research years, the ratio of a woman's pre- and
post-divorce per capita income was strongly correlated with her
husband's income,30 2 her own income,30 3 and the ratio of wife to
family income.304 Wives of high income husbands suffered an av-
erage loss in per capita income more than seven times greater
than that of their counterparts married to husbands in the low-
est income bracket.3 0 5 (See Table 57.)
298 BAKER, supra note 42, at 19.
McLindon, supra note 42, at 392.
200 Hoffman & Duncan, What are the Economic Consequences of Div'oree?, supra
note 43, at 643 (utilizing data contained in WErrzmAN, supra note 4, at Tables 27 and
28). Weitzman does not provide average changes in per capita income for her sample as a
whole, but describes them instead by income groups. See WErrzmN, supra note 4, at
328-33. Husbands in every income category had a median per capita income at least
100% that of the predivorce household. Id.
201 Wishik, supra note 42, at 98.
202 In 1978 Pearson's R=-.2286; p=.000. In 1984 Pearson's R--.2319; p-.001.
300 In 1978 Pearson's R=.2961; p=.000. In 1984 Pearson's R=.4427; p-.000.
In 1978 Pearson's R=.6015; p=.000. In 1984 Pearson's R=.7164; p=.0O0.
200 Other researchers have reported that the per capita income of divorced wives
tends to decline more as family income increases. See BAKER, supra note 42, at 20;
WErrzhuN, supra note 4, at 334.
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TABLE 57
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN WIVES' PER
CAPITA INCOME (BEFORE AND AFTER DIVORCE) IN
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY YEAR AND HUSBAND'S
INCOME ($1984)
Husband's Income 1978 1984
% Difference (n) % Difference (n)
$0- $19,999 - 4% (50) - 7% (52)
$20,000 - $39,999 -34% (98) -37% (93)
$40,000+ -49% (71) -52% (51)
Wives in the lowest income bracket themselves suffered a loss in
per capita income at least double that of their counterparts in
the highest income bracket; indeed, in 1984, wives in the highest
income bracket actually enjoyed a slight increase in their per
capita income post-divorce. (See Table 58.)
TABLE 58
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN WIVES' PER
CAPITA INCOME (BEFORE AND AFTER DIVORCE) IN
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY YEAR AND WIFE'S INCOME
($1984)
Wife's Income 1978 1984
% Difference (n) % Difference (n)
$0- $9,999 - 43% (131) - 57% (101)
$10,000 - $19,999 - 14% ( 61) - 12% (66)
$20,000+ - 20% ( 27) + 5% (29)
The largest losses in per capita income were registered by
low income wives with high income husbands. In 1984 wives in
the lowest income bracket married to husbands in the two high-
est income brackets saw their per capita income plummet to less
than half its pre-divorce level, while wives in the highest income
bracket married to husbands in the lowest actually saw their per
capita income increase by 77%. (See Tables 59 and 60.)
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TABLE 59
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN WIVES' PER
CAPITA INCOME (BEFORE AND AFTER DIVORCE) IN 1984
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY HUSBAND'S INCOME AND
WIFE'S INCOME ($1984)
Wife's
Income
$0 - $9999
$10,000 - $19,999
$20,000+
$0-$19,999
% (n)
Difference
- 48% (25)
+ 11% (19)
+ 77% ( 8)
Husband's Income
$20,000-$39,999
% (n)
Difference
- 66% (47)
- 20% (38)
- 3% (8)
840,000+
% (n)
Difference
- 66% (29)
- 22% ( 9)
- 34% (13)
This pattern held constant over the research period, although
the range of variation was somewhat greater in the later research
year.
TABLE 60
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE IN WIVES' PER
CAPITA INCOME (BEFORE AND AFTER DIVORCE) IN 1978
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY HUSBAND'S INCOME AND
WIFE'S INCOME ($1984)
Wife's
Income
$0 - $9999
$10,000 - $19,999
$20,000+
$0-$19,999
% (n)
Difference
- 17% (27)
+ 11% (19)
+ 14% (4)
Husband's Income
$20,000-$39,999
% (n)
Difference
- 45% (57)
- 20% (31)
- 18% (10)
840,000+
% (n)
Difference
- 55% (47)
- 41% (11)
- 33% (13)
Given the availability of income for transfer and the high
level of relative need among low income wives married to high
income husbands, the extremity of their losses in per capita in-
come is surprising. What these large scale losses in per capita
income evidence is the fact that a wife's income was, for the
sample population, a far more important factor than alimony or
child support in determining her post-divorce standard of living;
in neither time period were receipt of an alimony award or the
value of the child support award significant predictors of a wife's
post-divorce per capita income. Indeed, in 1984, the receipt of
an alimony award and an award of custody to the wife were both
negatively correlated with the wife's post-divorce percentage of
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pre-divorce per capita income.30 6 During that year, those wives
who were awarded alimony experienced a greater reduction in
their post-divorce per capita income than did those who received
no alimony.0 Similarly, those awarded child support exper-
ienced a greater decline (-42%) than did those whose husbands
assumed custody (-14%) or who had no minor children
(-24%).3o8 Neither the wife's age nor marital duration, on the
other hand, were significant predictors of the wife's post-divorce
percentage of pre-divorce per capita income in either time
period.
III. WHAT THE DATA MEAN: DIRECTIONS FOR DIVORCE REFORM
What conclusions emerge from this picture of divorce in
New York, before and after adoption of a new divorce regime
establishing equitable division of marital property and institut-
ing a new "rehabilitative" alimony norm?
One conclusion suggested by the New York experience is
that diminished alimony prospects do not hinge upon loss of the
ability to block a divorce, a theory that has been widely utilized
to explain divorced wives' lost alimony prospects in states that
adopted no-fault divorce reforms. New York has not adopted
no-fault divorce except based on mutual consent. The ability of
wives to block a divorce thus remains intact, but it failed to pre-
vent diminished alimony prospects markedly similar to those
that have been noted in no-fault divorce jurisdictions. The rules
governing post-divorce entitlements appear to be more impor-
tant determinants of divorce outcomes than do divorce
"o For the relationship between an award of alimony and the wife's percentage of
pre-divorce per capita income post-divorce, in 1984 Pearson's R=-.1070; p=. 068; in 1978
Pearson's R=.0509; p=.227. For the relationship between the wife's percentage of pre-
divorce per capita income post-divorce and a custody award, in 1984 Pearson's
R=-.1200; p=.047; in 1978 Pearson's R=-.1592; p=.009.
"O7 The group awarded alimony (n=64) suffered a drop of 40% in per capita income,
while those who were not awarded alimony (n=130) suffered a drop of 30%. In 1978 this
pattern was reversed. Wives awarded alimony experienced an average loss in per capita
income of 30% (n=105), while those who were not awarded alimony experienced an av-
erage per capita income loss of 35% (n=111).
.08 The differences were similar in 1978. Wives with custody of minor children ex-
perienced a 39% drop in per capita income (n=149); those whose husbands obtained
custody experienced a 10% increase in their per capita income (n=9); those without
minor children experienced a 22% drop in per capita income (n=58).
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grounds. 0 9 Legislatures that wish to improve the financial posi-
tion of divorced wives would thus be ill-advised to eliminate uni-
lateral no-fault divorce or impose substantial waiting periods; re-
vision of the rules governing entitlements appears far more
likely to produce the desired results.310
The New York experience also strongly suggests, however,
that even revision of the rules governing substantive entitle-
ments will not produce the desired results unless that revision
rests on an accurate understanding of current outcomes and pro-
vides clear guidance to judges and litigants about expected re-
sults. Property division, where the New York law was intended
to have its most significant impact, does not appear to have been
affected in any major way. The likelihood and duration of ali-
mony awards was, however, markedly reduced. While this result
was, to some extent, an expectable one given the establishment
of an alimony regime emphasizing rehabilitative goals, the ex-
tent of the change and the impact of the new rules on long-mar-
ried and low income wives appears to have been an unintended
consequence of the new law. The decline in the dollar value of
child support, and in the proportion of obligor income paid in
child support and alimony, associated with the new law were
also unintended consequences of the legal reform; it is not clear,
indeed, whether the equitable distribution law bears any direct
responsibility for these declines given the lack of any change in
the rules governing child support, and the existence of a similar
pattern in other jurisdictions over the same time period. The
question today, of course, is whether these results of reform, in-
tended and unintended, are acceptable. If they are not, the rules
must be revised so that acceptable results can be achieved.
Whether the results are acceptable depends on what we in-
tend the law to accomplish: we need to decide what we want
before we can evaluate what we have. I do not here pretend to
plumb the rich theoretical literature on the goals and limitations
of divorce law that has emerged in recent years;31 1 I do wish to
outline some goals that I believe divorce law can achieve, and
3o9 This issue is explored at length in Garrison, supra note 44.
310 See id. at 100-01.
" For a representative range of views, see, e.g., Ellman, supra note 51; Rhode &
Minow, supra note 4; Rutheford, supra note 51; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and
the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Micn. L. Rnv. 1803 (1985); Singer,
supra note 41; Sugarman, supra note 50.
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which enjoy, in my view, fairly widespread social consensus.
These goals inform the discussion that follows.
First, divorce law should, to the extent possible, protect
children from harm occasioned by the dissolution of their fami-
lies. There can be little question today that divorce poses major
risks, psychological as well as economic, to children of all ages.312
That children's standard of living plummets following divorce,
while that of the noncustodial parent frequently improves, is an
inexcusable failing of divorce law. Divorce law must prefer the
needs and interests of children to those of their fathers and
mothers. It must provide standards that meaningfully effectuate
parental support obligations, and ensure that children enjoy a
standard of living commensurate with that of both parents. As
Professor Glendon has succinctly put it, when children are in-
volved in a divorce, a "children first" principle should govern.3 13
Second, divorce law should distribute the economic burden
of divorce so as to protect wives who have been economically
disadvantaged by long-term reliance on the marital relationship.
Divorce law should not, of course, be seen as a primary strategy
for correcting women's lack of economic equality. Even though
women's weaker economic position results in part from conflicts
between career and family,314 marriage neither bears primary re-
sponsibility for the problem, nor is divorce law capable of pro-
viding a cure. On the other hand, divorce law should protect the
justifiable expectations of marriage partners that are based on
marital commitment and day-to-day sharing. While marriage
may not be responsible for women's economic problems-occu-
pational segregation and lower wages afflict women no matter
what their marital status315-the marital relationship does insu-
late women from the full effect of their economic disadvantage
"I See generally JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES:
MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE (1989); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN &
JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH Di-
VORCE (1980); Children and Divorce: Developmental and Clinical Issues, 12 J. DIVORCE 1
(1988).
313 See GLENDON, supra note 1, at 94.
See generally FUCHS, supra note 124, at 4, 58-74; Nancy E. Dowd, Work and
Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Re-
structuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989).
"I See, e.g., FUCHS, supra note 124, at 32-44; LEVITAN & BELOUS, supra note 6, at
93-98; WOMEN EMPLOYED INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION (1988); Jerry A. Jacobs,
Long-Term Trends in Occupation Segregation by Sex, 95 AM. J. Soc. 160 (1989).
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and thus encourages its persistence. Moreover, the childrearing
activities that play a significant role in women's economic disad-
vantage provide substantial benefits to the marital family. Di-
vorce law thus must strike a fair balance: it cannot serve as a
panacea for curing the feminization of poverty, but it can and
should protect divorced wives whose economic disadvantage has
been reinforced by the marital relationship.316
Third, divorce law should produce relatively consistent, pre-
dictable results in which like cases receive like treatment. Given
the insubstantial resources of the typical divorcing couple, pre-
dictable, consistent results must also be achievable without a
major investment in legal assistance; a significant number of
husbands and wives do not have legal representation at divorce
and can ill afford to obtain it. 317 Meeting these goals requires
that divorce law be clear and simple. Clear rules simplify and
streamline the negotiation and settlement process, decreasing
the tendency for cases to be litigated and lowering legal fees.318
Vague rules produce disparate results and tend to create a sense
among litigants that the divorce process is arbitrary and un-
fair.31 Vague rules also tend to favor the litigant with greater
resources, who has better access to legal counsel and can afford
to "wait it out.1320
The remainder of this section describes the deficiencies of
outcomes under New York's equitable distribution law in light
of these goals and makes recommendations for change. Almost
all of the legal changes that I suggest have been made before by
others, often more fully than the scope of this article permits.
" For a similar view, see, e.g., Rhode & Minow, supra note 4, at 193-94.
11 The rate of legal representation for couples in my sample (see Table 2, supra) is
generally consistent with that reported by other divorce researchers. See Thoennes et.
al., supra note 286, at 342 (Table 11) (in 1986-87, 23% of mothers and 48% of fathers
unrepresented in Colorado sample, 27% of mothers and 51% of fathers unrepresented in
Hawaii sample, and 8% of mothers and 30% of fathers unrepresented in Illinois sample).
3" For research on the impact of indeterminate rules on divorce bargaining, see
Howard S. Erlanger, et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cau-
tions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & Soc. REv. 585, 598-99 (1987); Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 LAw & Soc.
REv. 93 (1986).
39 See, e.g., GLENDON, supra note 1, at 96 ("far too many divorce litigants feel that
the outcomes of cases are simply arbitrary, or dependent on the luck of the judicial draw,
or systematically biased").
330 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 49, at 971-77; Erlanger, et al., supra
note 318, at 592-94; Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 318, at 99-108.
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My purpose here is not to develop a complete theory of divorce
entitlements or a detailed statutory program, but simply to out-
line how current divorce outcomes plot a direction for divorce
reform.
A. Property Division
The debate over property division today invariably assumes
the propriety of dividing property acquired during marriage,
without regard to title, when the marital relationship is dis-
solved. The proposition that marriage is a partnership of equals,
which typically results in equivalent, if different, contributions
by husband and wife, enjoys widespread acceptance.3 21 There
are few who would argue for a return to a title-based property
regime.
The debate over property distribution thus typically focuses
on two questions: what is property, and equal versus equitable
distribution.2 2 One conclusion that strongly emerges from my
research is that, to the average couple, both of these questions
are of little practical relevance. Given the scanty property avail-
able for distribution, neither the characterization of assets nor
the property regime will have much impact on their well-being
after divorce. This conclusion is not novel. The scarcity of mari-
tal property was first reported in 1956 in Goode's pioneering
study of divorce in Detroit, Michigan. Forty percent of the di-
vorcing couples he surveyed had no property beyond household
possessions and, only 18% had property worth $4000 or more.323
The lack of property typically available for division has been
rediscovered by several researchers more recently in a wide vari-
ety of locations.3 24 My research has not uncovered anything new
here. What it has revealed for the first time is the lack of valua-
ble property among the relatively wealthy. Even among the
Westchester County contested sample, whose family incomes av-
eraged close to $50,000 per year and who come from one of the
wealthiest counties in the nation, median net worth was only
"' See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 51; Krauskopf, supra note 51.
322 See generally FINEMAN, supra note 40, at 1-78, 175-80. Robert J. Levy, An Intro-
duction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1989).
323 WILLIAM J. GOODE, AFTER DIVORCE 217 (1956).
324 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 42; WEITZMAN, supra note 4; McLindon, supra note
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$44,219.
The general scarcity of marital property is exacerbated by
its relative nonliquidity. Most divorcing couples do not own
businesses, real estate, or substantial stock and bond portfolios.
Nor do they own professional degrees or licenses, celebrity sta-
tus, or business goodwill. The characterization of such assets as
marital property or individual entitlement, interesting though it
may be theoretically, will make little difference to Mr. and Mrs.
Average, who own household goods, a car, and possibly a house.
Current distribution patterns tend to exacerbate the liquid-
ity problem for divorced wives. In the typical property division,
the wife's share tends to be concentrated in household furnish-
ings and the marital home, which is probably subject to a sub-
stantial mortgage obligation. Wives typically receive the lion's
share of these assets, but seldom receive the majority of business
assets, real estate (which has income earning potential), or even
the pension, which probably represents the bulk of the couple's
retirement savings.
A primary focus on property division as a divorce entitle-
ment also creates pressure to give each spouse his or her share
now. This is a particular problem when the asset is the family
home and the custodial parent needs to live there with the
couple's minor children. It is thus not surprising that deferred
sale of the family home declined over the research period. In
1984 deferred sale occurred in only 10% of the cases in which a
home was at issue, as compared to 18% in the earlier research
period. Researchers in California, Connecticut, and Vermont
have also reported sale of the family home with increasing fre-
quency, even when there are minor children and the family
home would provide housing that is affordable. 2 " Such sales ap-
pear to occur most typically when there are insufficient assets
for the custodial parent to trade for the home. 20 Courts have
the power to defer distribution in such a case and insulate the
children against the further trauma of a new home, neighbor-
hood, and school-as well as potentially higher housing
costs-but this result does not always occur.
These facts-the scarcity of marital property, its frequent
325 See WErzmN, supra note 4, at 79-84 (California); McLindon, supra note 42, at
376-78 (Connecticut); Wishik, supra note 42, at 91 (Vermont).
316 See WErrzhA, supra note 4, at 80-81.
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nonliquidity, and the undesirability of current distribution in
many cases-suggest that property distribution should not be
viewed as a primary vehicle for achieving an equitable distribu-
tion of the hardships occasioned by divorce. This is not to say
that the rules relating to property division are unimportant. But
for the typical divorcing couple, no property division rule will
make a substantial difference in economic well-being after di-
vorce; divorce law must take account of that fact.
The drafters of the equitable distribution law did not take
account of the scarcity of marital property; they simply assumed
that wives would get more property to make up for less alimony.
It is now time to correct the imbalance by placing renewed em-
phasis on income and its post-divorce distribution.
The evidence also suggests that the equitable distribution
law's aim of producing individualized equity determinations has
been a failure, leading instead to inconsistent and unpredictable
outcomes. While the law has been associated with a trend to-
ward equal division of a couple's net worth, that trend is mod-
est. The range of variation continues to be great and highly
unpredictable.
The range of variation is particularly troubling given my
finding that the wife's average share of net marital property
tends to decline as the couple's net worth increases. This phe-
nomenon helps to explain why many women's advocates today
believe that an equal division rule would benefit divorced wives:
where there is enough property to make something of a differ-
ence, they may be lucky to get as much as half. This pattern is
troubling for several reasons. First, for couples with substantial
assets, marital property typically has a much lower value in rela-
tion to the husband's income than it does to the wife's. For ex-
ample, among couples in the 1984 contested case sample with
net worth exceeding $150,000, the average income of husbands
was more than ten times that of wives.327 Many wives in this
group are genuinely needy in comparison to their husbands.
This is the group that a property distribution law could help,
and which it appears to be failing. Moreover, the value of the
marital property is not a factor that should be relevant to prop-
erty division under the equitable distribution law. But the law's
327 The average income of husbands (n=38) was $127,053, while that of wives
(n=38) was $11,573. The average ratio of wife income to family income was 13%.
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indeterminacy makes this kind of result possible.
Another problem with the law's emphasis on individualized
determination is its cost. After the passage of the equitable dis-
tribution law, the length of the average contested proceeding in-
creased. While we do not have hard data on counsel fees before
and after equitable distribution, anecdotal evidence suggests
that they have risen.32 8 We also know that lack of full legal rep-
resentation was significantly linked with a smaller chance of be-
ing awarded alimony and with an alimony/child support award
of lower value. The equitable distribution law's goal of individu-
alized equity determinations thus appears, in retrospect, to have
achieved no more than expensive unpredictability. It is time to
end the charade.
How, then, should the property distribution features of the
equitable distribution law be revised? The obvious alternative to
equitable distribution is equal. This approach has the merits of
simplicity and predictability. But an equal division rule also has
disadvantages. Such a rule may create even more pressure for
immediate asset distribution than does the current equitable
distribution regime.2 9 Moreover, for couples with highly dispro-
portionate incomes and little to divide, it is unclear that an
equal division norm fairly distributes the burden of divorce.330
This is a particular problem when minor children are involved
and the family assets are largely composed of home equity and
furniture.
I thus believe that a new property division scheme should
combine features of equitable and equal distribution. Equitable
distribution concepts should apply when a couple's net worth is
328 See, e.g., Cynthia Cooper, State's Lawyers Differ Over Law's Success in First
Ten Years, N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1990, at 1 (reporting that the expense of divorce cases is
one of the most frequent criticisms of the equitable distribution law); Katherine Bauton,
Women & Divorce: How the New Law Works Against Them, N.Y. MAc., Oct. 1984, at 34,
35, 36 (based on anecdotal accounts, cost of contesting a divorce has "skyrocketed" since
passage of the equitable distribution law). The New York State Task Force on Women in
the Courts has also reported that "[e]conomically dependent wives are put at an addi-
tional disadvantage because many judges fail to award attorneys' fees adequate to enable
effective representation or experts' fees adequate to value the marital assets." TAsK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 77, at 122.
3' See, e.g., Wmzrzu, supra note 4, at 79-80 (reporting that equal division re-
quirement encouraged forced sale of family residence).
10 For similar views, see, e.g., FxnmsaN, supra note 40, at 175-80, Reynolds, supra
note 40, at 909-10.
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negative and when their assets are of relatively low value-worth
less, say, than $15,000. Wives now frequently keep the lion's
share of these assets, a reflection of their greater need in relation
to that of their husbands. For assets in this value range, which
in most cases will be composed substantially of household goods
and a car, a need-based allocation seems to distribute more
fairly the burden of divorce than does an equal division norm.33 1
In order to avoid the indeterminacy of equitable division, need
should be the only factor governing division at this asset level,
however, and it should be measured objectively by comparing
spousal incomes and expenses.
For larger marital estates, a presumption of equal division
should apply. When a couple has substantial assets it would
often be inequitable to use need as the sole basis of distribution;
equal division more fairly balances need with spousal contribu-
tion. A presumption also provides an established norm while
permitting deviation to accommodate the unusual case where
equal division would be inequitable. It must be kept in mind,
however, that an equal division presumption will not benefit the
average divorced wife, who already receives at least 50% of the
couple's meager assets. An equal division presumption will pri-
marily benefit wives in the relatively uncommon case where
there are substantial marital assets. The reason for such a pre-
sumption is thus not to ensure that women get a larger share of
the marital property; under this approach many will receive less.
It is to ensure more uniform, predictable, and less costly
determinations.
An equal distribution norm should also exempt from imme-
diate distribution the family home and household goods when
there are minor children and it is economically feasible for the
children and their custodial parent to remain in the home. 332 In-
332 California has taken a similar approach to cases of negative net worth. When
marital debts exceed assets, equal division is not mandated. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1991).
332 Based on the recommendations of a state task force established to evaluate
Weitzman's recommendations for legal change, the California legislature adopted a rule
similar in intent although far more discretionary in its approach. Ch. 729, § 1, 1988 Cal.
Stat. 1661, 1662 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE § 4700.10 (West Supp. 1991)). The statute
requires the trial court, upon request of a party having sole or joint physical custody of a
child, to determine whether it is economically feasible to consider ordering deferred sale
of the family home. If the court finds that such an order is economically feasible, it must
consider a list of ten factors in exercising its discretion to grant or deny such an order.
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deed, I would not support an equal division presumption that
did not include such an exemption. Children's needs must come
first and must be taken seriously.
The new rules should also govern spousal property entitle-
ments during marriage. If we seriously believe that the marital
relationship creates marital property, that principle should ap-
ply during marriage as well as at divorce. 333 The current empha-
sis on entitlement at divorce provides almost no protection for a
spouse whose partner is dissipating marital assets and who
wants to remain married. Even if such a spouse ultimately seeks
a divorce, the remaining property may be insufficient to compen-
sate for that which was irretrievably lost, and valuation of the
lost property may be difficult or impossible. A marital property
regime should protect the married as well as the divorced.
B. Alimony and Child Support
Given the scarcity of marital property, it is clear that ali-
mony and child support should be the primary means of equi-
tably allocating the burden of divorce. But in contrast to the
property division debate, where the propriety of division is inva-
riably assumed, there is little consensus on the appropriate theo-
retical basis for an alimony award. The traditional rationale for
alimony was, of course, a variant of that for damages based on
breach of contract. 34 The husband had a duty to support the
wife during the marriage; if he breached the marital contract, he
was required to pay damages in the amount of that obligation
until the wife remarried. The alimony obligation thus was theo-
retically measured by expectancy-what the wife could antici-
pate in view of the marital standard of living. The "modem"
approach to alimony-one reflected in the new alimony rules es-
tablished by the equitable distribution law-views alimony pri-
marily as a need-based remedy.
As dissatisfaction with this need-based approach has
For a compilation of other state laws regarding deferred sale of the marital residence
when there are minor children, see FINAL REPORT OF THE CALIFomRIA SENATE TAsK FORC
ON FAhMLY EQurrY 30-33 (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA SENATE TAsK FonCE
REPORT].
The Uniform Marital Property Act was designed to accomplish this goal in states
that did not utilize community property principles. The Act has thus far not been wdely
adopted, however.
11 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
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mounted, legal commentators have searched for a new theory of
alimony. Almost all have eschewed the traditional model and
that based on need. They have instead emphasized the twin
goals of encouraging marital sharing and providing compensa-
tion to a spouse who has made an "investment" in a failed mar-
riage.3 3 5 The remedies proposed to embody these ideals differ in
significant respects, however. a33
In contrast to the lack of consensus on a theory to govern
alimony determinations, there is widespread agreement on ap-
propriate outcomes in at least some typical cases. Publics and
judicial opinion polls338 evidence a surprising amount of unanim-
ity. Most respondents support permanent alimony for wives in
long marriages whose economic disadvantage has been occa-
sioned, at least in part, by childrearing and homemaking activi-
ties.39 Most believe that no alimony is required when the mar-
331 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage
and Divorce, 62 TUL. L. REv. 855 (1988); Ellman, supra note 51; Goldfarb, supra note 41;
Krauskopf, supra note 51; Rutheford, supra note 51.
330 Several of the commentators propose that alimony properly derives from detri-
mental reliance on the marriage relationship, but they do not agree on the types of detri-
ment which should be compensable. Moreover, some commentators use detriment type
rationales, in whole or in part, to support expectancy based recovery. Expectancy based
recovery harks back, of course, to the traditional theory of alimony, but modern com-
mentators tend to eliminate the fault aspect of the traditional theory and to instead
emphasize economic equity. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 51 (arguing that alimony
should be awarded when spouse makes marital investment resulting in postmarriage re-
duction in earning capacity, in amount equal to lost earning capacity, as long as decision
is financially rational and results in increased marital income or is based on child care
needs); Goldfarb, supra note 41 (proposing equalization of post-divorce living standards)
Krauskopf, supra note 51 (arguing that alimony should entail a division of enhanced
earning capacity as well as compensation for diminished earning capacity).
337 See WEITZMAN, supra note 4, at 150-63 (survey of divorced men and women).
Is Judicial surveys have typically asked judges to decide the same hypothetical
cases. See WETzMAN, supra note 4, at 194-204 (survey of California judges); J. Milligan,
14 OHIO PRACTICE FAM. LAW, § 4659.1 (1988 Supp.), described in Krauskopf, supra note
51, at 275-76 (survey of Ohio judges); The Economic Consequences of a Dissolution, N.J.
Judge Workshop, N.J. S. Ct. Faro. Practice Division Retreat (1990) (on file in author's
office) (survey of New Jersey judges).
119 See WErrZMAN, supra note 4, at 152, 154-56 (interviews with divorced men and
women); id., at 198-201 (responses of California judges to hypothetical case involving
homemaker wife in 27-year marriage; all predicted an alimony award, 63% predicted a
permanent award); Krauskopf, supra note 51, at 275-76 (responses of Ohio judges to
hypothetical case involving a 27-year marriage; two-thirds of judges predicted permanent
alimony; total amounts payable ranged from $1800 to $19,000); N.J. Judge Workshop,
supra note 338 (responses of New Jersey judges to hypothetical case involving 31-year
wealthy marriage where wife had no employment history; all but one (27 of 28) awarded
wife permanent alimony; three awarded rehabilitative alimony in addition to permanent
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riage is childless and short, or when husband and wife have
relatively equal incomes.3 0 Most support short-term alimony
when the wife is economically disadvantaged and wants further
training to enhance her income.34 1 It is thus no accident that
short-term alimony awards have become more frequent. Except
for the woman who has been economically disadvantaged by
long-term childcare and homemaking responsibilities, the con-
cept of durational alimony enjoys widespread support.
It is ironic that the equitable distribution law has dimin-
ished the alimony prospects of long-married, economically disad-
vantaged wives-the consensus case for long-term ali-
mony-more than those of any other group. While wives in long
marriages with low incomes are still the most likely to be
awarded alimony, a significant number of these women are not.
Moreover, under the new alimony standard, the greater the
length of the marriage, the greater the decline in the likelihood
of an alimony award. Even for unemployed wives, the likelihood
of receiving an alimony award declined markedly. While later
amendments to the statute342 were designed to enhance the ali-
mony prospects of these long-married, economically disadvan-
taged wives, the amendments are highly discretionary and
vague, making meaningful change doubtful.
Moreover, the equitable distribution law failed to alleviate
the variability of alimony decision making and pervasive dispari-
ties in how the burden of divorce is allocated. Under the new law
divorced wives and children continued to experience a dramatic
drop in their per capita income while that of husbands
improved. 43
The indeterminacy of the equitable distribution law's ali-
mony standard has undoubtedly contributed to these results by
failing to provide clear guidance to judges" and litigants on
maintenance).
340 See WErrzMAN, supra note 4, at 152 (interviews with divorced men and women);
GLAMOUR, July 1981, at 21 (readers' poll).
11 WEri TAN, supra note 4, at 152, 157-58 (interviews with divorced men and
women).
32 See note 80 supra for a description of the amendments.
13 See Table 55 supra and accompanying text.
', Little research has been done on alimony decision making by judges. One survey
examined a large sample of cases in Orange County, Fla. decided between 1971 and 1974.
The authors of the study attempted to develop a "predictive model," taking into account
factors such as needs, income, etc. They reported that- "Few discernible trends appeared
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
when alimony is appropriate, when it should be permanent, and
the size of the award. The variability of results is particularly
troubling given my finding that the likelihood of an alimony
award varied significantly depending on the type of divorce ac-
tion and the type of legal representation. Alimony outcomes
should not depend on access to counsel, when the neediest are
least likely to enjoy legal representation. As with the property
division standard, the costs of individualized determination ap-
pear to outweigh its advantages. More definite standards are
required.
Some corrective measures have already been taken for fami-
lies with minor children. Pursuant to federal requirement, all
states, including New York, now must make child support orders
under statutory guidelines.34 5 These guidelines may significantly
improve the consistency and predictability of child support
awards. 46 It remains to be seen, however, to what extent such
guidelines provide an adequate corrective for the pervasive dis-
parities in the standard of living of children and their noncus-
todial parent which I found, and which have been reported by
other researchers. The New York child support guidelines, for
example, establish a presumption in favor of a combined ali-
mony and child support award, when there are two minor chil-
dren, equal to 25% of the obligor's gross income.347 This is less
than the average percentage of gross income awarded in com-
bined support within the 1978 contested case sample, and virtu-
ally identical to the average combined percentage for the 1984
contested case sample, where major disparities in the post-di-
vorce standard of living of children and their noncustodial par-
ent were frequent. To be sure, these new guidelines also man-
date the allocation of child care costs and uninsured medical
expenses in accordance with the parents' ability to pay;348 these
expenses were rarely allocated under the prior regime. But it is
to exist in relation to each judge and alimony and consequently no model was devel-
oped." Kenneth R. White & Thomas Stone, A Study of Alimony and Child Support
Rulings with Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75, 80 (1976).
310 Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 17
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (West Supp. 1991)).
30 Some researchers have reported that child support guidelines have reduced the
variability of child support awards in some states. See note 295 supra.
:47 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240.1-b(b)(3)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
'4 Id. § 240.1-b(c)(4)-(6).
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not clear that New York courts are following these provisions of
the new child support law.34 9 Nor is it clear that the new support
guidelines go far enough to 'ensure that children enjoy a stan-
dard of living equivalent to that of their parents.3 0
Given these concerns, I believe that a revised alimony and
child support rule should have several features. First, it should
mandate child support in an amount that would equalize the
post-divorce standard of living of the children and their custo-
dial parent, with that of the noncustodial parent. This approach
would give concrete meaning to a "children first" principle. It
also has the merit of obviating the need for alimony in cases
involving minor children, except in the occasional case where ali-
mony is appropriate for purposes of restitution or to enhance
the custodial parent's income potential.-" 1 This is desirable in
order to focus settlement negotiations and court proceedings
where they belong-on the children-and because there is some
evidence which suggests that obligors are more willing to shoul-
der obligations to their children than to their former spouse.32
Second, a revised alimony and child support law should es-
tablish a presumption in favor of permanent alimony for the
long-married spouse who cannot otherwise maintain the marital
standard of living. There is broad support for the proposition
that women whose economic disadvantage has been enhanced by
their familial responsibilities and reliance on the continuity of
"I A 1990 survey of child support awards under the new guidelines reports that a
provision for payment of any extras was included in only 42% of the sample cases. When
such extra payments were required, they were typically limited to uninsured medical
expenses. Eighty-three percent of sample cases that required such payments in excess of
the bare child support award required the obligor to pay some portion of uninsured med-
ical expenses while only 10% required payment of child care expenses. New York State
Office of Court Administration, 1990 Report of the Chief Administrator of the Courts
Pursuant to Judiciary Law Section 216(5) as Required by Child Support Standards Act
(Tables 3 & 4) (undated) (on file in author's office). It is not even clear whether New
York courts are providing support equal to the basic child support obligation under the
new statute. The 1990 survey reports only mean child support for varying numbers of
children for various obigor income ranges. But for some of those ranges, the mean repre-
sents a lower percentage of obligor income than the statute presumes appropriate even
for obligors at the very bottom of that income range. Id. (Table 1).
uo For a similar critique of current child support guidelines, see Rhode & Minow,
supra note 4, at 207.
"' Ironically, a similar suggestion was made by the Reporter for the Uniform Mari-
tal Property Act. See LEvy, supra note 25, at 145.
12 See Gwynn David, et al., Divorce: Who Supports the Family?, 13 FAm! LAw 217,
223 (1983).
1991]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
marital commitment are entitled to long-term support, and it is
in such a case that an alimony award is most likely. A presump-
tion in favor of permanent alimony for this group would estab-
lish an alimony norm and improve the consistency of outcomes,
while nonetheless permitting deviation where appropriate.
Third, a revised alimony law should establish a presumption
against alimony, except for purposes of restitution, when the
marriage is short and childless and when the income and earning
capacity of the spouses are relatively equal. These are cases in
which alimony is rarely awarded, and in which there is substan-
tial consensus that it should not be. There is no obvious reason
why an alimony rule should not say so, again on the basis of a
presumption that permits deviation where appropriate.
For cases that do not fit any of these categories, and in
which there is also considerably less consensus on the appropri-
ate role of alimony, a more discretionary standard may be neces-
sary. One possible approach in such cases would entail guide-
lines that provide weights for various contribution and need
factors. The guidelines approach, which has already been uti-
lized to improve the consistency of child support awards,. 3
would permit consideration of a broad range of factors while
nonetheless establishing clear norms. Another possible approach
is that employed under the Uniform Probate Code for computa-
tion of a surviving spouse's share of a decedent's estate, which
relies on marital duration . 5 ' An alimony rule might, for exam-
ple, establish a presumption in favor of alimony for a period
equal to the duration of the marriage when a spouse canot main-
tain the marital standard of living. This approach is predictable
and would not necessitate elaborate proof of spousal contribu-
tion and income potential that require access to legal counsel.
Moreover, because it posits an alimony obligation that expands
in direct relation to the duration of marital commitment and
contribution, it seems relatively fair.
Finally, a revised alimony law should specify a method of
3' See note 295 supra.
", UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-201(a) (1990). The Uniform Probate Code provision derives
from John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & Tsi J. 303 (1987). The Langbein-Waggoner proposal was
incorporated in the Uniform Probate Code in 1990. A similar model in the divorce con-
text has also been outlined by Stephen Sugarman. See Sugarman, supra note 50, at 160-
63.
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computing the amount of the alimony award. Because the mari-
tal standard of living is the basis of marital support expecta-
tions, this traditional measure seems most appropriate. It will
not, of course, always be possible for both spouses to maintain
their former standard of living. Indeed, in the typical case it is
likely that the burden of dual households will require, if that
burden is equally apportioned, a significant diminution in the
standard of living of both. If it is not possible for both spouses
to maintain the marital standard of living, the alimony obliga-
tion should then serve the purpose of equalizing the post-divorce
standard of living. 55
CONCLUSION
The story of New York's equitable distribution law is one of
how good intentions, uninformed by an awareness of current
outcomes and codified in vague and uncertain directives, will
produce confused, inconsistent, and unexpected results. The law
was predicated on the assumption that divorced wives would
benefit from a property distribution law because husbands
owned the valuable property and wives thus failed to get more
than a small property share at divorce. For the typical divorcing
couple, both of these assumptions were erroneous: the average
husband's individual net worth was scarcely more than that of
his wife, and the typical wife already received half of the
couple's meager assets. The property distribution provisions of
the new statute thus failed to provide major benefits to divorced
wives. The alimony provisions of the new statute, which in vague
terms authorized short-term "rehabilitative" alimony, had a ma-
jor impact on divorced wives, however. But the dominant impact
did not fall on wives who were the intended candidates for
short-term alimony. Homemakers, the unemployed, and wives in
long marriages-all described in the statute's legislative history
as cases that should be treated as exceptions to the new, rehabil-
itative norm--saw their alimony prospects decline as much, or
more, than the alimony prospects of others. The statute's ambig-
uous language not only permitted this result, but produced
widespread variation in case outcomes as well. Like cases did not
3" For a similar approach to alimony computation, see CAIAFoR Ai SENATE TAsK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 332, at 42-53 (for marriages of long duration); Goldfarb,
supra note 41.
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receive like treatment.
We cannot expect a divorce law to resolve every social ill.
Divorce law will not cure the problem of women's economic ine-
quality, or reverse the current trend toward increased nuiAbers
of children living in poverty. Divorce law can, however, produce
consistent, predictable results which ensure children a standard
of living commensurate with that of both parents and which re-
flect contemporary notions of marital sharing and fairness. We
should settle for nothing less.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX TABLE 1
MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF INDIVIDUALLY OWNED ASSETS
AND DEBTS IN 1978 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY
GENDER OF SPOUSE
Asset Type Owned By
Wife Husband
Median Value (n) Median Value (n)
Automobiles $ 2,160 (110) $ 2,240 (215)
Business Assets $ 8,800 ( 1) $16,000 ( 47)
Household Goods $ 1,600 ( 49) $ 2,320 ( 52)
Jewelry $ 2,400 ( 49) $ 480 (13)
Liquid Assets
Bank Accounts $ 400 (253) $ 640 (265)
Other $ 1,840 ( 51) S 4,800 (113)
Nonliquid Assets
Pensions S 3,200 ( 5) $18,474 ( 21)
Other $ 824 ( 25) $ 1,216 ( 64)
Real Estate $18,933 ( 15) $24,936 ( 47)
Other Assets S 1,520 ( 32) $ 2,915 ( 77)
All Individual Assets $ 1,440 (301) $ 4,834 (301)
All Individual Debts $ 2,800 (63) $ 7,360 (64)
Individual Assets/
Total Family Assets 3% 20%
Individual Net Worth S 320 (301) S 1,552 (301)
Individual Net Worth/
Total Family Net Worth 1% 13%
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
VALUE ($1984) OF MARITAL PROPERTY REPORTED
BY COUPLES IN 1978 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE
Property Value Gross Value Net Worth
% Cumulative % % Cumulative %
(Negative value) (12) (12)
$0 -$4999 15 15 13 25
$5000-$9999 8 23 7 32
$10,000-$19,999 11 35 8 40
$20,000-$29,999 9 44 8 48
$30,000-$39,999 7 51 8 56
$40,000-$49,999 5 56 5 61
$50,000-$99,999 18 73 14 75
$100,000-$199,999 14 87 14 88
$200,000-$299,999 4 91 4 93
$300,000+ 9 100 7 100
Median $ 39,611 $ 34,070
Mean $126,601 $108,960
APPENDIX TABLE 3
OWNERSHIP AND MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF ASSETS
REPORTED BY 1978 CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY ASSET
TYPE
Asset Type
Owning
Median Value
Automobiles 79 $ 2,225
Business Assets 14 $ 9,950
Household Furniture 87 $ 3,000
Jewelry 20 $ 1,500
Liquid assets
Bank accounts 84 $ 1,200
Other 40 $ 4,600
Nonliquid assets
Pensions 11 $ 9,000
Other 25 $ 850
Marital Residence 61 $27,000
Other Real Estate 25 $20,000
Other Assets 36 $ 1,925
Spousal Debts 82 $ 3,650
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APPENDIX TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES OF DIVORCING COUPLES
IN CONSENSUAL CASE SAMPLE REPORTING ASSET
OWNERSHIP, BY ASSET TYPE AND YEAR
Asset Type 1978 1984
Automobiles 25 34
Businesses 2 4
Household Goods
& Furniture 40 34
Jewelry 1 2
Liquid Assets
Bank Accounts 19 21
Other 9 11
Nonliquid Assets
Pensions 2 4
Other 3 5
Marital Home 57 60
Other Real Estate 6 10
Other Assets 27 28
Debts 27 28
APPENDIX TABLE 5
PERCENTAGES OF DIVORCING COUPLES REPORTING
ASSET OWNERSHIP, BY ASSET TYPE AND RESEARCH
LOCATION
Asset Type AL' CA2  NY OH3
Automobiles 59 71 79 27
Business Assets 9 11 18 -
Household Goods & Furniture 72 89 83 49
Liquid Assets 48 61 85 13
Marital Residence 76 46 60 26
Other Real Estate 30 11 25 -
Pensions
Husband 54 24 15 25
Wife 33 11 5 2
* As reported by 1984 contested case sample.
Data on this asset was not provided for this research location.
I BAKa, supra note 42, at 6.
2 WErrzrtAN. supra note 4, at 62.
SSTERm ET Ai., supra note 46, at 105.
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APPENDIX TABLE 6
MEDIAN VALUE ($1984) OF DIVORCING COUPLES' ASSETS,
BY RESEARCH LOCATION
Asset Type AL 4  CA5  NY*
Automobiles 5,000 4,800 3,250
Businesses 30,000 47,840 29,750
Household Furnishings 5,000 4,800 4,000
Liquid Assets 6,250 2,880 1,393
Marital Residence 40,000 52,640 39,000
Other Real Estate 23,000 79,840 36,500
Husband Pension 27,000 4,800 20,390
Wife Pension 7,500 8,000 6,600
Other Assets 12,000 4,800 4,000
Marital Debts - 4,800 6,670
* As reported by 1984 contested case sample.
- Data on this asset type was not reported.
' BAKER, supra note 42, at 6.
- WErrzMAN, supra note 4, at 62 (Weitzman's values, in $1978, have been converted
to $1984 in the table).
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APPENDIX TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF NET MARITAL ASSETS, FOR COUPLES IN
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE WITH POSITIVE NET WORTH
(VALID GROUP) BY YEAR AND DISTRIBUTIONAL
ASSUMPTION, FOR ASSETS AND DEBTS WITH UNKNOWN
DISTRIBUTION
1978 1954
% %0
ASSUMPTION (see below)
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
(n=120) (n-104)
Majority to wife 47 46 46 47 48 38 42 45 46 48
Approximately equal 12* 12 13 13 14 26* 21 19 19 17
Majority to husband 42 43 41 40 38 37 37 36 35 35
Median % to wife 53 53 57 58 59 52 54 55 56 56
Average % to wife 55 55 57 58 58 50 53 54 55 54
50% or more to wife 52 52 53 54 56 54 57 57 59 60
Majority = More than 60%
Approximately equal = 40% to 60%
Average = Trimmed mean (most extreme 5% of cases eliminated)
ASSUMPTION 0 = Wife receives 0% of any asset with unknown distribution and 0%
of any asset with unknown valuation; wife receives 100% of any debt with unknown
distribution and 100% of any debt with unknown valuation. Value of assets and debts
with unknown valuation set at median value for that type.
ASSUMPTION 1 = Wife receives 0% of any asset with unknown distribution, 100% of
any debt with unknown distribution. Assets and debts with unknown valuation omitted
from analysis.
ASSUMPTION 2 = Wife receives 60% of any asset with unknown distribution, 33% of
debt with unknown distribution. Assets and debts with unknown valuation omitted from
analysis.
ASSUMPTION 3 = Wife receives 100% of any asset with unknown distribution, 0% of
debt with unknown distribution. Assets and debts with unknown valuation omitted from
analysis.
ASSUMPTION 4 = Wife receives 100% of any asset with unknown distribution and
100% of any asset with unknown value; 0% of any debt with unknown distribution, 0%
of any debt with unknown value. Value of assets or debts with unknown value fixed at
median value for that type.
* The difference between the 1978 and 1984 figures was significant at the .05 confidence
level or better.
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APPENDIX TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL ESTATE (THE SUM OF DEBTS
AND ASSETS) IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID
GROUP), BY YEAR AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ASSUMPTION,
FOR ASSETS AND DEBTS WITH UNKNOWN DISTRIBUTION
1978 1984
ASSUMPTION (see below)
0 1 2 3 4 0 1 2 3 4
(n=141) (n=134)
Majority to wife 47 47 47 48 48 36 43 43 46 48
Approximately equal 17* 18 19* 21 20 35* 29 33* 28 28
Majority to husband 36 35 34 31 32 29 28 24 26 25
Median % to wife 55 56 58 58 59 52 57 57 58 59
Average % to wife 53 54 54 55 56 51 54 54 56 56
50% or more to wife 53 55 57 57 59 57 63 63 64 67
Majority = More than 60%
Approximately equal = 40% to 59%
ASSUMPTION 0 = Wife receives 0% of any asset with unknown distribution and 0%
of any asset with unknown valuation; wife receives 100% of any debt with unknown
distribution and 100% of any debt with unknown valuation. Value of assets and debts
with unknown valuation set at median value for that type.
ASSUMPTION 1 = Wife receives 0% of any asset with unknown distribution, 100% of
any debt with unknown distribution. Assets and debts with unknown valuation omitted
from analysis.
ASSUMPTION 2 = Wife receives 60% of any asset with unknown distribution or value;
33% of any debt with unknown distribution or value. Assets and debts with unknown
valuation valued at median value for that type.
ASSUMPTION 3 = Wife receives 100% of any asset with unknown distribution, 0% of
any debt with unknown distribution. Assets and debts with unknown valuation omitted
from analysis.
ASSUMPTION 4 = Wife receives 100% of any asset with unknown distribution and
100% of any asset with unknown value; 0% of any debt with unknown distribution, 0%
of any debt with unknown value. Value of assets or debts with unknown value fixed at
median value for that type.
* The difference between the 1978 and 1984 figures was significant at the .05 confidence
level or better.
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APPENDIX TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF 1984 A GROUP, B GROUP, AND
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE BY SELECTED CASE
CHARACTERISTICS
Case A Group* B Group" Contested Group
Characteristic Mean/Median Mean/Median Mean/Median
(n) (n) (n)
Marital duration 12.9/11.3 14.6/13.3 14.2/13.1
(years) (55) (126) (303)
Wife's age 37.8/38.0 39.0/38.5 38.1/37.0
(years) (53) (126) (305)
Husband's age 40.3/41.0 41.6/40.0 40.8/40.0
(years) (52) (126) (305)
Husband's income 31/25 42.8/28.3 45/28
($1000's) (38) (83) (235)
Wife's income 12.0/10.5 11.4/10.4 11.3/10.2
($1000's) (45) (83) (276)
Wife's income/ 30/30 27/25 24/24
Family income (%) (30) (83) (205)
Alimony +
Child support 334/100 492/215 494/258
($ per month) (54) (129) (305)
Net worth 37.0/12.9 188/30.6 200/18.3
($1000's) (55) (83) (315)
% of wives 72% 73% 72%
employed (46) (118) (286)
% of husbands 90% 91% 93%
employed (52) (125) (295)
% of wives 26% 31% 30,%
awarded alimony (55) (134) (315)
% of wives 50% 51% 56%
awarded custody (54) (129) (299)
* A group = Cases with complete information on property & debts
** B group = Cases with complete information on property & debts plus cases vith no
more than one missing valuation and complete dispositional information on at least 90%
of marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts).
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APPENDIX TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF 1978 A GROUP, B GROUP, AND
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE, BY SELECTED CASE
CHARACTERISTICS
Case A Group* B Group" Contested Group
Characteristic Mean/Median Mean/Median Mean/Median
(n) (n) (n)
Marital duration 14.7/13.9- 15.7/15.0 14.5/12.9
(years) (74) (139) (299)
Wife's age 37.6/35.0 38.5/37.0 37.2/36.0
(years) (72) (133) (292)
Husband's age 41.1/40.0 41.9/41.0 40.3/39.0
(years) (73) (133) (295)
Husband's income 27/16 29.0/18.6 31.0/19.1
($1000's) (38) (83) (235)
Wife's income 5.6/4.2 5.5/3.0 6.2/5.3
($1000's) (62) (90) (270)
Wife's income/ 23/11 20/11 21/17
Family income (%) (51) (90) (231)
Alimony +
Child support 684/275 736/480 794/517
($ per month) (76) (141) (300)
Net Worth 37.9/3.2 66.5/20.8 68.0/21.3
($1000's) (76) (141) (301)
% of wives 66% 65% 64%
employed (62) (117) (265)
% of husbands 83% 87% 91%
employed (65) (126) (273)
.% of wives 46% 48% 46%
awarded alimony (76) (141) (301)
% of wives 60% 64% 66%
awarded custody (72) (132) (284)
* A group = Cases with complete information on property & debts
** B group = Cases with complete information on property & debts plus cases with no
more than one missing valuation and complete dispositional information on at least 90%
of marital estate (the sum of assets plus debts).
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APPENDIX TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NET WORTH IN
CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (CASES WITH POSITIVE NET
WORTH), BY YEAR
Wife's Percentage 1978 1934
% Cumulative % % Cumulative %(n=128) (n 116)
Less than 10% 20% 20% 23% 23%
10% -19% 6% 26% 5% 28%
20% - 29% 4% 30% 3% 31%
30% - 39% 12% 42% 4% 35%
40% - 49% 6% 48% 8% 44%
50% - 59% 7% 55% 10% 54%
60% - 69% 7% 62% 10% 64%
70% -79% 6% 68% 6% 70%
80% - 89% 4% 72% 5% 75%
90%+ 27% 100% 25% 25%
APPENDIX TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND MARITAL DURATION
Marital Duration Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0 - 9 years 47% 47% 51% (45) 74% 70% 64% (46)
10 - 19 years 57% 55% 53% (49) 50% 46% 51% (50)
20+ years 62% 64% 56% (45) 64% 55% 56% (37)
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APPENDIX TABLE 13
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND CUSTODY STATUS
Custody Status Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Wife sole 66% 65% 61% (84) 67% 59% 60% (66)
custody
Husband 39% 42% 44% (13) 40% 37% 35% (15)
custody*
No minor 43% 46% 45% (44) 64% 57% 54% (53)
children
*Includes joint or split custody
APPENDIX TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND WIFE'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS
Employment Status Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Employed 58% 57% 58% (76) 63% 58% 57% (86)
Unemployed 56% 59% 51% (41) 69% 58% 55% (32)
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APPENDIX TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND WIFE'S INCOME ($1984)
Wife's Income Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % 70
$0- $10,000 55% 59% 55% (65) 60% 56% 54% (52)
$10,000- 65% 65% 62% (37) 70% 60% 62% (43)
$1999
$20,000+ 56% 55% 53% (18) 65% 55% 51% (20)
APPENDIX TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND HUSBAND'S INCOME ($1984)
Husband's Income Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
$0- $20,000 51% 55% 52% (35) 58% 57% 53% (31)
$20,000- 52% 52% 51% (48) 60% 54% 52% (45)
$39,999
$40,000+ 54% 58% 55% (35) 52% 59% 50% (27)
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APPENDIX TABLE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND INCOME RATIO (WIFE'S INCOME/FAMILY
INCOME)
Wife's Income Ratio Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
0%- 9% 58% 61% 55% (45) 52% 48% 52% (27)
10%- 29% 46% 48% 52% (24) 62% 62% 58% (26)
30%- 49% 57% 53% 57% (21) 63% 54% 53% (19)
50%+ 64% 70% 58% (11) 67% 72% 64% (15)
APPENDIX TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE
(THE SUM OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS)
IN CONTESTED CASE SAMPLE (VALID GROUP),
BY YEAR AND ALIMONY STATUS
Alimony Status Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
Alimony 56% 57% 52% (68) 64% 59% 58% (42)
No Alimony 56% 56%' 57% (73) 62% 56% 54% (92)
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APPENDIX TABLE 19
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE (THE SUM
OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS) IN CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE (VALID GROUP), BY YEAR AND MARITAL FAULT
Divorce Judgment Against Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ 7% ,%
Husband 62% 60% 59% (94) 65% 58% 58% (90)
Wife 54% 56% 52% (24) 61% 60% 48% (33)
Both 35% 35% 42% (23) 55% 50% 52% (11)
APPENDIX TABLE 20
DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE (THE SUM
OF ASSETS PLUS DEBTS) IN CONTESTED CASE
SAMPLE (VALID GROUP), BY YEAR AND NET WORTH
($1984)
Net Worth Wife's Percentage Share
1978 1984
%Receiving Median Mean (n) %Receiving Median Mean (n)
50%+ % % 50%+ % %
(Negative) (76%) 65% 60% (21) (83%) (71%) 70% (30)
$0-$9999 50% 53% 71% (36) 65% 64% 58% (23)
$10,000-$39,999 62% 65% 60% (29) 60% 58% 50% (25)
$40,000-$99,999 69% 63% 61% (16) 67% 55% 53% (24)
$100,000-$149,999 65% 58% 62% (17) 44% 45% 43% ( 9)
$150,000+ 23% 38% 33% (22) 39% 42% 43% (23)
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APPENDIX TABLE 21
ALIMONY CORRELATIONS, BY YEAR
Variable Pearson's R=
(n)
P=1978 1984
Fault Judgment
Against Wife
Income
Husband
Wife
Wife's Income
Percentage
Legal Representation
Marital Duration
Marital Property
Home Ownership
Award of Home
Occupancy to Wife
Net Worth
Wife's Percentage
of Marital Estate
Spousal Age
Husband
Wife
-.1587
(599)
p=. 0 0 3
.1696
(252)
p=.003
-.2734
(248)
p=.000
-.3853
(231)
p-.000
.2762
(756)
p=.000
.3166
(906)
p-.000
.0989
(651)
p=.006
.0808
(416)
p=.050
.1097
(301)
p =.000
-.1038
(301)
p=.036
.2384
(295)
p=.000
.2748
(292)
p=.000
.0021
(652)
p =.479
.1077
(235)
p =.050
-.3725
(258)
p=.000
-.4510
(205)
p=. 0 00
.2708
(759)
p=.000
.2125
(937)
p=.000
-.0257
(651)
p-.263
.0921
(414)
p=.031
-.0340
(315)
p-. 27 4
-.0862
(312)
p-.064
-.0220
(305)
p=.351
.0371
(305)
p-.259
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